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The Religious Freedom Restoration Act:
Pushing the Limits of Legislative Power
Scott C. Idleman"
This Article explores the potential practical and constitutional barriers to the
success of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The author suggests that
the increasing secularization of contemporary legal culture is fundamentally
incompatible with the aspirations embodied in RFRA and may impede its implementa-
tion-particularly when invoked to protect nonmainstream religious practices. He also
reviews pre-Smith case law and the text of RFRA and argues that the inherently
manipulable language of the Act seeks to "restore" a doctrine that did not exist in the
first place, leaving substantial room for judges to interpret the statute restrictively.
The author raises two possible constitutional problems with RFRA. By protecting
only the free exercise of religion, RFRA may violate the Establishment Clause, either
on its face or as applied to a situation in which conduct is protected when motivated
by religious beliefbut not when motivated by secular concerns. The Act also raises the
constitutional question of the limits of Congress's power under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment; it is questionable whether Congress can override the Supreme
Court on the content of a basic constitutional right such as religious liberty.
Finally, the author examines the implications of RFRA forfurther development in
the area of religiousfreedom. Specifically, he argues that RFRA may have unforeseen
effects on the development of Establishment Clause jurisprudence and the unintended
consequence ofdiscouraging the protection of religious liberty through alternative legal
channels such as state law or the repudiation of existing constitutional doctrine.
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The passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Acte (RFRA) in
November of 1993 ostensibly marked a beneficial turning point in the
protection of religious liberty. Enacted in response to the widely
condemned Supreme Court case of Employment Division v. Smith,2 RFRA
was warmly received and intensely celebrated by a remarkably diverse
group of supporters-from secular liberals in the ACLU to religious
conservatives in the Traditional Values Coalition ? Indeed, not since the
1. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993)). RFRA passed in the Senate by a vote of 97 to
3, 139 CONG. REc. S14,770-71 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993), and in the House of Representatives by a
voice vote, 139 CONG. REc. H2363 (daily ed. May 11, 1993), and President Clinton signed it into law
on November 16, 1993, Peter Steinfels, Clinton SignsLaw Protecting Religious Practices, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 1993, at A18.
2. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the State of Oregon could constitutionally deny unemploy-
ment benefits to two members of the Native American Church who were terminated for ingesting
peyote in violation of state law, even though the ingestion of peyote was a principal sacrament of their
church).
3. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797Before the Subcomm.
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 65
(1992) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 2797] (statement of Nadine Strossen, President, National Board
of Directors, ACLU & Robert S. Peck, Legislative Counsel, ACLU) ("The ACLU strongly supports
[RFRA] because it restores religious liberty to its rightful place as a preferred value and fundamental
right within the American constitutional system."); Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 62 FoRDAm L. REv. 883, 895-96 (1994) [hereinafter Laycock, Free
Exercise] ("The bill was supported by a wall-to-wall coalition of religious and civil liberties groups,
including the ACLU, People for the American Way, the National Council of Churches, major Jewish
organizations, the National Association of Evangelicals, the Mormons, and some conservative religious
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anti-pornography movement of the 1980s, which witnessed the union of
radical feminists and religious fundamentalists, 4 had such unusual bed-
fellows emerged from the legislative process.
The object of their collective celebration was, of course, RFRA's
apparent revitalization of religious free exercise protection. Three years
prior, the majority in Smith effectively limited the vitality of constitutional
religious liberty to the Court's restrictive pattern of holdings over the
preceding decade,5 largely by recasting its strongest free exercise cases,
such as Sherbert v. Verner' and Wisconsin v. Yoder,7 as anomalies result-
ing from the unique legal and factual setting of each case.! In actuality,
the Sherbert and Yoder Courts had strictly scrutinized the governmental
actions in question, requiring the government in each case to demonstrate
a compelling interest before its infringement on religious liberty would be
upheld--with no mention of the proposition that strict scrutiny was else-
groups of which most ofyou have never heard."); Steinfels, supra note 1, at A18 (listing the "unusual
coalition of liberal, conservative, and religious groups" supporting RFRA).
4. See Nicholas Wolfson, Free Speech Theory and Hateful Words, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 32
(1991) (noting that radical feminists and religious fundamentalists formed an uneasy alliance to combat
pornography); Susan Elkin, Casenote, Taking Serious Value Seriously: Obscenity, Popev. Illinois, and
an Objective Standard, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 855, 858 & n.33 (1987) (mentioning that an Indianapolis
statute banning pornography was supported by the joint lobbying efforts of radical feminists and
religious fundamentalists).
5. This restrictive pattern of holdings includes Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (holding that the government could build a timber road through federal
land that was sacred to certain American Indians); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (holding that
the government could require an American Indian child to use a social security number despite her
parents' belief that the child's spirit would be robbed if she were assigned a number); Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (holding that the military could prohibit the wearing of a yarmulke
by an Orthodox Jewish officer); and United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (holding that the
government did not need to exempt the Old Order Amish from mandatory payment of social security
taxes, despite the Amish belief that such payments undermined religious duty).
6. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that the State of South Carolina could not constitutionally deny
unemployment benefits to a Seventh-day Adventist whose observance of Saturday as the Sabbath
prevented her acceptance of otherwise available employment); see also Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause proscribed the denial
of an award of unemployment benefits to an individual who lost her job after she converted to the
Seventh-day Adventist faith and refused to work on Saturdays); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707
(1981) (holding that the State of Indiana could not deny unemploymentbenefits to a Jehovah's Witness
who resigned from his job due to a religious belief prohibiting him from participating in the production
of weapons).
7. 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that Old Order Amish parents could not be compelled by a
criminal law to send their children to school beyond the eighth grade).
8. In Smith, the Court limited the application of the Sherbert test by noting that it had been used
to invalidate government action only in the context of the denial of unemployment benefits.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990). The Court also limited Yoder by distinguishing
it as a case that involved not only the Free Exercise Clause, but also the rights of parents to direct the
education of their children. Id. at 881.
9. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (announcing that "no showing merely of a rational relationship
to some colorable state interest would suffice" to prove a "compelling state interest" that "justifies the
substantial infringement of appellant's First Amendment right"); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 ("The essence
Texas Law Review [Vol. 73:247
where to be avoided.1" Nevertheless, Smith held categorically that strict
scrutiny should be invoked only when a governmental action is not neutral
or generally applicable," when the case involves a denial of unemploy-
ment benefits, as in Sherbert," or when the claimant asserts another
liberty, such as free speech or parental autonomy, in conjunction with the
free exercise claim, as in Yoder.13 In all other situations, the Smith Court
implied that the governmental action should be sustained as long as it is
minimally rational. 4
In direct response to Smith, RFRA purports to restore the compelling
interest test invoked in Sherbert and Yoder as the standard in all cases in
which a claimant's religious conduct is substantially burdened. 5 Section
Three of the Act reads:
of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those [state] interests of the highest order
and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.").
10. Of course, the writing had been on the wall for the last decade. See supra note 5. Many have
noted that Smith was the culmination of an identifiable movement of the Court away from the protec-
tions afforded in Sherbert and Yoder. See Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law
Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1, 53 (1993) [hereinafter Lupu, Statutes] (noting that "the Smith decision was
not entirely a surprise" because "f]he Court had been tending strongly against the favorable treatment
of Free Exercise claims for some years"); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of
Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 302 (1992) (noting that prior to Smith, the
Supreme Court had honored the compelling interest requirement "more in the breach than in the
observance"); James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic
Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1416 (1992) ("The Smith decision undoubtedly completed the
Court's gutting of the Free Exercise clause, but it seems clear that the clause had already been hollowed
by the Court before Smith.").
11. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79 (interpreting the Free Exercise Clause in a way that would allow
the exercise of religion to be hindered by a generally applicable law as long as the hindrance is
incidental); see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217,2233-34
(1993) (invalidating four municipal ordinances that were facially and intentionally discriminatory).
12. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883-84.
13. Id. at 881-82.
14. Rationality is the default level of internal integrity, and thus judicial scrutiny, that govern-
mental actions must satisfy as a matter of constitutional due process. The Smith Court does not
expressly fall back on a rationality requirement, but it is implicit in the Court's mandate that the neutral
and generally applicable statute at issue be "consistent with the Federal Constitution." Id. at 876.
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a) (Supp. V 1993) ("[The compelling interest requirement] applies
to all Federal and State law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and
whether adopted before or after November 16, 1993."). The Act's language suggests that it is fully
retroactive, although the decisions thus far are not consistent on this point. Compare Brown-El v.
Harris, 26 F.3d 68, 69 (8th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that RFRA applies retroactively) with Moses v.
Diocese, 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993) (declining to apply RFRA retroactively when doing so could have
altered the disposition of the case), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2153 (1994). Indeed, several religious
liberty decisions making no mention of RFRA have been handed down subsequent to its enactment,
although this is presumably the result of attorney negligence. See, e.g., First Assembly of God, Inc.
v. Collier County, 27 F.3d 526, 526 (11th Cir.) (modifying its earlier opinion with the rather under-
stated observation that "the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 may apply to this case," but
declining to discuss the Act "since it was not raised by either party"), modfying 20 F.3d 419 (1 1th Cir.
1994), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3388 (U.S. Nov. 15, 1994) (No. 94-791).
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(a) In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise
of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general appli-
cability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person-
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest. 6
By enacting RFRA, Congress has therefore essentially "create[d] a statu-
tory right where the Court declined to create a constitutional right."17 In
fact, RFRA not only "restores" pre-Smith doctrine; it effectively endows
the protection of religious liberty with a vigor that one would be hard-
pressed to discern in all but a handful of the Court's opinions. In so
doing, the Act provides ample reason for advocates of religious liberty to
celebrate, extending the promise of freedom to all religious people, espe-
cially those of nonmainstream faiths, whom the Court effectively abandon-
ed three years earlier.
Before tolling the bell of religious liberty too heartily, however,
proponents of RFRA must face the sobering possibility that the Act may
not be what it seems and that its textual promise of robust religious free-
dom may ultimately ring hollow. Indeed, before proceeding with abandon
to refuse to pay social security taxes18 or to ingest sacramental peyote,19
we must recognize that serious obstacles may stand in the way of turning
RFRA's promise into reality. This three-part Article examines several of
these potential problems, ranging from the strictly legal question of the
Act's constitutionality to the more subtle and intractable problem of its
ultimate inefficacy. Part I begins by explaining why our current culture,
the existing body of free exercise doctrine, and the language of RFRA,
when viewed in concert, strongly indicate that the Act will be interpreted
more narrowly by the courts than the Act's proponents have thus far sug-
gested. Part II then examines the issue of RFRA's constitutionality, both
in relation to the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and in
relation to the power of Congress under Section Five of the Fourteenth
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a), (b) (Supp. V 1993).
17. Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 13.Y.U. L. REV. 221, 246
[hereinafter Laycock, RFRA].
18. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (holding that the government did not need
to exempt the Old Order Amish from mandatory payment of social security taxes).
19. This was the conduct at issue in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874-75 (1990).
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Amendment. Finally, Part III addresses two additional problems-one
concerning the interpretive interplay between RFRA and the Establishment
Clause, and the other concerning the potential independent drawbacks
associated with codifying religious liberty.
There are two purposes to this Article, one narrow and one broad.
The narrow purpose is to evaluate RFRA, including its constitutionality,
and to explain why we should not be surprised if the jurisprudence of
religious freedom is not substantially transformed by its application. The
broad purpose, by comparison, is to highlight the larger, age-old problem
of incongruity between the dictates of positive law and the mores and
culture of the people whom the law is designed to govern." Taken
together, these analyses reveal that the limits of legislative power can be
both stark and subtle-stemming not only from the written commands of
the Constitution, but also from the unstated beliefs and deep commitments
that define the contours, and mark the edges, of our legal culture.
From a personal standpoint, I would like to believe that my observa-
tions and estimations in this regard are incorrect, for I am quite certain that
Smith was unsoundly reasoned, and I fully support RFRA, at least in prin-
ciple.21 To the extent that such a stance is less than congruent with the
reality of our present situation, however, it seems to me that we are
obliged to confront and to expose, not to evade, the manifold forces that
have brought that situation about and the various obstacles that may lie in
the path of the Act's implementation. Indeed, should the reader happen to
detect a systematically adversarial, even cynical, orientation to this Article,
it is only because my positions are in large part responses to the equally
imbalanced idealism of those who have thus far represented RFRA to the
legal community and the public. In this respect, my Article is essentially
the other half of the dialectic-the missing brief, if you willF-in our
20. This problem can be conceptualized and addressed from any number of perspectives.
Professor William Fisher, for example, has noted "a tradition emphasizing the limited power of the
positive law and the degree to which it must and should track customs and popular understandings-a
tradition whose most insightful exponent was David Hume." William W. Fisher i, Reconstructing
the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1659, 1692 (1988) (citing DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF
HUMAN NATuRE 1739-1740, at 484-513 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1975)); see also Oliver W. Holmes,
The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458-64 (1897) (discussing the limits of law, particularly
the distinction between law and morality), cited in Fisher, supra, at 1692 n.163. See generally THE
LIMITs OF LAW (J. Roland Pennock&John W. Chapman eds., 1974) (containing a collectionof essays
that explore the practical and ethical limits of laws, particularly laws that seek to influence behavior
contrary to deep-seated values).
21. See Scott C. Idleman, The Sacred, the Profane, and the Instrunenal: Valuing Religion in the
Culture of Disbelief, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1313, 1372 (1994) (reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE
CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMmCAN LAW AND PoLmcs TRIVIALE RELIGIoUs DEVOTION
(1993)) (advocating that a compelling interest standard should be imposed upon governmental actions
that interfere with the religious free exercise of citizens).
22. Couching the matter in the discourse of litigation is no rhetorical ploy; the Act's constitutional
validity was being challenged in at least seven cases as of the time of this writing. See Responding to
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collective effort to understand and characterize RFRA and to place it within
our present and future legal order. My purpose, in the end, is simply to
inject a necessary measure of skepticism, and yes, perhaps even a bit of
devil's advocacy, into that enterprise.?
I. Cultural and Doctrinal Limits
In addition to its substance, RFRA is notable for the use of the word
"restoration" in its title. The basic idea-as indicated in Section Two of
the Act-is that RFRA is intended to "restore the compelling interest test
as set forth in [Sherbert and Yoder] and to guarantee its application in all
cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened."' From
Constitutional Challenges, Diverse Coalition Launches Defense of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, U.S. Newswire, Aug. 19, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (discussing
six cases challenging RFRA's constitutionality in various federal district courts in New York). The
seventh case, Cochran v. Morris, No. 94-6014 (4th Cir. 1994), is pending in the Fourth Circuit.
To date, three cases concerning the scope and application of RFRA have been presented to the
Supreme Court, but the Court has declined review in all three. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights
Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994); Ramona Convent of the Holy
Names v. Alhambra, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 140 (Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 315 (1994);
Association of Christian Academies & Colleges v. Puerto Rico Dep't of Educ., 94 I.T.S. 16 (P.R.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 92 (1994). Although interpreting denials of certiorari is always a risky
endeavor, it may be that the Court would prefer not to rule on the substantive merits of any RFRA
claims until after it has resolved the question of the Act's constitutionality.
23. Other critiques of the Act, developed from a remarkably diverse range of perspectives, are
gradually surfacing in the law reviews. See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act: The Constitutional Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MONT. L. Rnv.
(forthcoming Winter 1995); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious
Freedom Act Is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 1995) (manuscript at 64, on file
with the Texas Law Review) (arguing that RFRA "is a uniquely sweeping, and constitutionally
corrosive, instance of legislative favoritism for religion" and, in the final analysis, is unconstitutional);
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional
Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHt. L. R V. 1245, 1306, 1306-11 (1994) (noting
several potential problems with the Act, including its possible unconstitutionality, and concluding that
"[i]t is a clumsy and misguided response to the failings of Smith"); Stanley Ingber, Judging Wthout
Judgment: Constitutional Irrelevancies and the Demise ofDialogue, 46 RuTOERS L. REV. 1473, 1665-
73 (1994) (cataloging various constitutional and interpretive difficulties associated with RFRA); Lupu,
Statutes, supra note 10, at 55-66 (predicting that RFRA's rigorous standard of review may cause courts
to employ a less stringent version of the "less restrictive means" test); Ira C. Lupu, The Congress, the
Courts, and Religious Liberty: The Uneasy Case for a Limiting Construction of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 56 MoNT. L. REV. (forthcoming Winter 1995) [hereinafter Lupu, Uneasy Case];
Wlliam P. Marshall, The Religious Freedom RestorationAct: Establishment, Speech, and Free Exercise
Concerns, 56 MONT. L. REV. (forthcoming Winter 1995); Ryan, supra note 10, at 1412 (arguing prior
to the Act's passagethat "enacting RFRA in order to reestablish the compelling interest test is a largely
futile endeavor"); David M. Smolin, The Free Exercise Clause, the Religious Freedom RestorationAct,
and the Right to Active and Passive Euthanasia, 10 IssuEs L. & MED. 3, 8 (1994) (arguing that the
'application of RFRA would make relatively little difference to most euthanasia-related issues");
Luralene D. Tapahe, Comment, After the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Still No Equal Protection
for First American Worshipers, 24 N.M. L. REv. 331, 332 (1994) (arguing that "the effect of RFRA
in protecting Indian religious freedom is dubious").
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993) (citations omitted).
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a doctrinal and practical standpoint, however, the idea of restoration is
utterly problematic, for RFRA seeks to establish a protective legal frame-
work that may never have truly existed-hence it cannot be "restored"'-
and ventures to do so amidst a legal and political culture that may be
fundamentally incapable of implementing it. Not the least of the obstacles
facing RFRA, therefore, is the potential incongruity between its positive
commands and the cultural and doctrinal world into which Congress has
placed it.
In order to expose this incongruity and then evaluate its consequences,
this Part is divided into two subparts. Subpart A will examine the cultural
context within which the meaning of RFRA will unfold over the coming
years. Unfortunately, the nature of this context creates a significant
likelihood that RFRA may be interpreted narrowly, regardless of its spe-
cific language, and that as a result, religious liberty before and after RFRA
may not be substantially dissimilar. Subpart B will then examine the actual
language of RFRA and the nature of existing case law to demonstrate that
the risk of narrow interpretation is significantly heightened because of the
pliability and indeterminate quality of these interpretive sources. Ulti-
mately, I suggest that the future of religious liberty following RFRA will
turn not so much on the commands of the Act as it will on the predisposi-
tion of those charged with its interpretation. Given the nature of that
predisposition-as evidenced by the culture that produced Smith and by the
pre-Smith case law-that future may be significantly less favorable than
RFRA's advocates have thus far acknowledged.
A. The Cultural Context
In the late summer of 1993, just a few months prior to the passage of
RFRA, Professor Stephen Carter's The Culture of Disbelief entered the
marketplace of ideas and quickly became the subject of considerable dis-
cussion and debate.' Carter's principal thesis is actually quite simple.
25. See Lupu, Statutes, supra note 10, at 62 ("[RFRA] cannot fairly be construed as designed to
restore Free Exercise Clause doctrine as of Smith's eve.... The Act restores religious freedom, but
that freedom is of a variety far more potent than most of the pre-Smith case law would support."); id.
at 55, 54-55 (suggesting that RFRA "barely fits its name").
26. CARTER, supra note 21.
27. See Sanford Levinson, The Multicultures of Belief and Disbelief, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1873,
1873 (1994) (book review) ("Surely no recent book written by a law professor has received more
reviews and has been more the subject of discussion in the general media than has Professor
Carter's."); Joan Beck, We Should Give Up Trying to Ignore the Value of Religion, CHI. TRiB., Oct.
7, 1993, § 1, at 31 (book review); Michael Kinsley, Maryr Complex, NEW REPUBLIc, Sept. 13, 1993,
at 4 (book review); Jonathan Kirsch, A Spirited Plea for Religious Tolerance, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 17,
1993, at E3 (book review); Thomas Morawetz, The Soul of the Matter, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1993,
Book World, at 8 (book review); Paul Reidinger, Keeping the Faith, 79 A.B.A. J., Oct. 1993, at 114
(book review) (all discussing The Culture of Disbelief). Not surprisingly, Carter has received a
[Vol. 73:247
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In essence, he contends that our contemporary legal and political regime
trivializes the pursuit of religious faith and practice, causing us "to belittle
religious devotion, to humiliate believers, and, even if indirectly, to
discourage religion as a serious activity."' Whether through the words
and deeds of the media,' the educational community,' or even the Su-
preme Court,31 there has emerged over the last few decades a "common
rhetoric that refuses to accept the notion that rational, public-spirited people
can take religion seriously."32 Carter is not alone in his cultural
indictment. Several others have observed not only the trivialization of
religion,33 but also disparate treatment of religious and nonreligious
viewpoints' and even hostility toward the presence of religion in law and
politics and toward the beliefs and practices of religious people. 35
number of awards for The Culture of Disbelief, including the prestigious Grawemeyer Award, never
before bestowed upon a non-theologian. Law Professor Wins Theology Award for Book on Religion
in Public Life, L.A. TIME, May 7, 1994, at B4; see also ABA Announces Media Winners in Gavel
Awards Competition, P.R. Newswire, July 8, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File
(noting Carter's receipt of a Certificate of Merit for the book).
President Clinton publicly touted Carter's treatise several times, see Larry Witham, Clinton's
Religious View of His Job: The Bully Pulpit for a 'Ministry, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1993, at Al
(reporting Clinton's recommendation of the book to a group of religious leaders at a White House
breakfast), and in fact, there now hangs in the Yale Law School a portrait of Clinton holding the book
in his right hand, Ronald A. Taylor, Clintons Return to Yale for Celebration of Triumph, WASH.
TiMES, Oct. 10, 1993, at A4.
28. CARTER, supra note 21, at 16.
29. See, e.g., id. at 24-26 (criticizing the media for comparing the "religious right" at the 1992
Republican Convention to the Salem witch hunters).
30. See, e.g., id. at 157-82 (arguing that proponents of teaching creation science in public schools
are characterized as "irrational" and "fanatical" because their viewpoint is motivated by their religious
beliefs).
31. See, e.g., id. at 126-32, 141-43,269 (discussing recent Supreme Court decisions that, Carter
argues, treat the religious practice in question "as a hobby-something sufficiently trivial that competing
state interests can readily override it").
32. Id. at 6.
33. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, 'God Is Dead and We Have Killed Him!': Freedom of
Religion in the Post-ModernAge, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 163, 165-66 [hereinafterMcConnell, Freedom
of Religion] (discussing the privatization and marginalization of religion).
34. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE LJ.
1611, 1613 (1993) (expressly advocating disparate treatment of religious and nonreligious viewpoints
in the legislative process).
35. See, e.g., STEPHEN V. MONSMA, PosTvE NEUTRALrry: LETriNa RELmous FREEDOM RING
68-73 (1993) (arguing that "among some influential segments of the population, there is a very real
antireligious strain," and that this strain is directed towards "religions whose adherents take their faith
seriously as an authoritative, literal force in their lives'); Frederick M. Gedicks, Public Life and
Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REv. 671, 671-72 & nn.1-5 (1992) (declaring that many commentators
"have contended that American politics and public life are hostile to religion" and offering several
specific examples); Richard J. Neuhaus, A New Order ofReigious Freedom, 60 GEO. WAH. L. REV.
620, 623-24 (1992) (contending that "secularized elites in our universities and courts" seek to separate
religion from public life); R. Randall Rainey, Law and Religion: Is Reconciliation Still Possible?, 27
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 147, 150-51 (1993) (arguing that there is an "antireigious bias that is deeply wary
of religion and that tends to tolerate, if not advocate, its public marginalization').
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To the extent that Carter and others are correct, there should be
serious concern that RFRA may fall on deaf ears. After all, how seriously
can a "culture of disbelief" respond to a directive, legislative or otherwise,
that the practices of religious people merit enhanced protection, particularly
when many of those practices may appear to generate little social value and
potentially great social harm? Even more troubling is the possibility that
Carter and these other authors have exposed merely the surface of a much
larger complex of historical, social, and philosophical phenomena con-
cerning the place of religion in contemporary culture, phenomena that call
into question the operative premise of RFRA-that positive law will be
enough to "restore" religious liberty. It may be, in other words, that the
tenor and substance of RFRA are fundamentally incongruent with the
underlying forces, and not simply with the passing temperament, of our
contemporary culture.36
What are these phenomena or forces? Without purporting to catalog
them exhaustively, I believe we can discern at least three chief causes of
the political and legal marginalization of religion over the last several
decades. First and foremost has been the intellectual delegitimation-the
mythologification-of religiously based claims of truth or meaning.37 By
this, I mean not simply fundamentalist religious paradigms or deviant rel-
igious beliefs, but virtually any worldview that does not rest principally on
36. There is no conflict, moreover, between either the overwhelming congressional support
exhibited at the passage ofRFRA or the multiplicity of organizations backing the Act, on the one hand,
and this Article's suggestion, on the other hand, that our legal and political culture may be less than
enthusiastic about the Act's commands. For one thing, the congressional display of support transpired
within an inherently political context, and often it is simply a mistake to take such political activities
at face value. This is particularly true in the case of RFRA, given the enormous potential gap between
one's capacity to express a strong, even absolute, commitment to free exercise in the abstract-who,
after all, would declare on C-SPAN that he or she is against "religious freedom"?-and one's willing-
ness to adhere to that same commitment when faced with particular factual scenarios, such as claims
by inmates that potentially threaten prison security, David E. Anderson, MY. Prisoners Put New
Religious Freedom Law on Trial, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 9, 1994, at N9; or a claim by an Indian that he
needs to kill endangered species for their feathers, Marc Peyser & Sonya Zalubowski, Between a Wimg
and a Prayer, NEwSWEEK, Sept. 19, 1994, at 58; or a claim by parents that their seriously ill child
ought to receive spiritual healing in lieu of conventional medical treatment, Walker v. Superior Court,
763 P.2d 852, 869-71 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989). As for the multiplicity of
groups, their unity is clearly noteworthy, but surely their collective advocacy is no more significant (at
least in terms of estimating the ultimate interpretation of the Act) than that of any other set of lobbyists
and special interests backing a particular piece of legislation. Finally, and by no means insignificantly,
we must not forget that the final interpreters of RFRA will not be legislators speaking in the abstract,
but rather judges dealing with the concreteness of genuine cases and controversies. In turn, if one
believes, as I do, that both the purposes and the composition of the (federal) judiciary are meaningfully
different from those of Congress, then one may also believe, as I do, that determinations about some
vast national commitment to religious freedom may have little to say about thejudiciay's ultimate treat-
ment of the Act.
37. See generally Rainey, supra note 35, at 151-59 (tracing the estrangement of law and religion
in part to various intellectual and philosophical traditions over the past two centuries).
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the pillars of experience and material rationality.38 In recent years, this
philosophical dimension has assumed a particularly aggravating quality with
the emergence of postmodernism, which emphasizes the cultural and tem-
poral contingency of all, or at least all but its own, ethical and ontological
claims.39 The second cause of religion's marginalization has been the
substantial displacement of religious institutions by the government as the
primary locus or provider of human welfare, social meaning, and educa-
tion." This phenomenon has necessarily engendered both a societal
devaluation of religion and an ever-increasing commitment to achieving the
progressive ends-the compelling interests-of the state. The third and
final phenomenon underlying the marginalization of religion, which is
closely related to these first two phenomena, has been the joint transforma-
tion of law and politics from overtly and deliberately moralistic affairs into
essentially instrumentalist, utilitarian enterprises." According to Harold
Berman,
Within the past two generations the public philosophy of Amer-
ica has shifted radically from a religious to a secular theory of law,
from a moral to a political or instrumental theory .... Rarely, if
ever, does one hear it said that law is a reflection of an objective
justice or of the ultimate meaning or purpose of life. Usually it is
thought to reflect, at best, the community's sense of what is use-
ful. 42
As a result, the relationship between religion and legal and political culture
has become increasingly attenuated, and the place of religious claims in the
scheme of governance and social order has devolved to the point that such
claims are basically outside the realm of reasonable or relevant considera-
tion.
38. See, e.g., KENT GRmAWALT, RELIGIous CONVICTIONS AND PoLIcIAL CHOICE 6 (1988)
("A good many professors and other intellectuals display a hostility or skeptical indifference to religion
that amounts to a thinly disguised contempt for belief in any reality beyond that discoverable by
scientific inquiry and ordinary human experience."); Richard H. Hiers, Normative Analysis in Judicial
Determination of Public Policy, 3 J.L. & RELIGION 77, 77 n.2 (1985) ("Generally... legal philoso-
phers, like many other western intellectuals since the Enlightenment, tend to view religion as supersti-
tion, and faith as a poor substitute for reason and logic.").
39. See generally McConnell, Freedom of Religion, supra note 33, at 18 1-88 (discussing the nature
and consequences of postmodernism in regard to religious freedom).
40. See Harold J. Berman, Religious Freedom and the Challenge of the Modern State, in ARTICLES
OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE 40, 48-50 (James D. Hunter & Os'Guinness eds., 1990) [hereinafter
ARTICLES OF FAITH] (observing that in the 20th century, the roles of religion and government have
reversed, and now the government is the main provider of social services relating, inter alia, to educa-
tion, health care, and poverty); McConnell, Freedom of Religion, supra note 33, at 177-81 (lamenting
the increasing role of government in previously private spheres and its influence on religion).
41. See generally ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTAuSM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY
(1982) (charting the emergence and influence of "pragmatic instrumentalism" on legal thought).
42. Harold 3. Berman, Religion and Law: The First Amendment in Historical Perspective, 35
EMORY LJ. 777, 789 (1986).
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These changes have accompanied a gradual and pervasive commitment
to civil secularism that sometimes verges on being ideological in its
strength-surely it has far exceeded the First Amendment's command
against religious establishments'-as well as a corollary, almost anti-
pathetic view towards religious claims within or against the civil order.
The traditional perspective towards nonmainstream religious claims was,
broadly speaking, essentially one of theological judgment. The Mormons
could not practice plural marriage, for example, because at some level it
was simply deemed to be morally wrong and theologically misguided."
This was doubtless the case with unabashedly religious laws, such as those
prohibiting blasphemy or the telling of fortunes. Today, by contrast,
the perspective towards religious claims of any sort (although most litigated
claims arise from nonmainstream religions) is essentially one of rational-
istic, social, and political discreditation-hence the Amish must pay social
security taxes because it is simply necessary for "the common good."'
Or, in the somewhat callous words of the Court, "[tihe government's
ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful
conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, 'cannot
depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious
objector's spiritual development. "'47
As for the desirability or undesirability of these phenomena and their
cultural consequences, reasonable people may differ in their assessment.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
.... "). Professor Steven Smith, for one, concludes that the contemporary aversion to reliance on
religious views or ways of understanding has undermined the entire enterprise of religious liberty.
Steven D. Smith, The Rise andFall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 149 (1991). As a consequence, "there is at present no intelligent constitutional commitment to
religious freedom." Id. at 150.
44. See, e.g., Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333,341-42 (1890) ("Bigamy and polygamy are crimes
by the laws of all civilized and Christian countries .... To call their advocacy a tenet of religion is
to offend the common sense of mankind."); id. at 343 ("Probably never before in the history of this
country has it been seriously contended that the whole punitihe power of the government for acts,
recognized by the general consent of the Christian world in modern times as proper matters for prohibi-
tory legislation, must be suspended in order that the tenets of a religious sect encouraging crime may
be carried out without hindrance."). See generally Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free
Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1106,
1124-29 (1994) (discussing the historical criminalization of polygamy despite claims by some Mormons
that such criminalization interfered with their religious practice).
45. See generally WILuAM G. TORpI'Y, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIcIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERICA
59-63 (1948) (describing several laws grounded in religion, such as prohibitions against blasphemy and
fortune telling).
46. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982). "Because the broad public interest in
maintaining a sound tax system is of such a high order, religious belief in conflict with the payment
of taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax." Id. at 260.
47. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988)).
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As for the likelihood, however, that these phenomena will exert an
enormous and potentially adverse influence on the protection of religious
liberty-and more narrowly on the implementation of RFRA-this is unde-
niable. For if these truly are the defining phenomena of our collective
approach to religion, and insofar as Carter and others are correct in their
depiction of contemporary law and politics, then RFRA's most difficult
obstacle may not be legal or administrative as such, but simply the prospect
of being interpreted and implemented by a culture that is unable or unwill-
ing to take seriously the Act's elemental substance and purpose. To some
extent, albeit a very limited one, RFRA will effectively be to our legal and
political institutions today what the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments49 and the Civil Rights Acts' were to many states in the decades
following the Civil War,"1 or what the Eighteenth Amendmen 2 and the
Volstead Act 3 were to the United States of the 1920s -- a statement of
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
49. Id. amend. XV, § 1.
50. Civil Rights Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-
1982 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) (providing for equality under the laws for all citizens regardless of
race); Civil Rights Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-
1982 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) (enforcing the right of citizens of the United States to vote regardless
of their race); Civil Rights Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (repealed 1894) (amending Act
of May 31, 1870 to provide sanctions for those who interfere with the rights of others to vote); Civil
Rights Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985-1986 (1988))
(establishing civil actions for victims of racial discrimination against those who deprive them of their
rights to equal treatment under the 14th Amendment); Civil Rights Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18
Stat. 335 (providing for nondiscriminatory equal access to inns, public conveyances, theaters, and
common carriers). Sections One and Two of the Civil Rights Act of March 1, 1875 were declared
unconstitutional in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), Sections Three and Four were repealed,
ch. 645, § 21, 62 Stat. 862 (1948), and Section Five was eliminated, 42 U.S.C. § 1984 (1988),
51. See DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 534-40 (3d ed. 1992)
(describing how various societal and governmental institutions vehemently resisted equal treatment for
blacks). In turn, the Supreme Court did relatively little to assist in the full enforcement of the
reconstruction amendments. See id. at 41-43, 45-46, 112-16 (discussing the decisions in Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which upheld legislation requiring railroads to segregate their
passengers by race, and the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), which invalidated the Civil Rights
Act of 1875 insofar as it prohibited racial discrimination by private parties in the provision of public
accommodations); HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW:
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1835-1875, at 486-506 (1982) (discussing the Supreme Court's
narrow interpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments during the period following the Civil War).
As one commentator has noted, "ft]he decision in the Civil Rights Cases was an important stimulus to
the enactment of segregation statutes. It gave the assurance the South wanted that the federal govern-
ment would not intervene to protect the civil rights of Negroes." John H. Franklin, History of Racial
Segregation in the United States, 304 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 1, 6, 5-6 (1956).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1, repealed by U.S. CONS17. amend. XXI.
53. Ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919) (prohibiting the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages).
54. See Marie-Andree Bertrand, Creation of an International Anti-Prohibitionist League in the
Field of Drugs, 18 HOFSrRA L. REV. 881, 885 & n.22 (1990) (discussing the failure of the 18th
Amendment based on empirical data revealing an increase in alcohol consumption following its
statutory enforcement).
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aspirations that is substantially incongruent with the beliefs and interests of
those who must implement and obey its directives.5' Indeed, the very
same reasons that many argued that RFRA was necessary-because govern-
mental actors are seldom mindful of the needs of religious citizens56 and
because the Court has decided that religious liberty no longer merits
meaningful constitutional protection57 -call into question the efficacy of
RFRA once in the hands of judges, let alone the faceless governmental
actors who are charged with administering the state."
Without belaboring the point, it might be helpful to deviate for a
moment and consider yet another recent legislative experiment-one also
involving a conflict between the dictates of Congress (in this case through
a judicial agency) and the perceptions and culture of the bench. Specifi-
cally, I am referring to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines59 and the
related scheme of mandatory minimum sentencing. Prompted by concerns
about disparate and excessively lenient sentencing,'o Congress passed the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,1 which created a United States Sentenc-
ing Commission empowered with the authority to promulgate mandatory
guidelines for sentencing in federal cases.62 Despite the celebration and
55. Let me be perfectly clear. I am not equating our current situation vis-a-vis religious liberty
to that of post-Civil War culture vis-a-vis equal rights, either in terms of degree or in terms of moral
character. That would be absurd, not to mention pessimistic. Rather, my point is simply that positive
law and culture may frequently diverge-as so starkly illustrated by the post-Civil War situation-and
that such a divergence to some extent characterizes RFRA as well.
56. Cf. Laycock, RFRA, supra note 17, at 222-28 (detailing the historical and contemporary threats
to religious liberty presented by generally applicable laws).
57. The Smith Court expressly characterized the pre-Smith doctrine of subjecting virtually all
governmental actions that burdened free exercise to strict scrutiny as a "luxury" that we as "'a
cosmopolitan nation' . . . cannot afford," Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990)
(quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)), and suggested that religious claimants
seeking relief from generally applicable laws will be sufficiently protected by periodic dispensations
of legislative grace:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a
relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that
unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in
which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance
of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.
Id. at 890.
58. As Professor Laycock notes, "[t]here is no government bureaucrat in America who doesn't
believe that his program serves a compelling interest in every application." Laycock, Free Exercise,
supra note 3, at 901.
59. The guidelines are reproduced in UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (West 1994) [hereinafter GUIDELINES MANUAL].
60. See, e.g., Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: 7he New Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 883 (1990) (describing the sentencing guidelines as
designed "to attack the tripartite problems of disparity, dishonesty, and.., excessive leniency").
61. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended at scattered sections of Titles
5, 18, 21, 26, 28, 29, 49, and 50 of U.S.C.).
62. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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praise by the guidelines' proponents,'s however, the guidelines have been
received quite poorly by federal judges-the very people charged with their
ultimate implementation.' In the somewhat tart words of Jos6 Cabranes,
a widely respected federal circuit judge, "the Sentencing Guidelines system
is a failure-a dismal failure, a fact well known and fully understood by
virtually everyone who is associated with the federal justice system."'
Not surprisingly, judges have developed a tendency over the last several
years to exercise their remaining discretion and to creatively depart from
the otherwise mandatory sentencing requirements-sometimes on the basis
of extra-enumerated grounds.' RFRA is, of course, significantly dif-
ferent from the Sentencing Reform Act not only in terms of subject matter,
but also and especially in terms of the dimension of judicial discretion-the
development of mandatory sentencing guidelines is a direct assault on the
63. See Marvin E. Frankel, Sentencing Guidelines: A Needfor Creative Collaboration, 101 YALE
L.J. 2043, 2049-51 (1992) (defending the federal sentencing guidelines by claiming that they are
preferable to the unguided discretion of judges); A. David Mazzone, Conference on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Summary of Proceedings, 101 YALE L.J. 2053, 2058-59 (1992) (claiming that
the sentencing guidelines are fair and rational); William W. Wilkins, Jr., The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Striking anAppropriate Balance, 25U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 571,583 (1992) ('Theguidelines
are the core of a new federal sentencing system that is more honest, fair, and certain than the [pre-
guidelines] system.. ").
64. See Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on
the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE LJ. 1681, 1719-20 (1992) (detailing the federal judges' severe
opposition to the sentencing guidelines based on the guidelines' complexity, unfairness, and usurpation
of the judicial function); David Margolick, Full Spectrum of Judicial Critics Assail Prison Sentencing
Guidelines, N.Y. THMEs, Apr. 12, 1992, at Al (reporting that judges of all ideological stripes agree
that the guidelines have imposed "a foolish and illusory consistency," which has "become the hobgoblin
of the federal courts"); Eric Schlosser, Marijuana and the Law, ATLANTIc MONTHLY, Sept. 1994, at
84, 93-94 (stating that many judges resent being reduced from "impartial arbiters" to "adding
machines" by the mandatory guidelines); Bruce M. Selya & John C. Massaro, The Illustrative Role of
SubstantialAssistance Departures in Combatting Ultra-Uniformity, 35 B.C. L. REV. 799, 799 (1994)
("The United States Sentencing Guidelines are regularly attacked by critics, many of whom wear the
robes of the federal judiciary, on the ground that they too severely constrict the discretion of district
judges and, therefore, result in sentences which do not adequately reflect the particular circumstances
of individual offenders."). At least one judge, federal district court Judge J. Lawrence Irving, has
already resigned expressly because of the guidelines. See Criticizing Sentencing Rules, U.S. Judge
Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1990, at A22 (quoting Judge Irving: "If I remain on the bench I have
no choice but to follow the law.... I just can't, in good conscience, continue to do this."). And
while it is true that David Mazzone and William Wilkins, whose works are cited in support of the
guidelines, supra note 63, are federal judges, they also happen to be members of the U.S. Sentencing
Commission. GUIDEINES MANUAL, supra note 59, at i.
65. Jos6 A. Cabranes, Sentencing Guidelines:A Dismal Failure, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 11, 1992, at2.
66. See Theresa W. Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Meeting
Congressional Goals?:An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMoRY L.J. 393,423, 423-29 (1991)
(describing how courts are departing from enumerated sentencing ranges "when encountering circum-
stances of a kind and degree not adequately considered by the guidelines"); see also Freed, supra note
64, at 1725-27 (examining opportunities for judges to avoid the seeming rigidity of the guidelines'
requirements). See generally Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of Emerging
Departure Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1 (199 1)
(discussing how judges deviate from statutory guidelines and the underlying rationales they use).
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freedom and independence of judges. Nevertheless, the lesson from the
federal sentencing experience remains salient: Legislative power has its
cultural limits, notwithstanding a declaration of its constitutionality, 7 and
legislation that deviates substantially from the prevailing legal and political
culture is likely to be interpreted restrictively.
In regard to RFRA, such a deviation exists because Congress has
basically misstated the cultural baseline. As one RFRA proponent argued
during its consideration, the purpose of the Act would be to place claims
of religious liberty "just where they would be under the Free Exercise
Clause if Smith had not so greatly reduced protection for religious
practice."" And yet that is precisely the problem: "[R]estoring the pre-
Smith law would do little for religious freedom, because the tendency in
that law had been heavily in favor of government."' Only if one con-
siders Smith to be an extreme, perhaps unexplainable aberration would this
prospect not be troubling. But Smith is not such an aberration. It is the
logical manifestation of a legal and political culture that cannot handle
religious claims as statements about transcendence and higher meaning-
about God and one's relationship to God. 'Smith need not have been an
inevitable product of this culture, of course, but by no means can it be
labeled an extreme aberration. The parades of post-Smith horribles
presented to Congress by RFRA's proponents ° clearly demonstrate that
some form of action is necessary to protect religious liberty-particularly
that of nonmainstream religions. However, they also suggest that the
67. The federal sentencing scheme was upheld against an array of constitutional challenges in
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
68. Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 3, at 345 (statement of Professor Douglas Laycock).
Although almost all subsequent citations to testimony and statements before Congress will be to the
hearings on H.R. 2797, I should note the existence of parallel, and substantially similar, hearings
before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearing on S.
2969 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Seas. (1992) [hereinafter Hearing on S.
29691.
69. Lupu, Statutes, supra note 10, at 54 (citing Ryan, supra note 10, at 1412-36); see also EEOC
v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg., 859 F.2d 610 app. at 624-29 (9th Cir. 1988) (Noonan, J., dissenting)
(listing federal appellate cases involving free exercise challenges to federal legislation and noting that
the vast majority held in favor of the government action), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989).
70. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 3, at 80-81 (statement of Nadine Strossen,
National Board of Directors, ACLU & Robert S. Peck, Legislative Counsel, ACLU) (claiming that
Smith put at risk religious practices such as kosher slaughter, segregation by sex during worship
services, and the sacramental use of wine); id. at 122-23 (statement of Rep. Stephen J. Solarz)
(documenting restrictions on religious freedom in the wake of Smith such as zoning regulations that
excluded churches from certain areas, and OSHA's rescission of an exemption from the hardhat rule
for Old Order Amish and Sikhs); id. at 157-59 (statement of Professor Edward M. Gaffnhey, Jr.)
(criticizing decisions handed down after Smith requiring that a religious hospital teach all residents how
to perform abortions and requiring that an Orthodox Jew killed in an auto accident undergo an autopsy);
id. at 335, 334-39, 361-72 (statements of Professor Douglas Laycock) (reviewing examples of
governmentaction to show that "[mlanyjudges, bureaucrats, and activists have taken Smith as a signal
that the Free Exercise Clause is largely repealed").
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absence of federal legislation is not necessarily the problem.7' In short,
it would be a mistake to believe that we can take comfort in the prospect
that RFRA has simply placed religious freedom in the position it was in
before-or would have been without-the Court's decision in Smith.
It is true, of course, that the mere act of codifying religious liberty
may have positive cultural consequences, just as the codification of civil
rights guarantees has arguably had such an effect over the last several
decades. 2 In fact, creating a readily accessible statutory right to religious
accommodation may even make religious adherence more attractive from
the viewpoint of the nonreligious.3 The only problem is that this
attractiveness may have nothing whatsoever to do with the intrinsic value
of religious faith and exercise, but rather with the instrumental and secular
benefits that can attach to an allegedly religious claim under the Act. And
in some respects, that is the basic problem with RFRA-it is addressed to
a political and legal culture in which religious liberty is not necessarily
valued intrinsically. As a result, it does no more to enhance the cultural
valuation of religious liberty than the civil rights statutes did to improve the
moral and social status of African-American citizens following the Civil
War. Broadly speaking, it was not until the twentieth century-when the
meaning of equality and the perception of these citizens had undergone
significant transformations on a mass scale-that the statutory promises of
71. On this point, consider the following statement of views accompanying the Report of the
House Judiciary Committee:
In justification of the need for this legislation, proponents have provided the Committee
with long lists of cases in which free exercise claims have failed since Smith was decided.
Unfortunately, however, even prior to Smith, it is well known that the "compelling state
interest" test had proven an unsatisfactory means of providing protection for individuals
trying to exercise their religion in the face of government regulations. Restoration of the
pre-Smith standard, although politically practical, will likely prove, over time, to be an
insufficient remedy. It would have been preferable, given the unique opportunity
presented by this legislation, to find a solution that would give solid protection to religious
claimants against unnecessary government intrusion.
H.R. REP. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (May 11, 1993) (footnotes omitted) (additional views of
Representatives Henry J. Hyde, F. James Sensenbrenner, Bill McCollum, Howard Coble, Charles T.
Canady, Bob Inglis, and Robert W. Goodlatte).
72. See Matt Pawa, Comment, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional Rights, Can
Congress Save Us? An Examination of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
1029, 1041 (1993) ("[The] continued reverence for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 demonstrates that a federal legislative solution to an important problem, once achieved,
can become a permanent part of our national laws."). Moreover, once a statute of unlimited duration
is put in place, it is often difficult to repeal or to amend adversely due to the forces of legislative inertia
and interest group pressures, id., although any difficulty of repealing the Act would hardly be advan-
tageous if the courts render restrictive interpretations of it.
73. At the same time, this consequence may affect the Act's constitutionality because legislative
accommodation apparently must not induce people to adopt religion for the purpose of procuring a
benefit. See infra text accompanying note 226.
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these rights assumed anything near their full significance.74 In the same
way, until the nature of culture itself is altered, presently unpopular and
untolerated religiously motivated practices-such as plural marriage,75 the
denial of conventional medical treatment to children,7' the economically
nonproductive use of federal lands,' or, need I say, snake handling7 -
will be no more accepted or tolerated under the RFRA regime than they
were under the Smith and pre-Smith regimes.
What is needed-but is for all practical purposes impossible-is not
legislative action that assumes the intrinsic value of religious liberty, as
does RFRA, but rather legislative or other action that teaches society about
the value and meaning of religious faith and exercise and thereby attempts
to transform the culture that produced Smith and the preceding years of
74. See generally BELL, supra note 51, at 39 ("[B]acks became victims ofjudicial interpretations
of the Fourteenth Amendment and legislation based on it so narrow as to render the promised protection
meaningless in virtually all situations.").
75. See, e.g., Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1068-71 (10th Cir.) (holding that Utah's
prohibition of plural marriage did not violate a plaintiff's right to privacy or right to free exercise of
religion), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 849 (1985); see also Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1890)
(declaring that plural marriages for religious reasons are not constitutionally protected because they are
based on cultic beliefs and because they offendpublic morals); Reynoldsv. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
165 (1878) ("[l]t is impossible to believe that the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom was
intended to protect plural marriages.").
76. See, e.g., Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 869-71 (Cal. 1988) (permitting California
to maintain a prosecution against the mother of a child who died of meningitis after receiving treatment
by prayer in lieu of conventional medical treatment), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989); In re D.L.E.,
645 P.2d 271, 276 (Colo. 1982) ("The right to practice religion freely does not include the right or
liberty to expose the community or the child to ill health or death."); Henry 1. Abraham, Abraham,
Isaac, and the State: Faith-Healing and Legal Intervention, 27 U. RICH. L. REv. 951, 977-85 (1993)
(cataloging several recent cases involving successful homicide prosecutions of parents who denied
conventional medical treatment to their children for religious reasons).
77. See, e.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 742-45 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that a proposed land
development would not burden the religious practices of the Navaho and Hopi Indians), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 956 (1983), and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1056 (1984); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172,
177-79 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that allowing tourista into Rainbow Bridge National Monument did
not inhibit plaintiffs' religious practices), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Sequoyah v. Tennessee
Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1163-65 (6th Cir.) (finding that the Cherokee Indians' claim that the
Little Tennessee Valley contained sacred sites, cemeteries, and medicine-gathering areas did not prove
that the area was central or indispensable to their religious observances), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953
(1980); Inupiat Community of Arctic Slope v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182, 188-89 (D. Alaska
1982) ("[ T]he action of the federal government in initially leasing the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas does
not create a serious obstacle to the exercise of the plaintiff's religion."), aft'd, 746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 820 (1985); Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785, 790-93 (D.S.D. 1982)
(holding that the construction of a road and parking lot near an Indian religious area did not unduly
burden plaintiff's free exercise of religion), a'd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977
(1983).
78. See, e.g., State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 113 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 954 (1976); State v. Massey, 51 S.E.2d 179, 179-80 (N.C.), appeal dismissed, 336 U.S. 942
(1949); Harden v. State, 216 S.W.2d 708, 710-11 (Tenn. 1948); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 164
S.W.2d 972, 974 (Ky. 1942); Hill v. State, 88 So. 2d 880, 885 (Ala. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 88 So.
2d 887 (Ala. 1956) (all upholding anti-snake-handling ordinances).
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free exercise restrictiveness. Before religious freedom can be taken
seriously, our culture-and especially our judges and other government
actors-must first take religion seriously. The problem with this proposal,
of course, is that the government is almost certainly prohibited from doing
so by the Establishment Clause as it is currently interpreted' and by
liberal ideals such as neutrality and secular government.' As a con-
sequence, we must settle for RFRA, a potential "parchment barrier " " in
the face of an unaltered legal and political culture that is not altogether
certain why the vigorous protection of religious liberty-particularly
nonmainstream religious conduct such as peyote ingestion or animal sacri-
fice-is worthwhile, let alone necessary.
B. The Doctrinal and Textual Framework
The prospect of an unreceptive legal and political culture, particularly
among the judiciary, is sufficiently troubling in and of itself. It takes on
particular gravity when viewed in combination with both the text of RFRA
and the nature of existing case law-each of which is sufficiently accom-
modating to allow judges to adopt restrictive interpretations of the Act
should they be so predisposed. To illustrate this, I will focus on the
operative language of three of the Act's four principal components: (1)
"substantially burden," (2) "compelling interest," and (3) "least restrictive
means."82
1. "Substantially Burden. "-The Act indicates that its prohibitory
force extends only to governmental actions that "substantially burden" the
79. See infra subparts II(A), 11(A).
80. See generaUy Michael l. Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, in ARTICES
OF FArrH, supra note 40, at 74, 75-87 (summarizing the theory and case law advancing the liberal
principle of neutrality in the interpretation of the religion clauses).
81. The reference is to James Madison's characterization of bills of rights during the debate over
the wisdom of amending a written bill of rights to the federal Constitution. See Letter from James
Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, 1788-1789, at
295,297 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977) (arguing that a bill of rights would not,
by itself, refrain government from violating individual rights because "[r]epeated violations of those
parchment barriers have been committed by overbearing majorities in every State"); see also THE
FEDERAuST No. 48, at 313 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[A] mere demarcation on
parchment of the constitutional limits of the several departments is not a sufficient guard against those
encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government in the same
hands.").
82. The fourth component is the "exercise of religion," which according to the Act should be
interpreted in the same way it is interpreted in the First Amendment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) (Supp.
V 1993). Although restricting the meaning of "exercise" or of "religion" would be one way to confine
RFRA's scope, it would likely prove the most difficult and least flexible means by which to do so. In
addition, most claims under the Act will probably involve practices that are undeniably religious, thus
limiting both the opportunity and the value of using this approach.
1994]
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exercise of religion.' It fails, however, to define either the term
"burden" or the modifying term "substantially." What this means in prac-
tical terms is that the courts must look to existing cases to construe the
phrase, and when those cases are not instructive, they must simply fashion
definitions they find most suitable. In turn, to the extent that a court, for
whatever reason, places little value on a particular claimant's religious
practice, it may very well opt for a restrictive reading of "substantially
burden"-either through a narrow interpretation of the term "substantially"
or through a finding that the governmental action just does not constitute
a "burden. " ' Indeed, the concept of the substantial burden is one of the
most manipulable-and thus dangerous-components of the Act,5 and it
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) (Supp. V 1993).
84. To date, several RFRA claims have met this fate. See, e.g., Vernon v. City of Los Angeles,
27 F.3d 1385, 1392-95 (9th Cir.) (holding that a five-month investigation into the religious motivations
behind the conduct of a police chief did not substantially burden the free exercise of his religion), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 510 (1994); Merritt-Bey v. Delo, 26 F.3d 127 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that
inmates' freedom of religion could not have been substantially burdened because the discriminatory
distribution of canteen funds among the prison's religious groups did noi prevent the prisoners from
practicing their faith); Brown-El v. Harris, 26 F.3d 68, 69-70 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that a prison
did not substantially burden a Muslim prisoner's free exercise of religion when it removed him from
a nighttime meal regime after he had broken his Ramadan fast by eating during daylight hours);
Germantown Seventh Day Adventist Church v. City of Philadelphia, No. 94-1633, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12163, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 1994) (ruling that the plaintiff had produced no evidence that
the city's zoning ordinance substantially burdened religious freedom); Riely v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693,
709 (D. Ariz. 1994) (finding that the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (FACE) did
not burden the plaintiffs' free exercise rights because they did not allege their religion mandated the
prohibited behavior); Prins v. Coughlin, No. 94-2053, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10564, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 3, 1994) (denying a prisoner's application for an injunction to stay his transfer to another prison
because he failed to show that the kosher menu at the new prison was so insufficient that it burdened
his free exercise of religion); Boonev. Commissioner of Prisons, No. CIV.A.93-5074,1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10027, at *19-*27 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 1994) (finding that the confiscation ofpersonal documents
by prison authorities, a 15-day cell restriction, and prison regulations prohibiting group meetings
without approval and supervision were not substantial burdens on the prisoners' free exercise of
religion); Council for Life. Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422, 1430 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (finding that
FACE placed no burden on the plaintiffs' religious exercise because the "plaintiffs [did] not contend
that it is part of their exercise'of religion to make ingress to or egress from a facility impossible,
unreasonably difficult, or hazardous, which is what is prohibited by the statute"); Fordham Univ. v.
Brown, 856 F. Supp. 684, 697 (D.D.C. 1994) (finding that the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration's denial of a funding request for a university radio station whose pro-
gramming included a Sunday broadcast of Catholic Mass did not amount to a burden because "[i]n no
way is a failure to subsidize a 'burden'"); Messina v. Mazzeo, 854 F. Supp. 116, 137 (E.D.N.Y.
1994) (dismissing a prisoner's civil rights claim because he failed to allege that deprivation of kosher
food burdened his exercise of religion).
85. By itself, of course, the term "substantially" is arguably no more manipulable than, say, the
term "compelling." In context, however, they are quite different. Because the compelling interest test,
or some variation on it, is used in so many constitutional contexts, see generally Stephen E. Gottleib,
Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication,
68 B.U. L. REV. 917 (1988), courts are presumably uncomfortable with the idea of restricting or
expanding its meaning within any particular context lest there will be ripple or spillover effects in other
contexts. The samewould probably hold true with the "least restrictive means" requirement, although
perhaps the implications of a change in the "least restrictive means" test in one context would be less
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will surely prove the critical point in many RFRA cases over the coming
years.86
In order to appreciate the seriousness of this problem, it is necessary
to examine carefully the concept of the free exercise burden as construed
by the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court. Prior to Smith, the courts
used the burden requirement essentially as a "gatekeeper doctrine"r-
weeding out a number of otherwise seemingly valid claims of free exercise
infringement. To be sure, the term "burden" became somewhat of a well-
spring of doctrinal considerations, which at times appeared to have very
little to do with the concept of "burden" as such:
Courts often required claimants, as did Justice O'Connor in [Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)],
to prove that the state law or policy threatened to coerce them into
abandoning their beliefs. Laws or policies that made religion more
expensive, or more inconvenient, under this approach, simply did not
constitute burdens. Similarly, laws or policies that did not force the
likely to affect other contexts given the requirement's strongly factual or empirical component. See
infra text accompanying note 191. By contrast, because religious exercise is basically sui generis,
judicial determinations that it has been substantially burdened will likely have little or no precedential
value outside of the free exercise context.
86. In response, some may argue that restrictive interpretations of RFRA, notwithstanding the
nature of its text and of existing case law, are precluded by the legislative history of the Act. But this
response overlooks at least three important points. First, as a general matter, the use of legislative
history is plagued with several fundamental problems-from indeterminacy to potential illegitimacy.
See generally Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE LJ.
371, 375-79 (discussing various practical and theoretical problems associated with using legislative
history to construe statutes). Second, this response assumes that courts would both look to and feel
compelled to follow the legislative history of RFRA. Yet, the very same judicial disposition that
increases the likelihood of restrictive interpretation undermines these assumptions. Third, even ifcourts
were to look to legislative history and could surmount these various theoretical and practical problems,
the legislative history in certain contexts-such as prisons and the military-is not especially favorable
for the religious claimant. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1993), reprinted in
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1900 ("[T]he committee expects that the courts will continue the tradition
of giving due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing
necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and discipline, consistent with
consideration of costs and limited resources." (footnote omitted)); id. at 12, reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1901 ("[Tlhe courts have always extended to military authorities significant
deference in effectuating these interests [of maintaining good order, discipline, and security]. The
committee intends and expects that such deference will continue under this bill."); H.R. REP. No. 88,
supra note 71, at 8 ("The Committee recognizes that religious liberty claims in the context of prisons
and the military present far different problems for the operation of those institutions than they do in
civilian settings. Ensuring the safety and orderliness of penological institutions, as well as maintaining
discipline in our armed forces, have been recognized as governmental interests of the highest order.").
87. See Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of
Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 935 (1989) [hereinafter Lupu, Burdens] ("The concept of burden
... serves as the latest in a series of gatekeeper doctrines, which function to increase the likelihood
of failure at the prima facie stage, and thereby to reduce the number of claims that must be afforded
the searching inquiry demanded by the free exercise clause.").
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claimant to forego an "important" benefit in order to follow her
religious dictates, were also not often considered burdens.!'
This is not to say, of course, that the Court's pre-Smith conception of
burden was entirely devoid of substance. In Sherbert v. Verner, 9 for
example, the Court favorably considered the case of a Seventh-day Advent-
ist who lost her job when she refused to work on Saturdays.' South
Carolina's Employment Security Commission denied her unemployment
benefits because it found that she had failed to accept suitable work when
it was offered. 9' In holding for the claimant, the Court articulated the
principal formulation of what constitutes an actionable free exercise
burden. Even though "no criminal sanctions directly compel appellant to
work a six-day week," the Court noted,
[T]he pressure upon her to forego [the practice of her religion] is
unmistakable. The ruling forces her to choose between following the
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and
abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept
work, on the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice
puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as
would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.'
Or, as the standard was restated in the 1981 case of Thomas v. Review
Board,'3 "[w]here the state conditions receipt of an important benefit
upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a
benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting
substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate
his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists."' The basic idea, then, is that
a constitutionally significant burden exists whenever a governmental action
provides a religious person with a Hobson's choice-defy your religious
dictates or be subject to some sort of government penalty-whether by
commission (such as a criminal sanction) or by omission (such as a loss of
benefits).
Because it is fair to say that a criminal sanction, like coerced partici-
pation in a patently religious activity,' is presumptively burdensome,'
88. Ryan, supra note 10, at 1421 (footnotes omitted).
89. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
90. Id. at 399.
91. Id. at 400-01.
92. Id. at 404.
93. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
94. Id. at 717-18.
95. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2661 (1992) (invoking a coercion test to invalidate a
public school graduation prayer under the Establishment Clause); cf. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (invalidating a public school requirement that students pledge
allegiance to the flag, though primarily on free speech grounds).
96. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that Old Order Amish parents
could not be compelled by criminal law to send their children to school beyond the eighth grade).
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the real question is what type of noncriminal obligation, or what form of
benefit denial, is sufficient to give rise to a burden. Unfortunately, the
answer is not entirely clear. Denying an Orthodox Jewish serviceman the
right to wear a yarmulke,' precluding Islamic prisoners from attending
weekly services,"' and requiring the Old Order Amish to pay social
security taxes" would all appear to meet this threshold. Yet even these
cases are clouded with some uncertainty because every one of the
underlying free exercise claims ultimately failed on other grounds."° As
a prudential matter, the Court may simply have bypassed the relatively
difficult burden inquiry, knowing full well that the claimant in each case
would eventually lose on these other grounds. Likewise, the denial of
unemployment compensation benefits to one whose religious beliefs re-
quired him to leave or lose his job would appear to be sufficient to
constitute a burden, 10' but once again it would be dangerous to place too
much stock in the Court's holdings in such cases. In particular, Smith
seems to call into question the conclusion that the denial of unemployment
benefits is a burden-at least in the criminal law context. For even though
Smith purported to leave the potential for strict scrutiny intact in
unemployment compensation cases," °2 Smith itself was an unemployment
case, leaving us to wonder whether a constitutional burden even existed.
Admittedly, Smith casts some doubt on this assertion, especially if the case was intended to apply only
to free exercise challenges to generally applicable criminal laws rather than free exercise challenges to
all generally applicable laws. If the former, narrower interpretation is correct, then it may be the case,
directly contrary to my assertion in the text, that criminal sanctions are presumptively not burdensome.
. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (both
holding that a state may criminalize the practice of bigamy and polygamy).
97. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,510 (1986) (recognizing that the effect of military
regulations was "to restrict the wearing of the headgear required by [an Orthodox Jew's] religious
beliefs").
98. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 345 (1987) (recognizing that a prison policy
prevented the prisoner's attendance at Jumu'ah, a religiously mandated service for Muslims).
99. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) ("Because the payment of the taxes or
receipt of benefits violates Amish religious beliefs, compulsory participation in the social security
system interferes with their free exercise rights.").
100. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 510 (holding that the wearing of a yarmulke by a serviceman
could be prohibited because of the Air Force's interest in uniformity); O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 353
(denying inmates' requests to attend Islamic services because of the prison's interest in security and
other penological interests); Lee, 455 U.S. at 260-61 (holding that an Amish employer's objection to
social security taxes as a violation of his religious beliefs was outweighed by the government's interest
in maintaining the integrity of the social security system).
101. See, e.g., Hobbiev. UnemploymentAppeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (holding
that a state could not deny unemployment benefits to a religious convert who resigned from a position
that required her to work on the Sabbath); Thomas v. Review Ed., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981)
(holding that a state could not deny unemployment benefits to an applicant whose religion forbadehim
to work on fabricating weapons).
102. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883-84 (1990) (announcing that the
compelling state interest test for substantial burdens on religion articulated in Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963), is limited to unemployment compensation cases).
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The matter is only complicated if we examine those instances when a
burden was not found. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Protective Cemetery
Ass'n,1° for example, the Court found no burden on Native Americans
in the construction of a timber road through their federally owned tradi-
tional religious site, not because their religious practice would not actually
be burdened-the Court "assume[d] that the threat to the efficacy of at least
some religious practices is extremely grave""--but rather because they
would be neither "coerced by the Government's action into violating their
religious beliefs" nor penalized by denying them "an equal share of the
rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens."15 The Court
seemed to be saying, in other words, that mere desecration is not suffi-
cientY Rather, the government must actually preclude one from prac-
ticing one's religion altogether, force one into religious practice, or deny
one a quantifiable entitlement because of one's religious practice. Yet,
even this last category is not fully reconcilable with the Court's decisions.
It obviously explains the unemployment compensation cases, but it does not
adequately explain those cases in which the Court has consistently held that
the imposition of a financial burden on a religious organization-whether
through a taxt'7 or through an inherently preferential legal struc-
ture"'--does not amount to a constitutionally significant burden. From
an economic standpoint, at least, forcing a person to select a different job
103. 485 U.S. 439, 450-51 (1988).
104. Id. at 451.
105. Id. at 449.
106. In addition to Lyng, see Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 739-45 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that
private development of sacred mountains into ski resorts, though offensive, did not substantially burden
the fiee exercise of religion for Navajo and Hopi Indians), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983); Badoni
v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 177-80 (10th Cir. 1980) (denying injunctive relief to Navajo Indians who
sought to prevent desecration of their prayer site on public lands by tourists because the desecration did
not burden their free exercise rights), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Sequoyahv. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1164 (6th Cir.) (denying relief to Cherokee plaintiffs seeking to enjoin the
flooding of a sacred valley because they failed to show the "centrality of the Valley to the practice of
the traditional Cherokee religion"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Inupiat Community of Arctic
Slope v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182, 188-89 (D. Alaska 1982) (finding that the Inupiat Indians
failed to adduce sufficient evidence of the religious significance of disputed portions of the Arctic seas
to support their action to quiet title against the United States and assorted oil companies), aff'd, 746
F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 820 (1985); Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785, 790-
93 (D.S.D. 1982) (finding that construction and tourist activities near a sacred butte did not burden the
religious exercise of the Lakota and Tsistsistas Nations), aff'd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 977 (1983).
107. See Jimmy SwaggartMinistries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 391 (1990) (holding
that the imposition of a generally applicable sales tax on a religious organization did not impose an
unconstitutional burden because it "merely decrease[d] the amount of money appellant ha[d] to spend
on its religious activities"); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (holding that the
disallowance of a tax deduction is not a substantial burden).
108. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) (rejecting a free exercise challenge by
Orthodox Jewish merchants against Pennsylvania's Sunday closing law, which worked to their relative
financial disadvantage, in part because the law imposed only an indirect burden on religious
observance).
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(perhaps at a lower income) in order to avoid violating his religious beliefs
cannot necessarily be distinguished from forcing a person to pay taxes on
his religiously related income." This analytical discrepancy is par-
ticularly ironic in light of the case of Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v.
Secretary of Labor,11° in which the Court found no burden, based ex-
plicitly on an economic analysis of the employees' situation, from the
application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to a nonprofit religious
organization."'
If nothing else, these cases demonstrate that the concept of "burden"
is presently amorphous. Coercion is apparently burdensome, but even this
restrictive criterion is not entirely helpful or meaningful. For one thing,
what constitutes coercion is not exactly clear. The claimants in Lyng, for
example, were deemed to have suffered no constitutional coercion from the
proposed degradation of their sacred sites despite the undeniable religious
importance and the unique nature of those sites. Moreover, the use of a
coercion criterion is plagued with analytical and administrative prob-
lems,"' not the least of which is that
the outcome of a coercion test can easily be manipulated by shifting
the locus of inquiry. By breaking down the particular context in
which a free exercise claim arises and focusing only on the relatively
less coercive aspects of the government's conduct, rather than on the
preceding compulsion, a court can avoid a finding of coercion alto-
gether.11 3
At best, this doctrinal uncertainty and analytical manipulability will cause
RFRA to be interpreted in unpredictable and inconsistent ways. At worst,
it will endow RFRA-resistant judges with a powerful means by which to
interpret the Act narrowly. Add to this the Act's requirement that the
burden be "substantial," and religious liberty is one step further away from
meaningful protection."'
109. For an even more anomalous application of the burden test, see Swannerv. Anchorage Equal
Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994). Swannerwas a landlord
who, on religious grounds, refused to rent housing to unmarried couples-a practice that violated state
and local antidiscrimination laws. Id. at 276. In analyzing the element of burden (under state constitu-
tional law, but later incorporated into its RFRA analysis), the Supreme Court of Alaska decided that
the correct question was not whether renting to unmarried couples was forbidden by Swarmer's
religious beliefs, but whether his religious beliefs "require[d] that he engage in the property-rental
business." Id. at 283. That, of course, is an absurdly restrictive framing of the issue, and, if adopted
by other courts, it would effectively render RFRA inaccessible to most potential claimants.
110. 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
111. Id. at 303-05.
112. See Lupu, Burdens, supra note 87, at 961-63 (criticizing the coercion test because of its
arbitrary nature in terms of detecting coercion and the consequential potential for abuse).
113. Id. at 963.
114. Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separadonism, 62 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 230, 274
(1994) [hereinafter Lupu, Separationism] (commenting that the addition of the modifier "substantially"
19941
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Before proceeding to an analysis of the Act's compelling interest
requirement, there is one final aspect of the burden requirement that
warrants attention. It is basically an institutional problem, although it may
have significant constitutional dimensions as well.11 To understand the
problem, we must recognize that Smith and its antecedent cases were not
simply about relieving governments of challenges to their generally appli-
cable laws, but also about the propriety of judicial examination of indi-
vidual religious claims-and specifically about the propriety of assessing
the nature and degree of an alleged burden. 6 In Lyng, for example, the
Court declined to measure the severity of the burden placed on the claimant
in that case relative to the claimant in another case, Bowen v. Roy," 7
because such an assessment would involve "determinfing] the truth of the
underlying beliefs that led to the religious objections."1 Likewise, in
United States v. Lee," 9 the Court altogether refused to examine whether
or not a burden actually existed because so doing would have required it
to engage in a theological inquiry. "It is not within 'the judicial function
and judicial competence'.., to determine whether appellee or the Govern-
ment has the proper interpretation of the Amish faith; '[c]ourts are not
arbiters of scriptural interpretation.'"" ° Finally, in Smith the Court flatly
rejected the use of a "centrality" test that would "requir[e] a 'compelling
state interest' only when the conduct prohibited is 'central' to the
individual's religion."' According to the Court,
[iut is no more appropriate for judges to determine the "centrality"
of religious beliefs before applying a "compelling interest" test in the
free exercise field, than it would be for them to determine the
"importance" of ideas before applying the "compelling interest" test
in the free speech field.... Judging the centrality of different
religious practices is akin to the unacceptable "business of evaluating
to the final version of the Act "suggests a class of governmental impacts on religion that are viewed
as burdensome, but unsubstantially so" and that "somejudges will seize upon this distinction to dismiss
some otherwise thorny claims").
115. The constitutional dimensions are discussed infra notes 392-93 and accompanying text.
116. Other commentators have remarked on the unusually difficult and risky nature of line-drawing
in the free exercise context. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 10, at 1423 (observing that courts face a
difficult dilemma in determining whether to grant an exemption to a law in any particular free exercise
case). In the words of Professor Lupu: "Behind every free exercise claim is a spectral march; grant
this one, a voice whispers to each judge, and you will be confronted with an endless chain of exemption
demands from religious deviants of every stripe." Lupu, Burdens, supra note 87, at 947.
117. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
118. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 449-50 (1988) (citing
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144 n.9 (1987) (citing United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944); and Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 687 (9th Cir. 1981))).
119. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
120. Id. at 257 (quoting Thomas v. Review Ed., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981)).
121. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 (1990).
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the merits of differing religious claims." As we reaffirmed only last
Term, "[ilt is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of
particular beliefs or practices to a faith ...."122
And lest one believe that I have conflated the concepts of centrality and
burden, thereby misappropriating the dicta of these cases, the Smith Court
itself asserted in a footnote that "'[c]onstitutionally significant burden'
would seem to be 'centrality' under another name.
These passages suggest that Smith's substantial repudiation of the
compelling interest analysis is as much a statement about what courts may
not do in the way of analysis as it is a statement about what religious
claimants should not expect in the way of protection. Indeed, the strongest
reading of the passage from Smith is that it may verge on unconstitutional
for a court to inquire into the substantiality of an alleged burden on
religious exercise. If this is the case, then RFRA's requirement that courts
engage in precisely such an inquiry may meet with doctrinal resistance
should the constitutionality of the Act in fact be challenged. Moreover,
even if the weakest reading is accurate-that courts institutionally should
not be in the business of evaluating the substantiality of alleged burdens
even if it is constitutional to do so-then at the very least we can expect
philosophical resistance to the demands that the Act places on courts."
Interestingly, Professor Laycock interprets these passages from Smith
as simply raising the issue of which institution-the judiciary or the Con-
gress-should authorize and assume ultimate responsibility for the task of
judicial balancing and estimation. Prior to Smith, it was the Court; with
RFRA, it is Congress. According to Laycock:
These institutional concerns do not apply to RFRA. Congress, rather
than the Court, will make the decision that religious exercise should
sometimes be exempted from generally applicable laws. And Con-
gress, rather than the Court, will retain the ultimate responsibility for
the continuation and interpretation of that decision.
Of course, the courts would still apply the compelling interest
test under the Act, and judges would be required to balance the
importance of government policies against the burden on religious
exercise. But striking this balance in the enforcement of a statute is
fundamentally different from striking this balance in the independent
judicial enforcement of the Constitution. Under the statute, the
judicial striking of the balance is not final.12
122. Id. at 886-87 (citations omitted).
123. Id. at 887 n.4.
124. See Lupu, Separatlionism, supra note 114, at 276 ("[N]o one should be surprised if under
these circumstances the Supreme Court searches for constructions of RFRA that minimize the extent
of interest-balancing reimposed upon the judiciary.").
125. Laycock, RFRA, supra note 17, at 253.
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This justification assumes that the primary concern in Smith was the
source and finality of the balancing process and not the process itself. But
this is not necessarily what Smith said. The Court suggested that the
fundamental enterprise of examining and weighing the individual impor-
tance of religious claims should not be part of the judicial decisionmaking
process at all. The excessive judicial discretion that the Smith majority
feared was not simply the power inherent in establishing and maintaining
the compelling interest test despite its lack of constitutional grounding, but
more importantly the power inherent in applying that test-a power auto-
matically available-to any lower federal or state court presented with a free
exercise claim prior to Smith."
It remains to be seen whether the Justices who supported Smith will
hold tightly to this concern when assessing the propriety-if not the
constitutionality-of RFRA's requirements. Professor Laycock may be
absolutely correct, and the Court may conceptualize the issue of judicial
discretion entirely differently when its source and finality are located in
Congress rather than in the Court. In the meantime, it is enough simply
to note this concern and, more immediately, to recognize the inherent
limitations of the substantial burden requirement as set forth in the Act.
2. "Compelling Interest. "-Unfortunately, RFRA is no more helpful
in defining "compelling interest" than in defining "substantially burden,"
even though it twice purports to give meaning to the term."2 According
to the Act, "the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court
rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious
liberty and competing prior governmental interests,"" and therefore the
principal purpose of RFRA is "to restore the compelling interest as set
forth in [Sherbert and Yoder]." 9 When one looks to the "prior Federal
court rulings," however, at least three things become evident. First, the
126. Moreover, Professor Laycock's finality claim is open to doubt as a practical matter.
Professor John Hart Ely's words in this regard are instructive:
It briefly baffled me that everyone (advocates, critics, media alike) treated the Supreme
Court as the final authority on the content of federal civil rights statutes. An observer
who took the paper system seriously would respond that such a view is unfair, as
Congress can always overrule an interpretation of a statute by amending it-it's not as if
the Constitution were implicated. The answer, of course, is that ... whichever way the
Court holds, the odds are extremely low that Congress is going to overrule it. Thus,
although the matter is "statutory," the Court is likely to be the last word.
John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World Where Courts Are
No Different from Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REv. 833, 861 (1991) (footnote omitted).
127. An amendment was offered at the subcommittee level that would have listed categories of
interests that could be considered "compelling" for the purposes of the Act. See H.R. REP. NO. 88,
supra note 71, at 16 n.6.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (Supp. V 1993).
129. Id. § 2000bb(b)(1).
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courts themselves never quite explain how one is to recognize a compelling
interest.1" Second, the inconsistency of the case law calls into question
the value of implicitly equating "prior Federal court rulings" with the
specific cases of Sherbert and Yoder."' And third, the compelling inter-
est test is therefore a relatively flexible concept open to restrictive
interpretations, should courts be so inclined. In fact, "[e]ven before the
recent shift in interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause [in Smith], free
exercise cases were almost always losers: virtually any plausible public
purpose was deemed sufficient to override the right of religious exer-
cise."132 According to one commentator who carefully examined the pre-
Smith case law:
[T]he free exercise claimant, both in the Supreme Court and the
courts of appeals, rarely succeeded under the compelling interest test,
despite some powerful claims. A survey of the decisions in the
United States courts of appeals over the ten years preceding Smith
reveals that, despite the apparent protection afforded claimants by the
language of the compelling interest test, courts overwhelmingly sided
with the government when applying that test. 33
Yet, one might ask, would RFRA's imposition of a compelling interest
requirement not change the outcomes in those cases-Employment Division
v. Smith,134 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,135
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz1 36 Bowen v. Roy, 37 and Goldman v.
Weinberger t3 -in which the Court declined to invoke such a requirement
130. See Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 3, at 313 (statement of Professor Robert A. Destro)
("As actually applied in free exercise cases (and it has not been applied in all such cases, or applied
consistently), [the compelling interest test] has become little more than a multi-factor balancing test.
No one really knows what makes a state interest 'compelling.'"); see also Waters v. Churchill, 114 S.
Ct. 1878, 1885 (1994) (noting in the free speech context that "[the Court has] never set forth a general
test to determine what constitutes a compelling state interest" (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324
(1988))).
131. See Lupu, Separationism, supra note 114, at 274 (remarking that the addition to the Act of
the reference to prior federal court rulings "might well reflect a weakening of the Act's standard,
because post-Yoder federal court rulings very much tended to dilute the rigors of Yoder"). As
Professor Laycock notes, even "[t]he Supreme Court has been very inconsistent on what it means by
compelling state interest." Laycock, Free Exercise, supra note 3, at 901.
132. McConnell, Freedom of Religion, supra note 33, at 176 (footnote omitted) (citing Michael
W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109, 1127
(1990)); see also Abraham, supra note 76, at 973 (concluding that "there have been a surprisingly large
number and variety of state interests that have been held sufficient to warrant the infringement of free
exercise rights").
133. Ryan, supra note 10, at 1412.
134. 494 U.S. 872, 878-89 (1990).
135. 485 U.S. 439, 450-51 (1988).
136. 482 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1987).
137. 476 U.S. 693, 707-08 (1986).
138. 475 U.S. 503, 506-07 (1986).
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altogether? Perhaps, but it seems rather unlikely given the nature of the
governmental interests in these cases. Indeed, focusing on the Court's
avoidance of a compelling interest test in these cases fails to appreciate
both how easily the Court could have achieved the same outcomes under
such a test and how little the Court's reasons for not invoking such a test
had anything to do with their resolution. As a practical matter, deference
to legislative and administrative judgment was the key to each case, and
this deference was as much an indication that the interests at stake were
presumptively compelling as it was the basis for forgoing the compelling
interest standard altogether. This can be most effectively illustrated, I
believe, by examining the governmental interest in each case in light of
precedents drawn from the free exercise context and from other, analogous
contexts.
I begin with Smith, which seems a proper choice given its close rela-
tionship with the passage of RFRA. Smith involved the denial of un-
employment benefits to two Native Americans because their termination of
employment resulted from their ingestion of peyote-an act prescribed by
their religion, but prohibited by state law."' Surely this was not a case
in which a compelling interest was lacking. The government could easily
have established that the full enforcement of its narcotics-related laws, at
least in this day and age, constitutes a compelling interest.1" Even
Justice O'Connor, who strongly opposed Smith's analysis, said as much in
her concurring opinion. 41 The same conclusion would be reached if one
considers the nature of governmental interests at stake in O'Lone, which
involved the preclusion of Islamic inmates at a state prison from attending
Friday services," or in Goldman, which involved the military's
139. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874-75 (1990).
140. See, e.g., Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Meese, 698 F. Supp. 1342, 1349 (N.D. Tex.
1988) ("The overriding interest of the State of Texas in controlling the abuse of narcotics and psycho-
tropic substances outweighs the interest of Peyote Way in exercising its religious beliefs."), aff'd sub
nom. Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991); see also United
States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 182 (9th Cir.) (assuming that the government had an "overriding
interest in enforcing the narcotics laws" to justify burdening a suspected drug dealer's privacy rights
by monitoring his mail), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Travis, 837 F. Supp.
1386, 1395 (E.D. Ky. 1993) (holding that the government's interest in effective drug interdiction was
so compelling that it outweighed an alleged equal protection violation).
141. Justice O'Connor noted:
There is ... no dispute that Oregon has a significant interest in enforcing laws that
control the possession and use of controlled substances by its citizens.... In light of our
recent decisions holding that the governmental interests in the collection of income tax,
a comprehensive Social Security system, and military conscription are compelling,
respondents do not seriously dispute that Oregon has a compelling interest in prohibiting
the possession of peyote by its citizens.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 904-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted).
142. O'Lonev. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 345 (1987).
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proscription of nonstandard headgear, in this case a yarmulke.1"3 As a
general matter, courts routinely find compelling interests in the military
and prison contexts, and judicial deference to legislative and administrative
judgments is commonplace. 1' Indeed, in their argument against amend-
ing the Act to lower the government's burden in prison cases, two RFRA
proponents maintained that such an amendment was unnecessary precisely
because, prior to O7Lone, "courts... broadly interpreted the boundaries
of [compelling state] interests in the prison context and ... [gave]
enormous leeway to the expertise, judgment, and experience of prison
administrators. "145 In turn, it would not be surprising if courts
effectively employed a presumption under RFRA that the government's
interest is compelling whenever these contexts are implicated.'" To be
sure, at least one prison case arising under RFRA seems to have done just
that. In Lawson v. Dugger,"7 a federal district court, although ultimately
holding in favor of the Jewish inmates challenging a prison restriction on
access to religious literature,'" stated that "[i]t is well established that
prison officials have a compelling interest in maintaining internal order and
security in the state penological institutions. It is clear that the defendants'
practice of routinely banning the religious literature at issue furthers this
compelling interest."'"
143. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 504.
144. Regarding the military context, see United States v. Schmucker, 815 F.2d 413,417 (6th Cir.
1987) (rejecting a free exercise claim against mandatory Selective Service registration in part because
"[t]he government ... has a compelling interest in being able to institute conscription quickly should
it prove necessary"); Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1228 (10th Cir. 1984) (rejecting
a homosexual serviceman's due process challenge to his honorable discharge by asserting that "[elven
if we assume, arguendo, that the constitutional right of privacy protects some private consensual
homosexual activity among adults," it would be outweighed by the government's "compelling interest
in maintaining a strong military force"); Blameuser v. Andrews, 630 F.2d 538, 544 (7th Cir. 1980)
(permitting discrimination in military education on the basis of one's political and social beliefs because
it "served the government's compelling interest in ensuring the recruitment of qualified officers in the
military"); and Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 455-60 (1971) (holding that the government's
interest in maintaining a fair system of conscription outweighed the conscientious objections of some
conscripts to a specific war). Regarding the prison context, see Faheem-El v. Lane, 657 F. Supp. 638,
645-46 (C.D. Ill. 1986) (rejecting the free exercise challengeto prison restrictions on separate religious
services and the wearing of emblems because of interest in institutional security); and Rahman v.
Stephenson, 626 F. Supp. 886, 887-88 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (rejecting a free exercise challenge to an
administrative use of a nonreligious name following the adoption of the religious name because of "the
state's compelling interest in the control, administration and security of prison institutions").
145. Oliver Thomas & David Saperstein, The Limits of Restoring Religious Freedom: A Prison
Exemption Is Not Needed, LEGAL TIMES, June 21, 1993, at 29.
146. I say "effectively" because RFRA expressly and unqualifiedly places the burdens of proof
and persuasion on the government. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(3) (Supp. V 1993) ('mhe term
'demonstrates' means meets the burdens of going forward with the evidence and of persuasion.").
147. 844 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
148. The court found that "the outright ban of Hebrew Israelite literature is not 'the least restrict-
ive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.'" Id. at 1542.
149. Id. (citations omitted).
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At first blush, it may seem that the military, prison, and controlled
substance contexts are inappropriate bases of analysis, given the peculiarly
strong governmental interests involved in each. Yet, when we extend our
analysis to other, less unique contexts, such as the welfare benefits context
in Roy"5 and the government land regulation context in Lyng," it is
no more obvious that a compelling interest test would produce results
favorable to the free exercise of religion. At issue in Roy, for example,
was the mandatory acquisition and use of a social security number in
conjunction with various federal welfare programs, a process that the
appellee claimed would ".rob the'spirit" of his daughter. 152 However, in
United States v. Lee, 153 a free exercise case decided four years earlier
using the compelling interest test, the Court specifically determined that
"the Government's interest in assuring mandatory and continuous participa-
tion in and contribution to the social security system [was] very high." 5"
As a consequence, it would only be prudent to assume that the govern-
ment's interest in maintaining full compliance with the social security
system, and with programs substantially similar to it, will likewise be
found compelling under RFRA. Finally, consider Lyng, which involved
the construction of a timber road through federal land that was sacred to
three Indian tribes."55 Although it may seem as if the government's
interest in the management of public land and resources would not be of
the same order as, say, its interest in the reduction of drug possession and
use, the case law in this area, particularly in regard to Native Americans
(whose religious relationships to particular geographic sites are relatively
uniqueY), would appear to belie such a conclusion."5 7 As the Eighth
150. Bowenv. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 695 (1986).
151. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 442 (1988).
152. Roy, 476 U.S. at 696.
153. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
154. Id. at 258-59; see also id. at 260 ("Because the broad public interest in maintaining a sound
tax system is of such a high order, religious belief in conflict with the payment of taxes affords no basis
for resisting the tax.").
155. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 442.
156. See Rita S. Mandosa, Another Promise Broken: Reexamining the National Policy of the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 40 FED. B. NEws & J. 109, 111 (1993) ("Any discussion of
litigation involving Native Americans and land must first consider the unique spiritual connectedness
between the two."); see also Tapahe, supra note 23, at 336 (discussing the centrality of sacred land
sites to Native American spirituality).
157. See, e.g., Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 177 (10th Cir. 1980) (rejecting a free exercise
claim in part because the government's interest in water management around the claimants' worship
sites was compelling), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); United States v. Little, 638 F. Supp. 337,
339 (D. Mont. 1986) (rejecting a free exercise defense to a charge of cutting and removing wood from
a national forest without a permit in part because the "government's interest in protecting and
preserving our national forests for-this and future generations is compelling"); Inupiat Comiunity of
Arctic Slope v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182, 189 (D. Alaska 1982) (rejecting free exercise claims
in part because the government's "significant economic stake in the development of energy resources
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Circuit noted not long after Lyng was decided, "[c]ourts consistently have
refused to disturb governmental land management decisions that have been
challenged by Native Americans on free exercise grounds.5""'
The sad truth of the matter is that the compelling interest requirement,
as established in the pre-Smith case law and thus as resurrected through
RFRA, is simply not the enormous hurdle for the government that one
might first imagine. Despite its linguistic similarity, it is a far cry from the
compelling interest required in other constitutional strict scrutiny contexts,
such as free speech, equal protection, or substantive due process. 159 One
commentator has even suggested that when viewed in tandem with the bur-
den test, the pre-Smith application of the compelling interest requirement
frequently turned out to be gratuitous:
In order to demonstrate a burden, the government involvement or
interference with the adherent's religious practices had to be
significant enough that it could potentially "coerce" the adherent to
abandon her faith. Yet such extensive involvement or interference
would almost always signify that the government had a compelling
interest in the law or practice in question .... In other words, to
show a burden was often to present simultaneously the government's
compelling interest."W
In the final analysis, it would be simply imprudent to assume that
RFRA's compelling interest requirement can effectively serve to neutralize
the threats to religious liberty inherent in our legal and political culture.
Judges who either do not agree with or do not appreciate a particular
within its borders" was found to outweigh the alleged interference with the plaintiffs' religious beliefs
concerning the sanctity of their land), aff'd, 746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 820
(1985). The most notable exceptionwould be the court of appeals' decision in Lyng, which concluded
that "the government has fallen short of demonstrating the compelling interest required to justify its
proposed interference with the Indian plaintiffs' free exercise rights." Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 695 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub noma. Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). Yet, as discussed supra text accompanying
notes 103-06, ultimately there was no burden found in Lyng, thus calling into question the value of a
compelling interest even if one is found to exist.
158. United States v. Means, 858 F.2d 404, 407 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 910
(1989).
159. See Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 3, at 308-09 (statement of Professor Robert A.
Destro) ("The standard of review actually applied in Free Exercise cases... is really quite different
from that applied in free speech and press cases.... The tests for freedom of speech and press are
far more robust and developed." (emphasis in original)); Conkle, supra note 23, at 18 ("Although the
Court's test was strict in formulation, its application suggested a somewhat more lenient review.");
Ryan, supra note 10, at 1415 (noting the observations of scholars, judges, and others that the Supreme
Court prior to Smith "was not applying a genuine 'compelling' interest test"); see also Michael W.
McConnell, Should Congress Pass Legislation Restoring the Broader Interpretation of Free Exercise
of Religion?, 15 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POI'Y 181, 182 n.5 (1992) [hereinafter McConnell, Should
Congress Pass Legislaton?] ("As actually applied, this [compelling interest] standard does not provide
as much protection for religion as the wording might suggest.").
160. Ryan, supra note 10, at 1416.
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claimant's religious practice, or who unduly value the governmental inter-
ests at stake, will likely not find the compelling interest requirement to
pose a serious obstacle. Perhaps this is too cynical a view, but within our
current adjudicative regime, it cannot be said to be incorrect.161
3. "Least Restrictive Means. --Like the terms "substantially burden"
and "compelling interest," the meaning of "least restrictive means" cannot
be ascertained from the face of the Act. Accordingly, as with these other
requirements, its meaning for the purposes of RFRA will necessarily derive
from pre-existing case law and from its direct interpretation by judges in
individual cases arising under the Act. What is particularly unsettling
about this prospect, both in terms of judicial discretion and in terms of
RFRA's purpose of "restoration," is that a least restrictive means require-
ment was never really a fixed component of the Court's pre-Smithjurispru-
dence, and in those cases in which it was invoked, it proved either
irrelevant or unavailing to the free exercise claimant. 62 Hence, this
requirement, like the other two, may turn out to be relatively ineffective
in the protection of religious freedom, despite its seemingly rigid language.
I should begin by elaborating on my claim that a least restrictive
means requirement was never solidly embedded in the Court's free exercise
doctrine." A means requirement within the free exercise context seems
first to have appeared in Sherbert v. Verner," wherein Justice Brennan
suggested in dictum that even if the government could show a compelling
interest, "it would plainly be incumbent upon [it] to demonstrate that no
alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infring-
ing First Amendment rights."" Yet Justice Brennan relied exclusively
on free speech and free association cases for this proposition,"~ and it
161. Even Professor Laycock, who is one of RFRA's strongest proponents and who advocates a
vigorous approach to the compelling interest test, concedes that judicial dilution of the test is the
principal danger to the Act:
Most federal judges right now are inclined to be highly deferential to the legislature.
There was some fear in the Senate that judges were going to run amok and protect all
sorts of crazy stuff. I think the greater risk is that they will be highly deferential and not
protect nearly enough.
Laycock, Free Exercise, supra note 3, at 901.
162. See infra text accompanying notes 185-86.
163. The more conventional formulation of the Court's free exercisejurisprudence is that found
in Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989): "The free exercise inquiry asks whether govern-
ment has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and,
if so, whether a compelling governmental interestjustifies the burden." Id. at 699. Hernandez makes
no mention of a "least restrictive means," "essentiality," "narrow tailoring," or "necessity"
requirement.
164. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
165. Id. at 407.
166. Id. at 407-08 (citing Sheltonv. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-90 (1960); Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 144-49 (1943); and Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)).
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ultimately played no part in the resolution of the case. More importantly,
this language from Sherbert has not once resurfaced in the Court's free
exercise cases. It was not until 1981, in fact, in the case of Thomas v.
Review Board, 7 that a means requirement reappeared, this time in the
formulation of "least restrictive means.""' In an opinion by Chief
Justice Burger, the Thomas Court asserted that "[tihe state may justify an
inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means
of achieving some compelling state interest."" As with Sherbert,
however, no precedent was cited for this particular formulation. Wisconsin
v. Yoder,"T also a Burger opinion, was cited in the following sentence,
but apparently only in support of the compelling state interest portion of
that formulation."' As was also the case with Sherbert, moreover, the
least restrictive means requirement proved irrelevant to the outcome in the
Thomas case.1"
In the following term, in United States v. Lee, 3 another Burger
opinion, the requirement appeared once again, but this time in an alter-
native formulation: "The state may justify a limitation on religious liberty
by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental
interest."74 As support, the Chief Justice provided general citations to
Thomas, as well as to Yoder, Sherbert, and Gillette v. United States"7 -
even though, of the four opinions, only Thomas and perhaps Sherbert could
support a requirement that the limitation be "essential." Then, in the 1983
case of Bob Jones University v. United States176-once again a Burger
opinion-the Court mentioned both the "essential" requirement (citing Lee
as support)"7 and the "least restrictive means" requirement (citing
167. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
168. Id. at 718.
169. Id.
170. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
171. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718 ("[It is... true that '[t]he essence of all that has been said
and written on the subject is that only those interests of the highest order... can overbalance legiti-
mate claims to the free exercise of religion.'" (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215)). Some may argue that
the Yoder standard also includes a least restrictive means requirement, namely, its mention of "those
[interests] not otherwise served." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215. Yet, the meaning of this phrase is not at
all self-evident-certainly it is not the same as saying "those interests not otherwise servable by less
restrictive means"-and in fact the Chief Justice specifically deleted the former phrase in Thomas (with
the ellipsis following "the highest order"). Compare id. with Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718.
172. The Court never reached the issue of the least restrictive means because it concluded that
Indiana had failed to demonstrate a compelling interest. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718-19.
173. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
174. Id. at 257-58 (emphasis added).
175. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
176. 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (denyingpetitionera tax-exemptstatusunderthenternal RevenueCode
because its racially discriminatory admissions practices violated public policy).
177. Id. at 603 (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 257-58).
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Thomas as support),17 but declined to undertake a meaningful analysis.
The formulation appeared only one more time: six years later in Justice
Brennan's plurality opinion in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,'79 and it
was disregarded in the analysis.1" In fact, Texas Monthly was not really
a Free Exercise Clause case at all, at least not in the mandatory accom-
modation sense-Texas had itself raised. a hypothetical free exercise claim
in defense of its tax exemption for religious periodicals-and the claim was
summarily, and not surprisingly, rejected by the Court.
Taken together, these cases have several things to say about the
meaning and implementation of RFRA. First, the means requirement as
found in these cases-whether expressed in terms of "least restrictive
means,"181  "essential,"" or "no alternative forms" 1  -was basically
a limited experiment, introduced by Justice Brennan and advanced by Chief
Justice Burger, that never actually became affixed in the Court's free
exercise jurisprudence."'I As a consequence, RFRA's own requirement
in this regard is not so much a restoration as it is a revisionist recon-
struction. Second, and more importantly, in the handful of cases in which
it actually appeared, the least restrictive means requirement or its variations
proved basically worthless. In three out of the five majority opinions in
which it is mentioned (Lee, Bob Jones, and Texas Monthly), the free
178. Id. at 604 (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718).
179. 489 U.S. 1, 19 (1989) (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 257-58).
180. In rejecting the state's argument that the Free Exercise Clause required its exemption, the
Court relied exclusively on the existence of a compelling state interest in the collection of taxes. Id.
at 19-20.
181. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718.
182. Lee, 455 U.S. at 257-58,
183. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
184. I should note that in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct.
2217 (1993), the Court stated that
[a] law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application must
undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny. To satisfy the commands of the First Amendment,
a law restrictive of religious practice must advance "interests of the highest order" and
must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests.
Id. at 2233 (emphasis added) (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978) (quoting Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972))). In turn, to the extent that "narrowly tailored" is equivalent to
"least restrictive means," this suggests that the Thomas formulation of strict scrutiny is not the aberra-
tion I have portrayed it to be. However, I think this would be an erroneous interpretation for at least
two reasons. First, the Court in City of Hialeah was speaking of the "most rigorous" scrutiny
appropriate for laws that fail the neutrality or general applicability tests, and not those that satisfy them.
Id. Hence, this is a different standard entirely than the one invoked by ChiefJustice Burger in Thomas,
Lee, and Bob Jones and by Justice Brennan in Sherbert and Texas Monthly. Second, it appears as if
the "narrowly tailored" requirement is itself new or aberrational because neither McDaniel nor Yoder
supports this requirement, let alone this particular formulation. On this point, I have already discussed
Yoder, see supra note 171, and McDaniel simply quotes Yoder, McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 628 (quoting
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215). Indeed, it is interesting that the City of Hialeah excerpt should include a
quotation for the "interests of the highest order" requirement, but not one for the "narrowly tailored"
requirement. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2233.
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exercise claim was rejected," while in the remaining two cases (Sherbert
and Thomas), it was irrelevant because the state could not demonstrate a
compelling interest. 6 As a result, it would simply be wrong to believe
that along with such a requirement would automatically come a legacy of
protective case law. Moreover, even though a least restrictive means test
has sometimes proven to be an effective source of protection in certain
other constitutional contexts,l" the same can be said of a compelling
interest test. And given that the potency of that latter test has been
specifically diminished in the religious liberty context,' it would be
unreasonable to assume that the former test might not also be diminished
when placed in the realm of free exercise.'89 Third, the least-restrictive-
means requirement's infrequent and superficial invocation in the Court's
cases provides little or no guidance to judges applying that requirement
under RFRA. To be sure, even Justice Brennan and Chief Justice Burger,
the test's principal advocates, seemed unable to settle on a single
formulation, let alone to provide their readers with an explanation of the
term's meaning."9  As a consequence, judges interpreting RFRA will
effectively have free reign to decide when and under what circumstances
this requirement is satisfied.
And while it is true that the "least restrictive means" is a seemingly
more objective or objectively scrutinizable test than either the highly
sensitive "substantially burden" test or the extremely value-laden "com-
pelling interest" requirement, it is nevertheless sufficiently flexible and
indeterminate to allow for significant judicial discretion. At the same time,
the heavily fact- and context-bound nature of this requirement is likely to
minimize judges' concerns that their holdings under RFRA will adversely
affect other contexts in which a similar inquiry is employed.' 9' In short,
this requirement, like the first two, cannot and should not be relied upon
to secure the blessings of religious liberty in the face of the culture of
disbelief. While a least restrictive means requirement may place some
limits on the contemporary demands and encroachments on free exercise,
it must also be recognized that this very same culture will invariably place
185. Lee, 455 U.S. at 260; Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604; Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,
489 U.S. 1, 18 (1989).
186. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-07; Thomas, 450 U.S. at 719.
187. See Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125 (1989) (using the least restrict-
ive means test to strike down a restriction on constitutionally protected sexual expression).
188. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
189. See Lupu, Statutes, supra note 10, at 64-66 (proposing that a "[clonstruction of the Act...
may tend toward the weaker rather than the stronger version of the test of 'less restrictive means'").
190. See supra text accompanying notes 181-83.
191. See supra note 85 (discussing this concern in relation to the substantial burden test and the
compelling interest requirement). But see Lupu, Statutes, supra note 10, at 66 (expressing concern
about the dilution of this standard in other contexts).
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limits on this requirement's implementation, on its judicial interpretation,
and thus on its ultimate scope and effectiveness. 1" Such are the cultural
limits of legislative power, and in the end they may prove RFRA's most
difficult obstacle.
II. Constitutional Limits
I turn next to a very different kind of potential limit on RFRA, the
question of its constitutionality. In particular, there are at least two
plausible arguments or bases for finding RFRA to be unconstitutional, each
of which comprises one of the two sections in this Part. Subpart A
examines whether RFRA violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment by running afoul of one or more doctrines or principles of
contemporary nonestablishment jurisprudence. Subpart B then examines
whether RFRA exceeds Congress's enforcement power under Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment. At bottom, my purpose in addressing
RFRA's constitutionality is not to demonstrate that it actually is
unconstitutional-although that conclusion is not unreasonable-but simply
to demonstrate that its constitutionality is an open question as a matter of
both Supreme Court doctrine and underlying constitutional principles.
Such a demonstration is necessary only because RFRA's proponents have
repeatedly discounted the possibility of its unconstitutionality under both
the Establishment Clause1" and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and in so doing have instilled potentially misguided expectations
in the minds of both its framers and those who intend to rely upon its
promise of freedom."'
192. See Lupu, Statutes, supra note 10, at 65 (noting that construing the least restrictive means
requirement narrowly "presumably would be the tendency one would expect from the very Court that
decided Smith and other free exercise-limiting decisions in the first place").
193. See, e.g., Laycock, RFRA, supra note 17, at 250 (stating that there is "no plausible claim"
that RFRA violates the Establishment Clause); cf. Native American Free Exercise of Religion Act:
Hearings on S. 1021 Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 294 (1993)
[hereinafterHearings onS. 1021] (statement of Jack F. Trope, Counsel to the Association on American
Indian Affairs, Inc.) (concluding that 'with only minor changes, the [Native American Free Exercise
of Religion Act] fully passes constitutional muster in terms of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution").
194. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 3, at 397-98 (statement of Professor Douglas
Laycock); Laycock, Free Exercise, supra note 3, at 897; Laycock, RFRA, supra note 17, at 245-54;
Paws, supra note 72, at 1096-97 (all concluding that Congress has the authority to enact RFRA under
Section Five of the 14th Amendment); cf. Hearings on S. 1021, supra note 193, at 281-86 (statement
of lack T. Trope, Counsel to the Association on American Indian Affairs, Inc.) (concluding that
Congress has the authority to enact the Native American Free Exercise of Religion Act).
195. As far as I know, the only scholar who openly and rigorously questioned RFRA's constitu-
tionality prior to its enactment, in this case under both the Commerce Clause and Section Five of the
14th Amendment, is Professor Lupu. Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 3, at 385-91 (statement of
Professor Ira C. Lupu); Lupu, Statutes, supra note 10, at 56-62. Without engaging in too much spec-
ulation, Lupu's cognizance and objectivity in this regard may simply have resulted from his pre-existing
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A. Does RFRA Violate the Establishment Clause?
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment mandates that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."19
Although relatively narrow on its face, this Clause has been interpreted by
the Supreme Court to encompass a broad array of doctrines or principles
concerning the relationship between religion and government. The Court
has held, for example, that a governmental action may be unconstitutional
if it has the effect of advancing or endorsing religion,1" lacks a secular
purpose,19 results in psychological coercion, 1" fosters the excessive
entanglement of religion and government," or amounts to religious
preferentialism, either among religions"'1 or between religion and non-
religion or irreligion.?
Even a moment's thought reveals that RFRA would seem to conflict
with several of these constitutional directives. Most strikingly, its principal
opposition to a broad doctrine of accommodation. See infra note 218 (citing Lupu's ongoing debate
with Michael McConnell over the propriety of discretionary accommodations). Conversely, the past
and present inability or unwillingness of others to question the Act's constitutionality may result simply
from their underlying desire that the Act be upheld.
196. U.S. CoNsr. amend. I.
197. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (requiring that governmental action's "principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion").
198. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987) (holding unconstitutional a Louisiana
statute requiring equal treatment in public schools of evolutionismand creationismbecause "the primary
purpose of the Creationism Act is to endorse a particular religious doctrine"); Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39, 41, 41-42 (1980) (invalidating a Kentucky statute requiring the posting of the Ten Command-
ments in public school classrooms because "[t]he pre-eminent purpose for posting the Ten Command-
ments on schoolroom walls is plainly religious in nature").
199. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649,2658 (1992) (holding unconstitutional a public school
graduation invocation because it "may [have appeared] to the nonbeliever or dissenter to bean attempt
to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy").
200. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (requiring that governmental action "must not foster 'an
excessivegovernmententanglement with religion'" (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674
(1970))); see also Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1982) (invalidating a Massa-
chusetts statute that vested in the governing bodies of churches the power to veto applications for liquor
licenses within 500 feet of their churches in part because "t]he challenged statute... enmeshe[d]
churches in the processes of government and create[ld] the danger of '[plolitical fragmentation and
divisiveness along religious lines'" (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623)).
201. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2493
(1994) ("[lit is clear that neutrality as among religions must be honored."); Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228, 244 (1982) ('The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another."); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
15 (1947) (declaring that the Establishment Clause prohibits laws that "prefer one religion over
another").
202. See Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2491 ("[A] principle at the heart of the Establishment Clause [is]
that government should not prefer ... religion to irreligion."); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
103-04 (1968) ("The First Amendment mandates government neutrality . . .between religion and
nonreligion."); Everson, 330 U.S. at 15 (declaring that the Establishment Clause prohibits laws that
prefer religion to irreligion).
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purpose is to advance religion, or at least to advance the free exercise
thereof, relative to other conscientious conduct that is not deemed religious.
The success of RFRA, to be sure, will in part be measured by the degree
to which it actually achieves the effect of relative advancement. That being
the case, it would be interesting to know on what secular basis Congress
decided to protect religious practices but not analogous nonreligious
practices. The decision cannot ultimately be premised on the intrinsic
importance of free exercise to the individual, such as an individual's sense
of personal autonomy, because many nonreligious practices also would
seemingly fall within that criterion.' Likewise, the basis cannot be that
of preventing the alienation of nonmainstream religious adherents who may
frequently fall prey to generally applicable legislation, because many laws
produce a sense of disenfranchisement and alienation among those whose
platforms or values regularly lose out in the political process.' Indeed,
I believe Congress would be hard-pressed to offer a rationale for RFRA's
singular protection of religious liberty that is not in some way religious or
that does not in some way establish religion as a governmentally preferred
activity.' 5 For what Congress has done is to accord special protection
only to substantially burdened religiously motivated conduct and has done
so based, in part, on its finding that the First Amendment was devised to
protect the "free exercise of religion as an unalienable right."" The
more genuinely neutral course of action, by contrast, would have been to
accord protection to all substantially burdened conviction-motivated
conduct, be it religious, nonreligious, irreligious, or even antireligious.
Whether Congress would have the power to enact such inclusive
legislation is another matter entirely, because there is no obvious grant of
congressional power for the protection of dignity or autonomy. (Even the
Commerce Clause,' which grants Congress virtually boundless pow-
er, 8 probably could not be extended that far.) Accordingly, to the
extent that RFRA's patent lack of neutrality violates these nonestablishment
203. See Smith, supra note 43, at 202-04 (arguing that a religious liberty argument based on
personal autonomy cannot logically distinguish between religious and nonreligious activities and beliefs
that advance autonomy).
204. Cf. id. at 211 (noting that any governmental action "may offend some citizens and cause them
to feel like 'outsiders'").
205. C. id. at 222, 196-222 (evaluating five possible nonreligious rationales for religious freedom,
including personal autonomy and nonalienation, and concluding that, at best, "the propositions upon
which the nonreligious rationales rely-propositions about the special nature and consequences of
religion-might be true if understood in a theological sense, or in an aspirational sense with a theolog-
ical component").
206. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
207. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
208. C. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556-57 (1985) (holding that
even fundamental government functions of states are not immune from Congress's power of regulation
under the Commerce Clause).
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principles, the Act's constitutionality is called into question. Simply
because another part of the Constitution, such as Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment,' may appear to authorize the enactment of free
exercise legislation does not in itself remove the specter of uncon-
stitutionality under the Establishment Clause.10 Congress can no more
override this Clause in the name of protecting religious liberty than it can
override the Free Speech Clause under the guise of protecting abortion
rights. 2"'  Likewise, RFRA's nonneutrality should not avoid scrutiny
merely because it appears to reflect a "'favoritism toward religion' ...
[that] is inherent in the very text of that amendment. "212 A constitutional
amendment, such as the First Amendment, is of an entirely different order
than a statute, and what the people create and assent to through Article
Five13 ought not to be the measure of what Congress may create through
statutes that purport to interpret that amendment.2 4 Moreover, simply
because Congress in this instance is expanding rather than contracting the
scope of individual liberty is itself not a sufficient reason to dispose
temporarily of the rule of law and to gloss over a potential constitutional
transgression. Elsewhere I have argued that judicial interpretations of the
Free Exercise Clause generally should not be held to violate the
Establishment Clause, even if these interpretations could easily run afoul
of current nonestablishment doctrine.2 5 For obvious institutional and
structural reasons, however, this same allowance or grant of immunity
should not extend to federal statutes enacted to supplement or take the
place of the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted by the Supreme Court.2 6
209. See infra subpart H(B).
210. See Charles Fried, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: 7wo Concepts of Equality, 104 HARv.
L. REV. 107, 115 (1990) ("Congress is entitled to special deference in selecting the means to a constitu-
tionally permissible end under the equal protection clause, but section 5 does not render an end that
would be illegitimate if pursued by other legislative bodies constitutionally acceptable if pursued by
Congress.").
211. See, e.g., Riely v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693, 704 (D. Ariz. 1994); American Life League,
Inc. v. Reno, 855 F. Supp. 137, 142 (E.D. Va. 1994); Council for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856 F.
Supp. 1442, 1426 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (all upholding the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of
1994 (FACE) to the extent it does not violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment).
212. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the
Critics, 60 Go. WASH. L. Rsv. 685, 717 (1992) [hereinafter McConnell, Response].
213. U.S. CoNST. art. V (setting forth the processes for constitutional amendment).
214. Certainly Congress would not be amused by an administrative agency that measured its scope
of discretion by looking to its enabling statute and noticing how much discretion Congress itself
exercised when creating the statute.
215. Idleman, supra note 21, at 1375-76.
216. One commentator has argued that "[t]o hold that RFRA advances religion over nonreligion
would require holding that the Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause itself, which embodied
a compelling state interest test for nearly thirty years, violated the Establishment Clause by protecting
religious conduct." Pawa, supra note 72, at 1098-99. It is precisely this kind of argument, however,
that is precluded once we differentiate qualitatively between a judicial interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause and a congressional enactment of a free exercise statute.
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In short, if RFRA transgresses the Establishment Clause, then the inquiry
need go no further.
In response to these potential claims of unconstitutionality, RFRA
probably will be characterized as an "accommodation" statute.2"
Accommodation occurs when a governmental body designs or implements
one or more of its practices in such a way that a person's religious exercise
is facilitated."1 It may occur voluntarily or, when the government loses,
217. Alternatively and additionally, the term "religion" could be broadly construed to include
nonreligion as well. C. infra notes 279-82 and accompanying text (arguing that courts avoided
constitutional conflicts by construing the Selective Service Act's exemption of religious conscientious
objectors to include those whose beliefs are not based on any particular organized religion, despite the
Act's specific reference to religious training and belief). Although thoroughly in derogation of clear
statutory language and express constitutional intent, this is, indeed, a possibility. See, e.g., Conkle,
supra note 23 (arguing that "the Court could construe the term 'religion' broadly enough to avoid any
Establishment Clause issue that might otherwise be presented"); Marshall, supra note 23 (concluding
that construing RFRA to protect nonreligious beliefs may be desirable from a policy and constitutional
standpoint, but is probably not supportable by the language of the statute). More generally, it has
likewise been suggested that RFRA might be construed narrowly to avoid or minimize the possible
constitutional infirmity of the Act. See, e.g., Lupu, Uneasy Case, supra note 23 ("[C]onstitutional
concerns may produce constructions of RFRA that pull it back from the broadest possible reach, and
therefore minimize the constitutional tension it creates."). This narrow construction option is all the
more plausible, and perhaps practical, to the extent that my legal-cultural critique, as set forth in Part
I, is accurate.
218. The nature of accommodation, as well as reasons for and against its existence, are set forth
in a dialectical series of articles by Professors McConnell and Lupu. Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with
Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 743 (1992); McConnell, Response, supra note 212; Ira C.
Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of
Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985
SUP. CT. REV. 1. Discretionary governmental accommodation in cases involving burdened religious
exercise should not be confused with equal governmental treatment in cases involving religion-based
claims of equal access or equal benefits, because accommodation in the latter context, unlike the former
one, is normally not prohibited by, and may often be required by, the Constitution. Regarding equal
access, see Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2146-49
(1993) (holding unconstitutional a school district's denial of after-hours access to a church group
wishing to use school premises); and Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273 (1981) (holding that a
state university may not deny equal access to a registered student group simply because that group is
seeking to use those facilities for religious worship or discussion). Regarding equal receipt of benefits,
see Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2466-69 (1993) (holding that the
Establishment Clause does not bar the state from providing an interpreter to a deaf child attending a
Catholic school when the interpreter is provided as part of a general government program equally
available to any qualified child); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 608-09 (1988) (noting that the
Court has allowed religious institutions to participate in publicly sponsored social welfare programs
despite past Establishment Clause violations); Witters v. Washington Dep't ofServs. for the Blind, 474
U.S. 481, 488-89 (1986) (holding constitutional a state vocational rehabilitation program that provided
aid to a blind student at a religious college); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 401-02 (1983) (holding
constitutional a statute that provided for a tax deduction for elementary school expenses, even if
incurred by children at religious schools); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 746 (1976)
("[Religious institutions need not be quarantined from public benefits that are neutrally available to
all."); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741-42 (1973) (holding constitutional a state statute whose
benefits were available to all institutions of higher education regardless of any religious affiliation);
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 676-77 (1971) (holding constitutional a federal program providing
construction grants to colleges and universities, including religiously affiliated institutions); and Board
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may result from judicial compulsion, as in Sherbert and Yoder. 19
Conceptualizing RFRA as an accommodation statute would have significant
implications because the Court has effectively held that accommodation is
one of a handful of exceptions to the full application of Establishment
Clause doctrine.' In deciding whether a governmental action constitutes
permissible discretionary accommodation under the Clause, the Court has
looked to a number of factors, including (1) the extent to which the
governmentally created exemption is extended to nonreligious persons or
institutions, and not simply to religious ones;' 1 (2) whether the
exemption applies to all religions or whether it is preferential; m (3) the
degree to which the exemption accounts for the needs of the accommodat-
ing party, such as an employer, as opposed to being absolute;' (4) the
magnitude of the resulting burden placed on nonbeneficiaries; 2 (5) the
of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968) (holding constitutional a statute that required public
school authorities to lend textbooks to children at public and private schools, including religious
schools, free of charge).
219. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409-10 (1963) (allowing a Seventh-day Adventist to
observe Saturday as the Sabbath without losing unemployment benefits by declining jobs that required
Saturday work); wisconsinv. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,234 (1972) (preventing the state from compelling
Old Order Amish parents to send their children to school beyond the eighth grade).
220. The other major exception arises when the governmental action has a strong historical or
traditional dimension. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984) (upholding a city's
display of a nativity scene because it fell within a tradition of "official acknowledgment... of the role
of religion in American life"); see also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) (upholding the
Nebraska legislature's practice of beginning its sessions with a prayer by a state-sponsored chaplain
because the institution of legislative prayer was an "unbroken practice for two centuries in the National
Congress and for more than a century in Nebraska and in many other states"); Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 676-77 (1970) (recognizing an unbroken tradition of tax exemptions for religious institu-
tions). But see Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 19 n.8 (1989) ("The fact that [certain tax]
exemptions [for religious institutions] are of long standing cannot shield them from the strictures of the
Establishment Clause.").
221. See, e.g., Board of Edue. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481,
2487-92 (1994) (holding that a statute creating a school district comprised entirely of members of the
Satmar Hasidic sect violated the Establishment Clause); Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 15-17 (finding no
secular objective for a sales tax exemption because the exemption applied only to religious organiza-
tions).
222. See Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2493 ("[W]hatever the limits of permissible legislative
accommodations may be.... it is clear that neutrality as among religions must be honored." (citations
omitted)); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 711 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(concurring in the Court's decision that a statute was unconstitutional because it "single[d] out Sabbath
observers for special and ... absolute protection without according similar accommodation to ethical
and religious beliefs and practices of other private employees"); Walz, 397 U.S. at 672, 672-73
(upholding a property tax exemption in part because it "ha[d] not singled out one particular church or
religious group").
223. See, e.g., Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 709 (holding unconstitutional a statute that
imposed on employers "an absolute duty to conform their business practices to the particular religious
practices of the employee by forcing observance of the Sabbath the employeeunilaterally designates").
224. See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 15 (asking whether the exemption "burdens nonbeneficiaries
markedly"); Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 710 & n.9 (emphasizing the burdens that an unconstitu-
tional statute imposed on those employees unable to invoke a state Sabbath exemption).
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substantiality of the free exercise burden removed due to the exemp-
tion;' and (6) the extent to which permitting the accommodation might
induce, rather than simply facilitate, religious belief or practice.2
Needless to say, these are not bright-line considerations, and there
may very well be other criteria that have guided, or in the future will
guide, the Court's accommodation decisions.' Moreover, it is not clear
how many or which criteria must be satisfied before an alleged accom-
modation is deemed permissible. In fact, the greatest problem facing
RFRA in this respect is not the absence of criteria, but rather the existence
of serious division within the Court and hence a substantial degree of
uncertainty and instability in its doctrine.' These problems have not
been lessened by changes in the Court's membership over the last several
years. Two of the Court's most recent accommodation cases, Corporation
of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Amos 9 and Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,' illustrate these
problems as well as the starkly different analyses to which an alleged
accommodation may be subjected.
In Amos, the Court unanimously upheld an exemption for religious
organizations from Title VII's prohibition against religious discrimination
in employment 31 Five Justices supported the majority opinion (two of
which, Justices White and Powell, have since retired), while four justices
concurred in the judgment (three of which, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun, have also since retired). Writing for the Court, Justice White
crafted an unusually strong doctrine of accommodation. Beginning with
the premise that the "Court has long recognized that the government may
(and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and that it may do
so without violating the Establishment Clause,"2 32 the Court held that
"laws 'affording a uniform benefit to all religions' should be analyzed
under Lemon."' Justice White then proceeded to conduct one of the
225. See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 15 (asking whether an exemption can "reasonably be seen
as removing a significant state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise of religion").
226. See McConnell, Response, supra note 212, at 700-02 (distinguishing accommodations that
remove a significant obstacle to the exercise of religious belief from those that induce a person to adopt
a religion in order to benefit from the accommodation).
227. I should note, however, that these are substantially similar to the four accommodationfactors
discerned by Professor Michael McConnell. See id. at 698-708.
228. See Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76
GEo. L.J. 1691, 1695, 1692-95 (1988) (analyzing two accommodation cases and concluding that "the
Court has not yet fully developed the accommodation principle").
229. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
230. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
231. Amos, 483 U.S. at 335-36.
232. Id. at 334 (citation omitted) (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S.
136, 144-45 (1987)).
233. Id. at 339 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original) (quoting Larsonv. Valente, 456 U.S. 228,
252 (1982)).
290 [Vol. 73:247
Pushing the Limits of Legislative Power
most deferential and least logically convincing Establishment Clause
analyses ever undertaken by the Court. In regard to Lemon's secular
purpose requirement, for example, Justice White simply declared, without
support, that "it is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant
governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to
define and carry out their religious missions."' Likewise, Justice White
adopted a relatively narrow definition of Lemon's effect requirement-that
the primary effect of a governmental action must not be to advance reli-
gion 3 -by focusing not on the dimension of effect as such, but rather
on the level of governmental involvement: "For a law to have forbidden
'effects' under Lemon," he said, "it must be fair to say that the government
itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence."3
And on the issue of neutrality, which theoretically arises any time the state
treats religion differently than it does nonreligion, Justice White said that
it is not a concern when the government is lifting burdens as opposed to
granting benefits: "Where ... government acts with the proper purpose
of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no
reason to require that the exemption come packaged with benefits to secular
entities."7
Based solely on these statements and principles from Amos, it would
be entirely reasonable to conclude that RFRA is facially constitutional
under the Establishment Clause despite its apparent religious purpose and
inherent favoritism of religious practices over analogous nonreligious
practices. Yet, because much of Justice White's reasoning and dicta were
basically unsupported, either by logic or precedent, Amos should be under-
stood as a relatively unreliable case." To be sure, Amos suffers from
the very same condition that afflicted the pre-Smith cases-a failure to
articulate the underlying principles and rationales for religious liberty239-
which is one reason that Justice Scalia could so easily rearrange free
exercise doctrine in Smith.' °
234. Id. at 335.
235. Lemony. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
236. Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 (emphasis in original).
237. Id. at 338.
238. As Justice Schaefer of the Supreme Court of Illinois once noted, "[A]n opinion... whose
premises are concealed ... is not likely to enjoy either a long life or the capacity to generate
offspring." Walter V. Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHj. L. REv. 3, 11 (1966).
239. See William P. Marshall, Truth and the Religion Clauses, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 243, 243
(1994) (arguing that "[t]here is little agreement as to what values underlie the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment" and that religion clause jurisprudence is "perceived as shallow, inconsistent, and
nonpersuasive").
240. Professor Robert Destro suggested that the Court's lack of understanding of the theoretical
basis for religious liberty is one factor that made Smith possible:
[I]f Smith is bad constitutional law, it is not because the majority rejected the sort of
multi-factor balancing which has come to characterize much of the case law in the field
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Yet if Amos can be considered short on logic and reasoning, then
Texas Monthly can be considered short on Justices. Indeed, while Justice
Brennan's opinion announcing the six-to-three judgment in Texas Monthly
involved a much more sophisticated analysis, the opinion itself garnered the
approval of only two other Justicesl 1 only one of which, Justice
Stevens, remains on the Court. (Although I should further note that the
specific holding of unconstitutionality under the Establishment Clause was
supported by two other Justices, "2 for a total of five.) At issue in the
case was the constitutionality of a Texas statute that created a state sales
and use tax exemption for religious periodicals but not for nonreligious
periodicals. 3 In striking down the statute, Justice Brennan invoked the
standards of Lemon in conjunction with at least three of the accommodation
criteria set forth above:'" the inclusion of nonreligious beneficiaries, the
burden on nonbeneficiaries, and the substantiality of the burden re-
moved.' Based on these principles, he offered the following analytical
framework:
Insofar as [a tax exemption or subsidy] is conferred on a wide array
of nonsectarian groups as well as religious organizations in pursuit
of some legitimate secular end, the fact that religious groups benefit
incidentally does not deprive the subsidy of the secular purpose and
primary effect mandated by the Establishment Clause. However,
when government directs a subsidy exclusively to religious organiza-
tions that is not required by the Free Exercise Clause and that either
burdens nonbeneficiaries markedly or cannot reasonably be seen as
removing a significant state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise of
religion, ... it "provide[s] unjustifiable awards of assistance to
religious organizations" and cannot but "conve[y] a message of
endorsement" to slighted members of the community.'
Then, noting that "[i]t is difficult to view Texas' narrow exemption as
anything but state sponsorship of religious belief, regardless of whether one
adopts the perspective of beneficiaries or of uncompensated
of substantive due process, but because the precedents upon which [sic] rests are
defective. The Supreme Court's understanding of the extent of religious liberty... has
been a crabbed one since the late 1800s.
Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 3, at 309.
241. Justice Brennan's opinion was joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens. Texas Monthly, Inc.
v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989).
242. Id. at 28-29 (Blackmun, J., joined by O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
243. Id. at 5-6.
244. For a list and explanation of the accommodation criteria, see supra notes 221-26 and
accompanying text.
245. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 8-20.
246. Id. at 14-15 (footnote omitted) (brackets in original) (quoting Amos, 483 U.S. at 348
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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contributors," 7 Justice Brennan concluded that the Establishment Clause
had necessarily been violated on at least two grounds: "[b]ecause Texas'
sales tax exemption for periodicals promulgating the teaching of any
religious sect lacks a secular objective that would justify this preference
along with similar benefits for nonreligious publications or groups, and
because it effectively endorses religious belief .... I
In turn, if one were to examine the facial constitutionality of RFRA
based solely on the statements and princibles from Texas Monthly, one
could plausibly conclude that the Act violates the Establishment Clause,
notwithstanding its benevolent purpose of ensuring religious accommoda-
tion. Indeed, it is precisely because of this purpose and its intended effects
that the Act seems inconsistent with the stated reasoning of Texas Monthly.
Clearly, many of the accommodations under RFRA will "not [be] required
by the Free Exercise Clause' --that is, after all, the whole purpose of
the Act. The question under Texas Monthly, then, would seem to be
whether RFRA either will burden "nonbeneficiaries markedly or [will not]
reasonably be seen as removing a significant state-imposed deterrent to the
free exercise of religion. " ' Because the Act requires that religious
exercise be substantially burdened, the latter alternative would appear to be
satisfied. As for the former alternative, however, it is an open question
that will turn largely on the facts of each case and the predisposition of the
bench. The Texas Monthly Court, for one, appeared to suggest that even
a slight burden on the nonreligious would be sufficient to invalidate a
benefit to religion-not receiving the tax exemption was apparently suffi-
cient-and indeed the Court's decision seemed to hinge mostly on the lack
of a secular purpose. To be sure, these criteria from Texas Monthly are
difficult to apply to RFRA on its face because RFRA is not truly an
accommodation statute; instead, it is a statute that directs all government
actors to make accommodations in all situations-a distinction that may
have additional constitutional ramifications and hence will be revisited
below."1 That distinction notwithstanding, the bottom line is that Amos
and Texas Monthly, taken together, demonstrate that the present law of
accommodation is both uncertain and shifting. While the outcomes in these
cases could no doubt be reconciled, the reasoning and principles on which
these outcomes expressly relied in many instances simply cannot.
Unfortunately, this dialectic of modern accommodation cases achieved
little if any synthesis in the Court's most recent decision, Board of
247. Id. at 15.
248. Id. at 17.
249. Id. at 15.
250. Id.
251. See infra text accompanying notes 260-70.
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Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet,"2 which held
unconstitutional a legislature's creation of a state school district specifically
to accommodate the needs of an Hasidic community in upstate New
York. 3 Writing for the Court, Justice Souter rested the holding on two
related grounds: (1) that the creation of a school district brought with it
governmental power and that this creation, and hence this delegation,
impermissibly turned on the criterion of religious identity;' and (2) that
even though the state alleged neutrality in its decisionmaking, the case-
specific nature of creating school districts would preclude the Court from
verifying and ensuring such neutrality in the future. 5  What might
Grumet have to say about the constitutionality of RFRA? In some respects,
it has very little to say because its factual and procedural history was so
uniqueY6 Moreover, it seems to give equal deference, rhetorically at
least, to both Amos and Texas Monthly, 7 thus perpetuating the logical
tension between them. In other respects, however, Grumet arguably does
have something to say about the validity of RFRA. According to Professor
Daniel Conkle, for example, Grumet "suggests that RFRA's generalized
scheme of accommodations might actually mitigate one Establishment
Clause concern, the risk of selective accommodations that discriminate
among similar religious claims."" 5 By creating a national mandate for
accommodations, in other words, Congress has effectively preempted state
and local discretion in this realm, discretion that might have otherwise been
exercised in a discriminatory manner.
Perhaps one of the most provocative aspects of RFRA-and one that
renders it difficult to assess relative to existing accommodation cases such
as Grumet-is that the Act is not really an accommodation statute at all, but
rather an across-the-board mandate of accommodation for all religious
claimants in all governmental situations. To be sure, the paradigmatic
discretionary accommodation scenario involves a decision by an agency or
legislature to exempt an identifiable religious claimant or a religious class
of persons, often nonmainstream, from the application of its otherwise
generally applicable actions or statutes, either on a case-by-case basis (such
as when a claimant petitions an agency) or on a facial basis (such as when
the policy or statute expressly contains an exemption). RFRA, by contrast,
252. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
253. Id. at 2491.
254. Id. at 2487-90.
255. Id. at 2491-92.
256. See generally id. at 2485-87 (discussing the circumstances surrounding the creation of a
separate school district that was the subject of the litigation).
257. Id. at 2492-93 (citingAmos for the proposition that the Establishment Clause leaves sufficient
rom for accommodation, then suggesting that the permissible limits of such accomhmodation may be
gleaned from a comparison of Amos and Texas Monthly).
258. Conkle, supra note 23, at 41 n.180 (citing Grumer, 114 S. Ct. at 2491-93).
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is essentially a command to each one of these agencies and legislatures that
it must, absent a compelling interest and the use of least restrictive means,
accommodate all substantially burdened religious exercise.259
RFRA's fundamental nature in this regard raises at least two additional
issues: First, the Act simply does not conform to the basic logic of
accommodation and thus offends the religion clauses at a nondoctrinal
level, and second, even if RFRA is facially valid, its deliberately sweeping
application may independently and repeatedly give rise to Establishment
Clause violations. With respect to the first issue, there may be a concern
that even if the Act is not constitutionally disabled by its lack of neutrality,
RFRA may not be the kind of accommodation that the Court in Smith, and
in its prior cases directly addressing accommodation, had in mind.' To
see this, it is first necessary to step back and examine the basic premises
and expectations underlying the concept of accommodation. According to
the mainstream or conventional view, individualized legislative or ad-
ministrative accommodation is a practical necessity, some might say a
necessary evil, arising from the coexistence of religious pluralism and
democratic government. 1 It balances respect for the primacy of govern-
ment with respect for an individual's or group's beliefs while recognizing
the pragmatic political importance of minimizing disenfranchisement (and
thus disorder) as well as the social utility that may arise from individual
and institutional religious practice.' 2  Accommodation is not necessarily
based on the premise that free exercise is an antecedent, inalienable right,
but rather on the view that the protection of free exercise is, to a certain
extent, both politically necessary and civilly proper. Hence, the Court has
permitted governmental attempts to "alleviate significant... interference
with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their
religious missions, " ' but has frowned upon the notion that religious
individuals should have "a right to dictate the conduct of the Government's
internal procedures"' or that the government's ability to conduct
business should "depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action
259. See Lupu, Statutes, supra note 10, at 60-61 (noting that unlike traditional statutes
accommodating religion, RFRA contains no narrow or context-specific focus, but instead is a broad,
across-the-board mandate). Professor Lupu places this consideration under his analysis of Congress's
Section Five power, although his observations are equally relevant here.
260. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (acknowledging instances of
accommodation and recognizing that its decision would "leav[e] accommodation to the political
process").
261. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 239, at 244-45 (discussing the argument that religious
pluralism facilitates the functioning of a democratic society).
262. See, e.g., Idleman, supra note 21, at 1359-60 & nn.159-60; Marshall, supra note 239, at
246-52 (both discussing several utility-based rationales for protecting religious liberty).
263. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987).
264. Bowenv. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 700 (1986).
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on a religious objector's spiritual development."' As the Court said in
Lee, "[t]o maintain an organized society that guarantees religious freedom
to a great variety of religious faiths requires that some religious practices
yield to the common good. Religious beliefs can be accommodated, but
there is a point at which accommodation would 'radically restrict the
operating latitude of the legislature.'" '
Of course, one need not agree with these principles and statements,
and I for one do not. 7 Nevertheless, they would appear to explain and
delineate the Court's current understanding of free exercise accommoda-
tion, and it is this understanding that will largely determine the validity and
propriety of RFRA's accommodation scheme. What exactly is the conflict,
then, between the Act and these principles? At the very least, RFRA
seems directly to ignore the Court's chief concern that governments be
relatively unencumbered in their operation by imposing upon them a
presumption of free exercise infringement whenever a substantial burden
can be demonstrated. The problem is not that Congress, drawing from the
above framework of accommodation, has simply arrived at a different
balance of the interests. Rather, it is that Congress has basically ignored
the state's interests (in all but the most compelling situations) and has
unduly imbued free exercise with a degree of priority that is inconsistent
with these interests.' It has, in a very real sense, created a regime in
which the validity of the state's conduct will indeed "depend on measuring
the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual
development."' Needless to say, RFRA's across-the-board nature only
aggravates this conflict.
The second concern in this regard is the substantial likelihood of
generating Establishment Clause transgressions in the application of the
Act. That is to say, even if RFRA is facially valid, it is quite probable that
independent violations of the Establishment Clause will result from
particular governmental attempts to accommodate religious practices in
accordance with its requirements. (Indeed, even if one accepts that there
is a realm of discretionary accommodations between what the Free Exercise
Clause requires and what the Establishment Clause prohibits, RFRA would
265. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988).
266. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982) (citations omitted) (quoting Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)).
267. Cf. Idlernan, supra note 21, at 1366-72 (arguing that religious freedom is best conceptualized
as an inalienable right and that, once so conceived, it necessarily warrants substantial governmental
deference).
268. l am speaking largely of effect. I realize that the Act itself is specifically written to preclude
this interpretation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (Supp. V 1993) (enumerating the congressional
finding that "the compelling interest as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for
striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests").
269. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451.
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appear to have eliminated a substantial portion of it, thus maximizing the
natural tension between free exercise and nonestablishment.) The risk of
excessive entanglement, for instance, would seem to be considerable in
light of the deliberately prospective, highly conspicuous, and thus readily
accessible nature of RFRA, which, after all, is essentially a civil rights
statute. To what extent, for example, will state and federal agencies now
have to conduct "free exercise infringement studies," much in the same
way the latter are presently required to conduct environmental impact
studies,' every time they undertake an action that may place substantial
burdens on religious practices? Certainly that would be one prudent
legislative and administrative response to the Act, particularly considering
the legal costs that may result from violating its requirements." In the
process of undertaking such studies, however, the government necessarily
and continually must involve itself in assessing various religious beliefs and
practices, an activity that in turn might require the assistance of clergy.
Again, this may seem a bit extreme (and perhaps too circumspect on the
part of many agencies), but in light of the risks, anything less would be
270. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (requiring the preparation of an
environmental impact statement for any "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment").
271. See, e.g., James Andrews, Clinton Steps Up Enforcement of New Religious Freedom Act,
CHISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Oct. 27, 1994, at 3 (discussing a new federal policy directing each federal
department "to prepare a report on religious-rights issues that could arise in the course of the
department's operations" and to designate "a staff lawyer to raise a red flag whenever a policy,
regulation, or enforcement action could violate the religious-freedom act"). This is, more or less, the
process currently employed under the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, which requires federal
departments to "evaluate their policies and procedures in consultation with native traditional religious
leaders to determine changes necessary to protect and preserve Native American religious cultural rights
and practices." 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Indeed, the U.S. Department of Justice
has raised the possibility of a so-called "Larkin problem," see infra text accompanying notes 272-78,
with the proposed Native American Free Exercise of Religion Act (NAFERA), although the unique
inter-governmental nature of federal government-Indian relations, among other factors, may provide
a means to avoid constitutional invalidity under Larkin. See, e.g., Native American Free Exercise of
Religious Freedom Act: Hearings on S. 1021 Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess. 58-59 (1993) (statement of Gerald Torres, Counsel to the Attorney General of the United
States) ("The crucial similarity between Larkin and NAFERA is that both vests [sic] religious groups
with unilateral authority to stop Government action. We believe in order to avoid any constitutional
problems, such unilateral authority should be replaced .... ."); Hearings on S. 1021, supra note 193,
at 117-20 (statement of Professor Mitner S. Ball) (suggesting that while an Establishment Clause
argument "might be drawn" from Larkin, NAFERA is nevertheless constitutional because the position
in which it places Native American religions is, unlike that of the churches in Larkin, "not a privileged
position but a necessary one"); id. at 141 n.60 (statement of Professor Michael W. McConnell)
(asserting that a Larkin argument would be "extremely farfetched" because NAFERA, unlike the statute
in Larkin, does little more than authorize Native Americans to "freeze the status quo" while consulting
with the government about actions that may affect them); see also Martin C. Loesch, The First
Americans and the 'Free" Exercise of Religion, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 313, 368 (1993) (noting
similar concerns, addressed by Professors Laurence Tribe and David Williams, in relation to proposed
amendments to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act).
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imprudent. In the 1982 case of Larkin. v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,'
however, the Supreme Court invalidated a state zoning statute precisely
because it "enmeshe[d] churches in the processes of government."' By
effectively giving each church the authority to veto applications for liquor
licenses within a 500-foot radius of itself or a school, the statute thus ran
afoul of "the core rationale underlying the Establishment Clause" of
"preventing 'a fusion of governmental and religious functions."' 24 In
the words of the Court, "[tihe Framers did not set up a system of govern-
ment in which important, discretionary governmental powers would be
delegated to or shared with religious institutions."' 5  It is true, of
course, that the government's use of religious advisors need not lead to the
degree of entanglement at issue in Larkin, but the risk of constitutionally
impermissible entanglement exists nevertheless. 6 As the Court recently
said in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v.
Grumet,'27 a case relying heavily on Larkin, "[tihat individuals who
happen to be religious may hold public office does not mean that a state
may deliberately delegate discretionary power to an individual, institution,
or community on the ground of religious identity." '
In closing this section of the analysis, I would like to address two final
issues regarding the Act's constitutionality under the Establishment Clause,
the first of which concerns the logical extension of my nonestablishment
analysis, and the second of which concerns the apparent lack of rigor with
which RFRA's proponents have approached the issue of the Act's constitu-
tionality. Regarding the first point, is it not true that by calling into
question RFRA's constitutional validity, essentially because of its lack of
neutrality, I am necessarily calling into question the constitutionality of
countless other legal enactments that appear to single out religious status
or conduct for beneficial treatment? The answer, quite frankly, is yes and
no, depending on the nature and interpretation of the enactment. Consider,
for instance, the singular exemption in the Selective Service Act (SSA) for
religious conscientious objectors. 9  Clearly, this is analogous to RFRA
272. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
273. Id. at 127.
274. Id. at 126 (quoting School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222
(1963)).
275. Id. at 127 (citations omitted).
276. I revisit the issue of unconstitutional applications of RFRA in greater detail in subpart 1e(A),
which examines the possible interpretive relationships between RFRA and the Establishment Clause.
277. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
278. Id. at 2489.
279. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1988) (exempting any person from "combatant training and
service in the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is
conscientiously opposid to participation in war in any form" and providing that "the term 'religious
training and belief' does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a
merely personal moral code"). Prior to a 1967 amendment, this subsection defined the term "religious
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in terms of its lack of facial neutrality, and thus it might seem suspect as
well. Since at least the Vietnam War era, however, courts have regularly
interpreted the exemption to include nonreligious objections to war as long
as they are based on beliefs that are functionally equivalent to religious
beliefs.' Professor Choper notes,. for example, that in Welsh v. United
States," the Court specifically "avoided the constitutional question of
whether this constituted an establishment of religion by construing the
statute to exempt a very broad class of conscientious objectors." m
Hence, not only is the SSA apparently constitutional, but the fact that the
Court felt compelled to read its conscientious objection exemption broadly
further calls into question the constitutionality of RFRA.
Fair enough, but perhaps this was too easy a case in light of Welsh.
The more difficult case, quite honestly, is that of state constitutional
provisions analogous to the First Amendment that preferentially protect
religious liberty, in some cases on expressly theistic grounds or in
expressly theistic terms. To what extent could they be considered
constitutionally viable if RFRA were invalidated for its lack of neutrality
in purpose or effect? As a practical matter, of course, the Court would
never find them unconstitutional, if only for the prudential reason of
training and belief" as "an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior
to those arising from any human relation." See 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1958) (amended 1967).
280. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965) (concluding that "the test of belief
'in a relation to a Supreme Being' is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a
place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly
qualifies for the exemption"); see also United States v. Haughton, 413 F.2d 736, 741 (9th Cir. 1969)
("One who is entitled to conscientious objector status because of his religious training and belief does
not lose that right because political and moral concerns lead him to the same position."); Thomas v.
Salatich, 328 F. Supp. 18, 21 (E.D. La. 1971) ("It is not necessary that the beliefs in question be
religious in the sense that they are based on belief in a deity or on the doctrines of a particular
religion."); Deckerv. Wheeler, 331 F. Supp. 347,350 (D. Minn. 1970) ('It is sufficient that one have
faith and by reason of that faith is opposed to participation in all wars."); Weber v. Inacker, 317 F.
Supp. 651, 656 (E.D. Pa. 1970) ('If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs which are purely
ethical or moral in source or content but which nevertheless impose upon him a duty of conscience to
refrain from participating in any war at any time, those beliefs . . . entitle that individual to a
'religious' conscientious objector exemption under [the Selective Service Act].").
281. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
282. Jesse H. Choper, Congressional Power to Expand Judicial Definitions of the Substantive
Terms of the Civil WarAmendments, 67 MINN. L. RsV. 299, 336-37 (1982) (citing Welsh, 398 U.S.
at 342); cf. Tushnet, supra note 228, at 1695 (noting that the Supreme Court has avoided addressing
the constitutionality of Title VnI's facially nonneutral mandate that employers accommodate religious
practices by construing the "reasonable accommodation" requirement to place only a de miimus
burden on employers).
283. The most explicit are Rhode Island's, which begins with "[w]hereas Almighty God hath
created the mind free," R.I. CONSr. art. 1, § 3, and Virginia's, which speaks of "religion or the duty
which we owe to our Creator" and "the mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love, and
charity," VA. CONsr. art. 1, § 16. For further examples, see generally EDD'DoERR & ALBERT J.
MENDBNDEZ, REaIOious LIBERTY AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 14-16, 31-100, 107-10 (1993).
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maintaining its political legitimacy.' As a doctrinal and theoretical
matter, however, the proper outcome would not be quite as certain. If the
Court were to hold them constitutional, it would most likely do so by
locating them within the Establishment Clause exception for historical or
traditional practices -- practices that.have "become part of the fabric of
our society."' This is a somewhat dubious exception, 7 but if it is
large enough to include legislative prayer and sponsorship of a Protestant
chaplain," s it is doubtless large enough to include state constitutional
provisions enacted to protect religious freedom. At the same time,
however, it is not clearly large enough to include RFRA, for there is no
"unbroken practice for two centuries in the National Congress"' of
requiring all state and federal governmental agencies to accommodate every
substantially burdened religious practice of the American people absent a
compelling interest and the use of the least restrictive means.
The final issue I would like to address is of a very different nature and
concerns the apparent failure of RFRA's proponents to question more
rigorously the possible unconstitutionality of the Act under the Establish-
ment Clause. The most obvious reason is that the contemporary liberals
who normally might raise an Establishment Clause issue-most notably the
ACLU-have simply kept silent.2' Either they have not seen the
284. But cf. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 629 (1978) (invalidating a Tennessee state constitu-
tional provision prohibiting any member of the clergy from serving in the state legislature); Torcaso
v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961) (invalidating a Maryland state constitutional provision requiring
a declaration of a belief in God as a prerequisite to holding public office).
285. See supra note 220.
286. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983).
287. Professor Carter illustrated one of the problems with this exception in The Culture of
DisbelW.
[Ilt is easy to see why the Court is reluctant to hold that the fabric of society includes
some threads of unconstitutionality, but it is difficult to imagine how that can be the right
test. Racial segregation was once part of the fabric of our society; so was prohibiting the
women's vote, and corrupt patronage politics in the big cities.
CARTER, supra note 21, at 114.
288. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793-95 (upholding the Nebraska legislature's practice of employing
a clergyman to pray at its sessions because it was a long-standing tradition).
289. Id. at 795.
290. The ACLU's tendency to advocate highly secularist and separationist readings of the First
Amendment is well documented and is often the source of frustration for those who do not completely
share the organization'p inclinations. See, e.g., David Cole, Are You Now or Have You Ever Been a
Member of the ACLU?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1404, 1421 & n.74 (1992) (book review) (pointing out that
in the public education context, absolute or neutral positions are often not available when religious
freedom conflicts with other liberal values and that the ACLU, in an effort to appear to take such
positions, has at times simply ignored the former in favorof the latter); Douglas Laycock, EqualAccess
and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REV.
1, 17 & n.92, 52-53 (1986) (noting that the ACLU denounced the Equal Access Act as "a flagrant
violation of the establishment clause" and calling the ACLU's position "puzzling" in light of Supreme
Court doctrine, logic, and the fact that the statute "on its face is a great victory for civil liberties");
Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools, 104 HARV.
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conflict, an oversight which is unlikely given their watchdog posture, or
they have been willing to ignore or subordinate one liberal principle
(secular government through the formal separation of religion and govern-
ment) in order to further another (individual liberty through a vigorous
doctrine of free exercise). Indeed, not only are liberals in a bind regarding
RFRA, but a claim of unconstitutionality would further indicate that liberal-
minded legislation of a similar nature, such as the American Indian Reli-
gious Freedom Act,291 may likewise be unconstitutional. 2' In short,
RFRA appears to be a true liberal's dilemma, and for this reason it is not
surprising that such atypical alignments of interest groups collectively
supported its passage,' despite the colorable claims of unconstitution-
ality that it raises.'
What, then, is the final verdict on RFRA's validity under the Estab-
lishment Clause? If we take current doctrine at face value, the answer is
that we simply do not know. We may not believe that this doctrine is
either sound or desirable,' but it is the formal law of nonestablishment
at present, and no amount of sophistry can change that fact. As for the
Court's likely disposition of the issue, there is a strong chance that RFRA
L. Rav. 989, 1025 n.119 (1991) ("The ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project has conducted the
litigation in both [Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988)] and the Title X cases, taking inconsistent
positions on free speech rights of grantees depending on whether the speech is in favor of abortion or
religion."). Indeed, the ACLU spearheaded the unsuccessful challenge to § 702 of Title VII, which
accommodates the hiring needs of religious employers, in part because that provision, like RFRA,
exceeded the requirements of the Free Exercise Clause as construed by the Supreme Court and
preferentially discriminated pursuant to the criterion of religious identity. See Appellees' Brief,
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327 (1987) (Nos. 86-179, 86-401); Appellees' Motion to Affirm, Amos (Nos. 86-179, 86-401).
At least on its face, such vigorous advocacy in Amos seems difficult to reconcile with the ACLU's
apparent decision not to question RFRA's constitutionality at all during the House and Senate
Committee hearings. Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 3, at 63 (statement of Nadine Strossen,
President, National Board of Directors, ACLU); Hearing on S. 2969, supra note 68, at 171 (statement
of Nadine Strossen, President, National Board of Directors, ACLU).
291. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
292. But cf. Hearings on S. 1021, supra note 193, at 280, 286 (statement of Jack F. Trope,
Counsel to the Association on American Indian Affairs, Inc.) (concluding that the proposed Native
American Free Exercise of Religion Act is constitutional under both the Establishment Clause and
Section Five of the 14th Amendment).
293. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
294. RFRA is also a libertarian's dilemma from the perspective of congressional power, whether
that power is grounded in the 14th Amendment or in one or more provisions of Article I. The liberty
of RFRA may be substantial, but it comes at the price of formally acknowledging broad congressional
power to legislate on matters, such as free exercise, that constitute the core of individual freedom.
295. Criticism of current Establishment Clause analysis is notable if only for its abundance. See
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2150 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (fisting numerous Justices and scholars who have criticized Lemon); Mary A. Glendon &
Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Eercise, 90 MiCH. L. Rzv. 477, 478 (1991) (noting that the religion
jurisprudence of the First Amendment "has been described on all sides, and even by Justices
themselves, as unprincipled, incoherent, and unworkable").
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will be found constitutional, given the Justices' general posture of
deference towards legislative judgments in recent years, 21 combined with
its specific trend in favor of upholding legislative accommodations' and
its indication in Smith that legislative accommodations are often appro-
priate." Yet, even this essentially nondoctrinal assessment of its
constitutionality is vulnerable to criticism: The Court in recent years has
not always been deferential to Congress,2' has not always upheld legis-
lative accommodations, and gave no indication in Smith that a statute
in the particular nature of RFRA would be upheld." 1 The bottom line,
therefore, is that RFRA's constitutionality under the Establishment Clause
is fundamentally an open question and that the declarations of constitution-
ality by the Act's proponents may be at best misleading, and at worst
mistaken.
B. Does RFRA Exceed Congress's Enforcement Power?
The Establishment Clause is neither the only nor the most obvious
source of potential unconstitutionality for RFRA. There is also the more
basic question of congressional power. Although not stated on the face of
the Act, the specific provisional basis for RFRA is apparently Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of [the
Fourteenth Amendment]."302 The relevant "provision" of that
296. See Glendon & Yanes, supra note 295, at 478 ("[T]he Court as a whole seems to be veering
toward a posture of reflexive deference to the elected branches of governmentwhere religion issues are
concerned.").
297. See McConnell, Response, supra note 212, at 695-96 (concluding that currently "[t]he Free
Exercise Clause no longer is interpreted to require accommodation in most instances, but the
Establishment Clause no longer is interpreted to interfere with them, in most instances").
298. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (noting that "a number of States
have made an exception to their drug laws for sacramental peyote use").
299. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992) (declaring the Low Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act's take-title provision to be an unconstitutional violation of the 10th
Amendment).
300. See, e.g., Board ofEduc. ofKiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2484
(1994) (striking down a New York law that 'carved out a separate [school] district" serving the
population of a particular religious enclave); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989)
(nullifying a Texas law exempting from sales tax certain periodicals because of their affiliation with a
religious faith).
301. Regarding the relationship between Smith and RFRA, Professor Lupu has argued:
[A] narrow reading [of the Act] appears at first glance to be inconsistent with the Smith
opinion's invitation to the political branches to accommodate religion. More careful
inspection of the opinion and its premises, however, reveals that the RFRA is by no
means responsive to the terms of that invitation.... Its reference to political-branch
accommodation was a plea that interest-balancing take place at the time of policy
enactment ....
Lupu, Separationism, supra note 114, at 275-76 (footnotes omitted).
302. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see S. REP. No. 111, supra note 86, at 14 (stating that
RFRA "falls squarely" within Congress's Section Five power); Conkle, supra note 23, at 22 n.94 ("It
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Amendment is, in turn, Section One, which among other things prohibits
states from "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law."' And in the case of religious freedom, the
relevant term is "liberty," for it was through this term that the Court
incorporated the First Amendment religion clauses, thus rendering them
applicable to state and local governments.'
This much is straightforward textual interpretation. Whether this
interpretation is valid, however, hinges on the answers to two critical
questions. The first is whether Section Five gives Congress the power to
interpret and statutorily enforce the substantive liberties in the Bill of
Rights, such as the free exercise of religion, whose only link to the
Fourteenth Amendment stems from judicial incorporation. More specific-
ally, does Congress have the power to enforce its own interpretation of
those liberties against state and local governments? Assuming that Section
Five does give Congress this power, the second question is whether RFRA
constitutes a valid effort to "enforce, by appropriate legislation,"' the
First Amendment guarantee of religious liberty and particularly whether the
breadth and nature of RFRA fall within the power accorded to Congress
under Section Five. Only if these two questions are answerable in the
affirmative can RFRA be held to be constitutional as a matter of legislative
power under Section Five.'
is hard to imagine any plausible source of congressional power [to promulgate RFRA] other than
§ 5."). Moreover, RFRA's proponents assumethat Section Five is the intended source of congressional
power. E.g., Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 3, at 353 (statement of Professor Douglas Laycock);
Laycock, RFRA, supra note 17, at 245; Rex E. Lee, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act:
Legislative Choice and Judicial Review, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 73, 90. For an analysis of the Act's
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause, see Lupu, Statutes, supra note 10, at 56-58. In light of
New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2408, Professor Lupu suggests that the Commerce Clause may not fully
support RFRA and that, as a result, "the constitutional underpinnings for the ... Act may be thrown
back on the scope of congressional power to expand the substantive reach of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Lupu, Statutes, supra note 10, at 58. That is to say, even if the Commerce Clause is
raised as a source of congressional authority, RFRA may still have to be assessed pursuant to Section
Five of the 14th Amendment.
303. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
304. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (citing the "preservation of civil
liberty," from Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 680 (1871), as support for applying the Establishment
Clause to the states through the 14th Amendment); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940)
("[C]ensorship of religion ... is a denial of liberty protected by the First Amendment and included
in the liberty which is within the protection of the Fourteenth.").
305. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
306. I should note that if RFRA is found to violate the Establishment Clause, then it would auto-
matically violate Section Five because one of the few discernible limitations on Congress's Section Five
power is that legislation may not transgress other constitutional rights or protections. See Laycock,
RFRA, supra note 17, at 249 (noting that the requirement that Congress not "'restrict, abrogate, or
dilute' the protections of the Bill of Rights in the guise of enforcing them" limits its 14th Amendment
power (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966))).
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1. Can Congress Enforce Its Own Interpretation of the First
Amendment Against the States?-The first and most fundamental question
is whether Congress has the power under Section Five to devise and
enforce its own interpretations of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights-in
this case the free exercise guarantee of the First Amendment-against the
states. Put differently, should "the provisions" referred to in Section Five,
when interpreted to mean the Bill of Rights, be defined solely by their
judicial construction, or does Congress's enforcement power include the
authority to construe them differently? Contrary to the affirmative answer
given by RFRA's proponents, the truth is that no one really knows because
the Court has never addressed this question directly.' Although it is
true that free exercise, as an incorporated right, is today as much a part of
the Fourteenth Amendment as equal protection, it would be unfounded and
formalistic to assume that the Court will give Congress the same power to
interpret the former as it has to interpret the latter. Neither the Court's
cases interpreting Section Five in other contexts, such as equal protection,
nor the history of the framing of Section Five necessarily leads to this
outcome. As one supporter of RFRA said before its enactment, "[a]bout
the only matter on which one can be confident in this regard is that if the
bill becomes law, there will be a challenge to its constitutionality."'s
a. The judicially determined scope of Section Five.-What the
Court has decided in this regard is that Section Five gives Congress the
power to enact at least two types of legislation. First, the Court has held
that Congress has substantial power to legislate in furtherance of equal
protection principles-to guarantee by statute, and to refine the meaning of,
constitutional equality.' For example, the Court has upheld Section
307. Much commentary has been written on the nature and scope of congressional power under
Section Five, particularly in relation to the power of the federal courts, yet surprisingly little of it
addresses this specific question. E.g., Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its
Power to Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV. 57 (1986); Robert A. Burt, Miranda and 7Ttie
1I: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 SuP. CT. REv. 81; Choper, supra note 282; William Cohen,
Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975);
Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. REv. 199
(1971); Samuel Estreicher, Congressional Power and Constitutional Rights: Reflections on Proposed
"Human Life Legislation, 68 VA. L. REv. 333 (1982); Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by
Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV. 707 (1985); Irving A. Gordon, The Nature and Uses of
Congressional Power Under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to Overcome Decisions of the
Supreme Court, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 656 (1977); Lupu, Statutes, supra note 10; Daniel J. Leffell,
Note, Congressional Power to Enforce Due Process Rights, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1265 (1980); Pawa,
supra note 72.
308. Lee, supra note 302, at 91. Already there have been rumblings to this effect in the federal
courts. See, e.g., Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 186 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994) ("The constitutionality
of [RFRA]... raises a number of questions involving the extent of Congress's powers under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
309. For a normative analysis of congressional power in this context, see Stephen F. Ross,
Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72 MINN. L. REV. 311 (1987).
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4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965310 even though its parameters ap-
peared to exceed the Constitution's requirements as interpreted by the
Court.31' To be sure, the Court's recognition of congressional power in
this regard makes a great deal of sense in light of the specific enumeration
of equal protection as a positive guarantee in the Fourteenth Amendment-
that is, one demanding governmental intervention;" the political and
social contexts from which that amendment emerged; 3 and the fact that
the meaning of constitutional "equality" is necessarily open to multiple and
evolving interpretations.314 The Court has basically maintained the same
deferential approach with regard to federal legislation advancing the
enumerated guarantees of the Thirteenth315 and Fifteenth3. 6
310. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 658. But cf. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (upholding the
congressional enfranchisement of 18- to 21-year olds in federal elections, but not in state elections).
311. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648 ("A construction of § 5 [of the 14th Amendment] that would
require a judicial determination that the enforcement of the state law precluded by Congress violated
the Amendment, as a condition of sustaining the congressional enactment, would depreciate both
congressional resourcefulness and congressional responsibility for implementing the Amendment.").
This principle has also been recognized in the federal affirmative action context. See Laycock, RFRA,
supra note 17, at 247-48 (listing decisions demonstrating Congress's power to provide greater
protection to racial minorities than that required by judicial interpretations of the Constitution).
312. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that no state shall "deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"); infra note 370.
313. See, e.g., Conkle, supra note 23, at 32 ("[The Civil War] Amendments, including the
Fourteenth Amendment and its enforcement provision, were designed primarily to address the problem
of slavery and racial discrimination. When Congress acts to address these provisions, its enforcement
power is at its zenith, and the Supreme Court is and should be especially inclined to defer to
congressional decisionmaking."). See generally MICHAEL K. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 26-91 (1986); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988) (both
describing the strong anti-inequality background of the framing of the 14th Amendment); JACOBUS
TENBRoEC, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1951) (discussing the
abolitionist crusade from which the 14th Amendment arose).
314. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 466 (1985) (Marshall,
J., concurring and dissenting) (noting that "constitutional principles of equality ... evolve over time").
Compare Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (upholding a statute requiring racial
segregation in private schools) with Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding
unconstitutional laws that required that children be assigned to schools on the basis of race), both
discussed in LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND
THE SCHOOLS 23, 18-32, 104-32 (1976) (describing the changes in the interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause in the education context over the years).
315. U.S. CONsT. amend. XI, § I (prohibiting slavery and involuntary servitude); see Runyon
v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175-79 (1976) (recognizing that § 1981 of Title 42 constitutes a legitimate
exercise of federal legislative power under Section Two of the 13th Amendment by prohibiting private
schools from excluding qualified children solely because they are black); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437-44 (1968) (relying on the 13th Amendment to uphold the section of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 prohibiting racial discrimination in private transactions involving property).
316. U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, § I (prohibiting denial or abridgment of voting rights "on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude"); see City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156,
177 (1980) (upholding congressional power, under the 15th Amendment, to prohibit electoral systems
with discriminatory effects even if such systems are otherwise constitutional); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,337 (1966) (holding that § 4(a)-(d) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which
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Amendments, each of which contains an enforcement clause similar to
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.317
Second, the Court has upheld the congressional creation of "vehicle"
remediation statutes, such as Sections 1983318 and 1988,319 which pro-
vide individuals with the procedural means and the incentives to assert
various claims of liberty under the Bill of Rights.' It may seem, at first
blush, that the enactment and judicial validation of such enforcement
statutes would support RFRA. Both RFRA and these statutes are designed
to advance the liberties of the Bill of Rights against the states, and
apparently neither is required by the Court's interpretation of those
liberties. Yet, closer inspection reveals that this is not the case and that
they differ in at least one important respect. The crucial distinction is that
the rights asserted and vindicated through the vehicle remediation statutes
such as Section 1983 are not substantively altered by Congress. Rather,
their nature and scope are determined by judicial decisions interpreting the
Constitution. On this point, in fact, the Supreme Court could not be
clearer: "Section 1983 'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but
merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere
conferred.'"321 Thus, while it is true that "these provisions have been
used to enforce the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments, as
incorporated through the Fourteenth, in thousands of cases," 3' the
meaning of these enforced Amendments is that as determined by the courts,
not by Congress. RFRA, in contrast, not only authorizes suits in the name
of religious liberty,3 3 but also defines the substance of free exercise
above and beyond the substantive parameters recognized by the Supreme
Court. Indeed, RFRA embodies an interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause that was specifically rejected by the Court in Smith and certain prior
cases.' 4 In short, because substantive congressional alteration is not the
had suspended literacy tests and other similar devices designed to discourage minority voting, was a
valid means for carrying out the commands of the 15th Amendment).
317. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 wt.h id. amend. XII, § 2 ("The Congress shall have
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.") and id. amend. XV, § 2 ("Congress shall
have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.").
318. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (authorizing redress for parties deprived of constitutional rights,
privileges, or immunities by individuals acting under color of state authority).
319. Id. § 1988 (allowing the prevailing party in certain civil rights suits to seek the award of
reasonable attorneys' fees).
320. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-98 (1978) (holding that § 1988 authorizes
attorneys' fees for Eighth Amendment violations). The limited significance of Hutto is briefly
mentioned infra note 328 and accompanying text.
321. Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 811 (1994) (emphasis added) (quoting Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)).
322. Laycock, RFRA, supra note 17, at 246.
323. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(c) (Supp. V 1993) (providing for judicial relief from RFRA
violations).
324. Compare Leon F. Szeptycki& Jean B. Arnold, Religious Freedom RestorationAct, 88 Educ.
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purpose or effect of these remedial enforcement statutes, it is simply
mistaken to argue that they somehow establish the constitutionality of
RFRA.32
The bottom line, then, is that any determination about the constitution-
ality of RFRA in relation to Section Five is necessarily speculative.
Neither the equal protection statutes nor the procedural statutes, which
represent the legal authority most relied upon by the Act's supporters, lend
conclusive support to the position that Congress has the power, under
Section Five, to enact RFRA. Indeed, the one thing the Court has specific-
ally not done in relation to Section Five is to validate a congressional act
like RFRA-one that is enforceable against the states and that specifically
codifies Congress's own interpretation of a Bill of Rights liberty whose
sole relationship to the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus to the states, is
by way of incorporation.3 At some level, of course, the Act's pro-
ponents must be aware of this missing logical-doctrinal link, and they have
arguably conceded as much either by citing no cases,3' or by citing cases
that are at best analogous,3" when making this particular claim about the
nature and scope of Section Five.
L. Rep. (West) 907, 915 (Apr. 7, 1994) ("Even before Smith, the Court had limited application of the
Free Exercise Clause to government activities that involved coercion to violate one's religious beliefs
or penalties for religious activity... [and] limited the compelling interest test to government actions
that somehow 'prohibit' religious beliefs and practices." (footnote omitted)) with 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb(a)(2) (Supp. V 1993) ("[L]aws 'neutral' toward religion may burden religious exercise as
surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise.").
325. Indeed, Professor McConnell suggests that the permissible scope of congressional power
under Section Five is inherently contingent on the breadth of the Court's interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause. See McConnell, Should Congress Pass Legislation?, supra note 159, at 189-90.
326. Some have argued that Congress did this with § 3501 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1988 & Supp.
IV 1992)), which basically affects one's constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). Mark E. Herrmann, Note, Looking Down from the Hill: Factors Determining the Success of
CongressionalEfforts to Reverse Supreme Court Interpretations of the Constitution, 33 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 543, 576-79 (1992). Section 3501, however, applies only to federal courts, and its
constitutionality has never been challenged before the Supreme Court. Id. at 584 & n.225.
327. See, e.g., Laycock, RFRA, supra note 17, at 246 (providing no citation for the claim that
the "[p]ower to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment also includes power to enforce the Free Exercise
Clause and other provisions of the Bill of Rights that are applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment"); Pawa, supra note 72, at 1056 (providing no citation for the carefully worded claim that
"because the Free Exercise Clause... applies to the states via the Due Process Clause..., RFRA
could be said to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process").
328. See, e.g., Laycock, RFRA, supra note 17, at 245-48 (arguing that RFRA is constitutional by
analogizing to cases involving equal protection, the 13th and 15th Amendments, and procedural
enforcement statutes such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Lee, supra note 302, at 94 (citing only Hutto v.
Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), a case addressing Congress's power to authorize the award of attorneys'
fees for litigants enforcing the Eighth Amendment as construed by the judiciary, not as construed by
Congress); Pawa, supra note 72, at 1096-97 (citing Hutto and Title VII's ban on religious discrimina-
tion, even though Title VII derives its authority from the Commerce Clause and Congress's Section
Five power in relation to the Equal Protection Clause).
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b. The undetermined scope of Section Five: three
considerations.-In light of this doctrinal void, the real question is not
whether RFRA is constitutional (we simply do not know), but rather what
the Court will likely do, and perhaps what we believe the Court should do,
when faced squarely with this issue. Naturally, it would be imprudent to
suggest that there is a single, discernible answer to this question. What we
can do, however, is to examine those factors that the Court may, or at least
should, consider when attempting to formulate its answer. To this end,
there are at least three factors that we can examine: (1) the logic of
incorporation, (2) the comparative capacity of Congress as constitutional
interpreter, and (3) the comparative nature of incorporated liberties.
Needless to say, underlying this entire analysis must be the principle stated
in Marbury v. Madison,' and reiterated in subsequent cases, 3' that
the judiciary should and indeed must be the final interpreter of the
Constitution.331
(1) The logic of incorporation.-Because RFRA's principal pur-
pose is the enforcement of an incorporated right, the first factor warranting
consideration is the underlying logic of incorporation. At the outset, I
think it is generally understood that one purpose of the Reconstruction
Amendments, as evidenced by their enforcement clauses, was to expand the
scope of federal legislative power, effectively at the expense of the
states. 32 The critical inquiry here is whether judicial incorporation of
the Bill of Rights was intended to advance this purpose, or whether its
nature and process were designed to advance other goals entirely. It may
seem, at first blush, that incorporation was mostly about the states and
particularly about the need to extend the guarantees of the Bill of Rights
against the states. As a result, RFRA may appear entirely consistent, or
at least not inconsistent, with this purpose insofar as it is a federal effort
to forestall state (and federal) governmental infringements of religious
liberty. In fact, incorporation was also substantially about the judiciary,
and particularly about the need to define the meaning of due process in
329. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
330. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,549 (1969) ("[lit is the responsibility of this
Court to act as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution." (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211
(1962))).
331. In the oft-cited words of Chief Justice Marshall, "lilt is emphatically the province and duty
of thejudial department to say what the law is." Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 (emphasis
added). For an elaboration of this point, see Conkle, supra note 23, at 30 (arguing that "the Supreme
Court should permit Congress to exercise [the power to render substantive interpretations of Section
One guarantees] ... as long as the congressional action does not frustrate the Court's essential function
as the primary interpreter of the Constitution").
332. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453-56 (1976); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339, 345-48 (1879).
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order to guide, and thus limit, the exercise of judicial discretion.33 In
other words, it was about the need to define the role of the courts, and the
institution of substantive judicial review, within the scheme of American
government.' Following the general demise of the Lochner-era concep-
tion of substantive due process, the Court's focus shifted increasingly
toward the Bill of Rights as the principal means of discerning freedom-
based restrictions and obligations on the states.335 At first, such efforts
yielded relatively broad formulations, particularly when, as with the
concept of fundamental fairness, the relationship between due process and
the Bill of Rights was not yet fully or clearly established. 6 Professor
Jerold Israel, drawing from the Court's own words, describes these efforts:
Due process was said to require adherence to those "principles of
liberty and justice" that are "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty," that are "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental," and that "lie at the base of
all our civil and political institutions." Due process also was
described as prohibiting state actions that "offend those canons of
decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-
speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous
offenses;" that are "repugnant to the conscience of mankind;" or that
deprive the defendant of "that fundamental fairness essential to the
very concept of justice. " 337
Eventually, the more surgical technique of "selective incorporation"
emerged, theoretically setting at least some limits on the capacity of the
333. See Adamsonv. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (proposing that
the incorporation of the Bill of Rights may prevent the Court from "substituting its own concepts of
decency and fundamental justice for the language of the Bill of Rights as its point of departure in
interpreting and enforcing that Bill of Rights").
334. See id. at 90 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's position of nonincorporation
and reliance on natural law allows the Justices "to roam at large in the broad expanses of policy and
morals and to trespass, all too freely, on the legislative domain of the States as well as the Federal
Government").
335. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONALLAW § 11.6, at 383 (4th
ed. 1991) (noting that after its denouncementof substantive due process, the Court began to concentrate
its attention on whether specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights are made directly applicable to the
states by the 14th Amendment); LAURENcE H. TRm, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11-2, at
772-73 (2d ed. 1988) (describing the Court's use of incorporation to protect individual liberties from
state intrusions).
336. See Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. LJ. 253, 273-77 (1982)
(tracing the relationship between the "ordered liberty" standard of dueprocess and the guarantees found
in the Bill of Rights).
337. Id. at 273 (footnotes omitted); see also TRIBE, supra note 335, § 11-2, at 773 ("In deciding
which Bill of Rights provisions to 'incorporate,' the Court has said that it was searching for
'principle[s] of justice so rooted in the tradition and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental' and thus 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' . .. ." (brackets in original)
(footnotes omitted)).
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federal judiciary to review state governmental actions infringing on the
people's liberties." Ultimately, this move toward discerning a concrete
theory of due process reflected, among other things, an "emerging view of
the Court's powers" as "disclaim[ing] any general right to review acts of
other branches of government . .. ."111 In particular, the decision to
embrace a doctrine of selective incorporation was in part an attempt to
avoid the "extremely subjective and excessively discretionary determina-
tion[s]" ° that characterized the broader approaches and "to avoid the
impression of personal, ad hoc adjudication by every court which attempts
to apply the vague contents and contours of 'ordered liberty' to every
different case that comes before it. "4
338. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 335, § 11.6, at 382-85 (tracing the emergence
of selective incorporation).
339. Id. § 11.6, at 385. Today, of course, the domain of substantive due process is not entirely
or strictly coterminous with the Bill of Rights, as illustrated most notably by the penumbral doctrine
of privacy. See, e.g., Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (using the concept of privacy to recognize
a right to an abortion); Eisenstadt v, Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (recognizing a right to marital
contraception in the principles associated with family privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (drawing upon the underpinnings of privacy to recognize a right to nonmarital contraception).
Given the recent trend toward restricting both its scope and its content, however, thepersistence of this
relatively extratextual doctrine does not undermine the view that incorporation in part represented a
desire to limit judicial discretion, and certainly it does not undermine the possibility that the current
Court, if given the opportunity, would ratify this particular view. Indeed, the Court's most recent cases
quite plainly reveal both its strong aversion to using the concept of substantive due process at all and
its resultant efforts not to deviate from the Bill of Rights when interpreting the concept of "liberty" in
the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 812-13 (1994) (specifically
rejecting the notion that one has a substantive due process right to be free from prosecution in the
absence of probable cause, and indicating that if such a right exists, it is to be found exclusively in the
Fourth Amendment); Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1068 (1992) ("As a general
matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because
guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted area are scarce and open ended."); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2809 (1992) (suggesting that the constitutional right to abortion
is not necessarily grounded in privacy as such, but rather in the "ability of women to participate equally
in the economic and social life of the Nation"); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) (flatly
refusing to expand privacy doctrine to encompass male homosexual sodomy, based in part on its
concern that "ft]he Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the
Constitution"); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 326 (1986) (limiting prisoners' right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment exclusively to the Eighth Amendment, expressly rejecting substantive due
process as an alternative ground). In fact, the Bowers v. Hardwick decision has been interpreted by
at least one commentator as signaling the possible demise of substantive due process as an autonomous,
principled constitutional doctrine. See Daniel 0. Conkle, The Second Death of Substantive Due
Process, 62 IND. LJ. 215 (1987).
340. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 413 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("My Brother
Harlan's view would also require this Court to make the extremely subjective and excessively
discretionary determination as to whether a practice, forbidden the Federal Government by a
fundamental constitutional guarantee, is... sufficiently repugnant to the notion of due process as to
be forbidden the States.").
341. Louis Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74,
77 (1963); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.5(d) (2d ed.
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At a superficial level, this view of incorporation-as a means to give
substance to, and thus to place limitations on, the judicial invocation of due
process-might also seem to be consistent with RFRA. The Act is specif-
ically designed to instruct the courts, as well as all other governmental
actors, as to what the Free Exercise Clause means. It deliberately gives
substance and contours to the due process concept of liberty, in this case
religious liberty. At a deeper level, however, RFRA is inconsistent with
the logic of incorporation because it undermines the related goal of limiting
judicial discretion by casting the substance of free exercise in vague and
expansive terms 2 -and does so in the face of the Court's express at-
tempt to limit judicial discretion in this specific area of review.' That
is to say, if it is true that incorporation emerged largely as an attempt to
circumscribe and channel the power of judges, Congress would seem to
have undermined this through RFRA, which deliberately expands judicial
power beyond what the Court itself has said is institutionally, and perhaps
constitutionally, appropriate. Hence, even if Congress should have
meaningful authority to enforce its own interpretations of incorporated
rights, RFRA, because it serves to enhance judicial power through vague
terminology and standards, arguably should not fall within that power. In
the words of Section Five, it simply may not be considered "appropriate
legislation. " '
(2) The interpretive capacity of Congres.-A second factor that
is relevant to determining Congress's power to interpret the Bill of Rights,
and then to enforce those interpretations against the states, concerns the
institutional justifications for giving Congress broad Section Five power,
as set forth in the Court's equal protection decisions and as discussed in the
academic literature.' Although several theories regarding the scope of
Congress's Section Five power are available, the proper starting point, it
would seem, is with the Court's decision in Katzenbach v. Morgan,'
which upheld a provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that imposed
certain limitations on the power of states to determine voter eligibility.' 7
In Morgan, the Court based its holding not only on the ground that Con-
gress possibly had determined that these limitations were necessary to
1992) (maintaining that selective incorporation avoids much of the subjectivity inherent in the
fundamental fairness doctrine).
342. See supra subpart I(B).
343. See supra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
344. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
345. See supra note 307.
346. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
347. Id. at 646-47.
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secure equal protection rights as previously defined by the Court,' but
also on the ground that Congress may have determined that these states
would violate Congress's own interpretation of what equal protection
requires.' The critical question for our purposes is why-for what
institutional reasons-Congress should enjoy this latter power at all.
Professor Samuel Estreicher, in his analysis of Morgan, discusses three
such reasons: (1) the factfinding competence of Congress, (2) the norm-
elaborating capacity of Congress, and (3) the basic authority of Congress
to enact statutes (viewed in conjunction with an understanding of Section
Five as an independent grant or source of statutory authority, much like
Article I).' After examining each of these, I will examine one addition-
al theory of Section Five, which argues that the permissible scope of
congressional power should stem from the underlying function of the
legislation.35'
The first and "principal rationale for permitting legislative revision of
the scope of Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment rights is the superior fact-
finding capability of Congress, as compared to the courts, on broad
questions of the true (and invidious) character of certain discriminatory
practices."352 Thus in Morgan, for example, the Court displayed sub-
stantial deference to Congress's ability and prerogative "to assess and
weigh the various conflicting considerations" at play in the context of
voting rights.353 Yet even in the abstract, this rationale runs into a
number of difficulties. According to Professor Estreicher,
Congress's factfinding superiority is assertable only with respect to
state legislation that is presumptively constitutional, but in such cases
the state legislature is not obviously a less competent factfinder than
Congress. With respect to legislation warranting a heightened level
of review, however, the Court does not "assume that there are facts
which furnish a constitutional foundation" and very often must
resolve underlying factual questions in articulating the constitutional
rule. In such cases, the claim of deference to congressional fact-
finding is unpersuasive.... Even where the Court upholds [a] state
statute, ... it is presumably doing so because the claim of right
must yield to government imperatives, and not on grounds of
deference to legislative factfinding. There is here no basis for
deferring on factfinding grounds to a congressional measure
348. Id. at 650-53.
349. See id. at 653-56 (listing several possible reasons for Congress's determination that English
literacy voting requirements violated the 14th Amendment).
350. Estreicher, supra note 307, at 423-33.
351. See infra notes 362-66 and accompanying text.
352. Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 3, at 390 (statement of Professor Ira C. Lupu).
353. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653.
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overturning state legislation that, notwithstanding the Court's factual
scrutiny, has been held constitutional.' 5
In the specific case of RFRA, moreover, the relevance of Congress's
factfinding capacity is not entirely obvious. For one thing, the rejection
of judicial balancing in Employment Division v. Smith was arguably a
normative, and not an empirically contingent, judgment about the meaning
of free exercise and the nature of the judiciary."5 Except for acknowl-
edging the potential for limited accommodations, the Court did not seem
at all interested in having its holding and reasoning reexamined by
Congress on the basis of the latter's factfinding capacity. Furthermore, as
Professor Lupu has noted, "the Act does not rest on any claim, general or
particular, of legislative superiority in fact-finding, and thus cannot draw
upon that line of reasoning."3"6 Finally, as will be discussed shortly, the
inherent differences between equal protection and free exercise call into
question the relevance of Congress's factfinding ability in the context of the
latter, even if it is completely appropriate in the context of the former.357
The second rationale examined by Professor Estreicher is that Con-
gress has the "ability to assist the Court in elaborating constitutional
norms.... [T]he Court for institutional reasons cannot enforce constitu-
tional norms to the full extent of their conceptual reach, but Congress,
being free of such considerations, can go the full distance."35 This is
an interesting theory of congressional power, and it might seem to favor
the constitutionality of RFRA, were it not the case that Smith is not truly
an instance of judicial underenforcement. To the contrary, Smith
represents the Court's best judgment of what the Free Exercise Clause
requires, based not on an inability to declare that the Clause requires more,
but rather on an inability to engage in the balancing and assessments that
more expansive readings would entail. Far from facing a situation of
underenforcement, in fact, the Court already possessed the compelling
interest test before deliberately jettisoning it in Smith. In turn, a
congressional mandate that courts once again undertake strict scrutiny
balancing not only would fail to enforce fully the Free Exercise Clause, but
354. Estreicher, supra note 307, at 425-26 (footnote omitted). For a general critique of this
rationale, see Stephen L. Carter, The Morgan Power and the Forced Reconsideration of Constitutional
Decisions, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 819, 834-37 (1986); Saul M. Pilchen, Politics v. The Cloister: Deciding
When the Supreme Court Should Defer to Congressional Facofinding Under the Post-Civil War
Amendments, 59 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 337, 339-40 (1984).
355. See generally Gordon, supra note 307, at 671-80 (distinguishing between the normative and
empirical dimensions of a constitutional interpretation and arguing that Congress may alter that
interpretation based only on its reassessment of the empirical dimension).
356. Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 3, at 391 (statement of Professor Ira C. Lupu).
357. See infra text accompanying notes 367-72.
358. Estreicher, supra note 307, at 427 (citing Burt, supra note 307, and LawrenceG. Sager, Fair
Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212 (1978)).
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also would directly serve to frustrate the Court's institutional judgment.
The third theory of Section Five power examined by Professor
Estreicher is his own. Explicitly building on the work of others,359
Estreicher argues that
rather than granting authority over the interpretation of the
Constitution itself, section 5 is simply a source of legislative
authority to create statutory rights enhancing the equal protection or
due process values identified by the Couit. Although these values-
areas of constitutional concern-are found in the Court's decisions,
Congress's legislative authority is not tied to the particular
resolutions struck by the Court. In effect, the Constitution supplies
an appropriate source of norms upon which legislation may be gen-
erated.....
Congress "enforces" the fourteenth amendment even when
enacting statutory rights not required for the vindication of constitu-
tional guarantees but simply reasonably related to the enhancement
of constitutional values.3 °
Needless to say, this is a bold and extremely expansive view of Congress's
Section Five power, one in which RFRA would presumably have little like-
lihood of being found unconstitutional, notwithstanding the Establishment
Clause concerns raised earlier. Precisely because of its breadth, however,
its actual usefulness and thus its attractiveness to the Court are seriously
questionable. Even Estreicher notes that "[n]ot all the wrinkles have been
ironed out. . . . [T]he precise contours of legislative authority would have
to await case-by-case judicial review, as has occurred in the commerce
clause area."' 1 In turn, it seems imprudent, at least at this point in our
constitutional development, to measure the potential constitutionality of
RFRA by using Estreicher's interpretation of Section Five. While it may
be true that the Court is currently in a deferential phase vis-A-vis Congress,
there is little indication that its deference would extend this far.
The final theory of Section Five power that merits attention is that of
Professor William Cohen. Although originally offered to explain why
Congress should not be empowered to dilute individual liberties (even
though Congress essentially has done the opposite in RFRA), nevertheless
his analysis raises important factors in the consideration of Section Five.
Specifically, he maintains that "the issue of federalism is the major
constitutional concern of laws that increase civil rights at the expense of
359. Id. at 429-30 (mentioning the works of Archibald Cox, Lawrence Sager, Robert Burt, and
William Cohen).
360. Id. at 430-32.
361. Id. at 457.
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state power," 2 that the "makeup of Congress and its political processes
make it the ideal forum for determining when decisions traditionally made
at the state level should be supplanted by national solutions,"' and
therefore that "a congressional judgment resolving at the national level an
issue that could-without constitutional objection-be decided in the same
way at the state level, ought normally to be binding on the courts.'
Although not securely embedded in the Court's jurisprudenceI this
approach is noteworthy insofar as it appears to provide one of the few
theoretically satisfying ways of justifying RFRA under Section Five.
Because RFRA is a politically valid product of the federal legislative
processes and because it asks states to do only what they would already be
constitutionally permitted to do, then, at least according to Cohen's model,
the statute should be upheld. Of course, a major sticking point may be the
element of constitutional permissibility. It is not clear, on closer
examination, that a state could pass a statute like RFRA under the Estab-
lishment Clause (certainly its constitutional authority would be no greater
than Congress's), and therefore it is not clear that RFRA actually re-
presents, in Cohen's words, a "congressional judgment resolving at the
national level an issue that could-without constitutional objection-be
decided in the same way at the state level."'
(3) The nature of incorporated rights.-The third and final factor
in determining Congress's Section Five power to interpret incorporated
rights concerns the basic nature of those rights, particularly when viewed
comparatively with the nature of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protec-
tion guarantee. In particular, I believe one can draw at least two
distinctions between the guarantee of equality, on the one hand, and the
guarantees of freedom, such as religious freedom, on the other hand. With
respect to the first distinction, it was noted earlier that one justification for
broad congressional power in determining the scope of equal protection is
that the meaning of constitutional equality is necessarily open to multiple
and evolving interpretations.367 Equality is a highly relative, heavily fact-
and context-bound concept whose satisfaction is almost never self-evident
and whose meaning may change, and in fact has changed, over time. 8
362. Cohen, supra note 307, at 603.
363. Id. at 613 (footnote omitted).
364. Id. at 614.
365. See Pawa, supra note 72, at 1065 ("Given the Court's current composition, its approval of
[Cohen's] federalism/personal liberties distinction [in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985),] stands on precariously fragile ground.").
366. Cohen, supra note 307, at 614.
367. See supra text accompanying note 314.
368. Among other things, equality might denote separate but equal, equal access, equal
opportunity, equal status or achievement; it might be evaluated on a dejure basis or a de facto basis;
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It is entirely appropriate, therefore, that Congress, when exercising its
Section Five power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, should enjoy
significant latitude in determining the conceptual and remedial nature of
equality. By contrast, the liberty protections enumerated in the Bill of
Rights, such as the mandate that the free exercise of religion shall not be
prohibited, are relatively concrete and intrinsically principled commands
to the government-commands that do not necessarily require congressional
embellishment or elaboration in order to be meaningful.' There was,
in fact, very little disagreement between the Court in Smith and the
Congress that enacted RFRA over the existence or nature of the liberty or
the principles at stake; rather, the disagreement centered on whether
citizens may demand exemptions in the exercise of that liberty (as well as
whether the judiciary is institutionally capable of discerning them). And
the conflicting answers to this question are substantive, normative
judgments about the balance between freedom and order, not empirically
complex and highly relative propositions about the fundamental nature of
the guarantee itself.
The second and more important distinction between equality and
liberty, in terms of congressional enforcement power under Section Five,
is that the former basically demands governmental interventionism while
the latter basically does not. This is true, I believe, both textually and
philosophically. If we examine the text of Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment, for example, it is fairly obvious that the command of equal
protection, even if accompanied by the word "deny," is simply not the
same as the mandate of nondeprivation.3" The former expressly includes
it might reach into the private as well as the public sphere. See, e.g., HENRY A. MYERS, ARE MEN
EQUAL? AN INQUIRY INTO THE MEANING OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1st ed. 1945) (discussing the
various conceptions of equality including economic equality, equality before the law, equality of
opportunity, equality in the eyes of God, and equality as a standard of values); Timothy L. Hall,
Religion, Equality, andDifference, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1992) (arguing that equality is an abstrac-
tion with no boundaries or norms); see also NELSON, supra note 313, at 21 (observing that the concept
of equality had a similarly large number of meanings at and before the time of the ratification of the
14th Amendment). For an argument that "equality" in fact has "no substantive content of its own,"
see Peter Westen, 7he Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 577 (1982).
369. I am not saying, of course, that the precise contours of these protections are fully obvious
from the constitutional text. As Stephen Carter notes, "[tihe individual rights clauses are drawn so
broadly as to beg to be filled with content from some extra-constitutional source." Carter, supra note
354, at 849.
370. According to Section One of the 14th Amendment,
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which-shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
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an affirmative component (protection), whereas the latter merely requires
that government not deprive any person of his liberty. While this alone
might be sufficient to differentiate between equality and liberty for the
purposes of congressional power, such a distinction is also consistent with
the prevailing philosophical-doctrinal understanding of the Bill of Rights
as an exposition of negative, as opposed to positive, rights?' Indeed,
in this respect the Equal Protection Clause should not be understood as a
model or paradigm for congressional power (as RFRA's proponents appear
to understand itl). Rather, it should be understood as a distinct
deviation from the baseline of the negative constitutional state, brought
about by a collective political realization that the goal of meaningful
equality demands a conceptual baseline that accepts the government as a
causal agent and sees identifiable governmental intervention-such as the
post-Civil War Civil Rights Acts-as a necessary measure for reaching that
goal. What does this mean in terms of discerning the proper scope of
Congress's Section Five power? At best, it suggests that relying too
heavily on cases such as Morgan may be unwarranted as a matter of logic,
The understanding at the time of ratification, at least among members of Congress, clearly
included the view that equal protection was a mandate for affirmative, not simply negative, govern-
mental responsibilities. "The prevailing view... was that a state denied equal protection when it
permitted repeated outrages against one class in the community.. . . [A]s it was said by Senator
Frelinghuysen: 'A State denies equal protection whenever it fails to give it. Denying includes inaction
as well as action.'" John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, The Original Understanding of 'Equal
Protection ofthe Laws," 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 421,470 (emphasis added) (quoting CONo. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Seas. 501 (1871)). "[A] state denied equal protection of the laws when it tolerated
widespread abuses against a class of citizens because of their color without seriously attempting to
protect them by enforcing the law." Id.; see also Donald H. Zeigler, A Reassessment of the Younger
Doctrine in Light of the Legislative History of Reconstruction, 1983 DuKE L.J. 987, 1034 & n.303
(recognizing that many of the legislators involved in the debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1871
believed that state officials violated the 14th Amendmentwhen they refused to provide equal protection
or to discharge their duties in an even-handed manner). Whether the Court has been faithful to this
understanding, however, is debatable. Compare Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution:A Critique,
88 MicH. L. REv. 2271, 2276-77 (1990) ("The equal protection clause requires that government
sometimes take affirmative steps to ensure that certain groups are not treated unequally; and has been
held to mandate government provision of goods and services which individuals would otherwise be
denied because of their poverty." (footnotes omitted)) with Louis M. Seidman, Public Principle and
Private Choice: The Uneasy Casefor a Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 YALE
L.J. 1006, 1014-15 (1987) ("With only rare exceptions, the Court has not read the equal protection
clause to mandate government intervention to counterbalance nongovernmental arrangements that
disadvantage minorities. The requirement of equal protection has instead been read almost exclusively
as a limit on government intervention." (footnotes omitted)).
371. Cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1989)
(holding that a state welfare agency had no affirmative constitutional duty under the Due Process
Clause to preven a parent's physical abuse of his child even though the agency was aware of the likeli-
hood of such abuse). For two critiques of the negative rights view, see Bandes, supra note 370;
Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative Rights View of
the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REv. 409 (1990).
372. See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
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despite the superficial relationship between the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of Section One. At worst, it could provide the Court,
should the Court confront RFRA's constitutionality, with a moderately
coherent and principled basis for invalidating the Act without uprooting its
equal protection jurisprudence in the process.
It would appear, then, as if none of these three factors-perhaps with
the exception of Cohen's federalism theory-strongly favors a determina-
tion that independent congressional interpretations of incorporated rights,
and specifically Congress's interpretation of free exercise under RFRA,
constitute a fully defensible exercise of power under Section Five. Of
course, once again there is no denying the fact that "liberty" appears on
the face of the Fourteenth Amendment and that this term includes "reli-
gious liberty" when viewed through the lens of incorporation. Nonethe-
less, the Court has never really explained the relationship between Section
Five and incorporated rights, and, until it does, it would be unwise to
assume that a strong reading of Morgan, which may not be as strong as it
seems, 373 will be extended to give Congress broad power in interpreting
these rights.
Might it be possible to argue that RFRA is actually an attempt to grant
equal protection to all religious citizens and faiths, and that it was
Congress'i judgment that this could be achieved only by restricting the
force of generally applicable laws?374 After all, this would bring RFRA
within the line of cases, such as Morgan, which support a relatively broad
doctrine of congressional power under Section Five. 75 Of course this is
a possibility, although as an equal protection interpretation, RFRA would
represent a fairly large deviation from the Court's jurisprudence in this
area. Religious affiliation would have to be deemed a suspect classifica-
tion,376 that classification would have to extend to all religions (much like
373. See, e.g., Conkle, supra note 23, at 15 (suggesting that "Morgan's theory of substantive
congressionl power must be regarded as suspect"); Estreicher, supra note 307, at 414-23, 433-38
(arguing that Morgan was a very narrow holding with little precedential value).
374. See generally David E. Steinberg, Religious Exemptions as Affirnative Action, 40 EMORY
LJ. 77 (1991) (suggesting that the Supreme Court should authorize the use of religious exemptions to
accommodate members of minority religious groups). For further analysis of the relationships between
equal protection principles and the Religion Clauses, see Jesse H. Choper, Religion and Race Under
the Constitution: Similarities andDifferences, 79 CoRNELL L. REV. 491 (1994); Hall, supra note 368;
Gary J. Simson, Lawslntentiohally Favoring Mainstream Reigions: An Unhelpful Comparison to Race,
79 CORNELL L. REv. 514 (1994).
375. See Laycock, RFRA, supra note 17, at 251-52 (likening RFRA to the Voting Rights Act
upheld in Morgan).
376. The Court effectively deemed religious affiliation a suspect classification through its dictum
in City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam), but has not done so through
a formal holding under the Equal Protection Clause. As a practical matter, such a declaration has been
unnecessary in light of the Court's discrimination-prohibitory interpretations of the Religion Clauses.
See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217,2226 (1993)
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race necessarily extends to whites as well as non-whites), and the discrim-
inatory purpose requirement of Washington v. Davis 3' presumably would
have to be ignored.37 All things considered, this seems an awfully
circuitous, not to mention legislatively unenvisioned, 379 route for the Act
to take simply to achieve minimal conformity with Section Five.
2. Does RFRA Qualify as "Appropriate Legislation" to Enforce the
Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment?-Even if Congress is found to
possess substantial power under Section Five to enforce its own interpre-
tations of the Bill of Rights against the states, there remains the question
of whether RFRA falls within the ambit of that power-that is, whether
RFRA constitutes "appropriate legislation" within the meaning of that
Section. Accordingly, the Act must be assessed relative to the standards
of appropriateness as set forth by the Court.
In discerning the scope of congressional power to enforce the free
exercise guarantee of the First Amendment against the states, we must turn
once again to Katzenbach v. Morgan,3" which involved the validity of
a provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The Morgan Court began
by noting that "[a] construction of § 5 that would require a judicial
determination that the enforcement of [a] state law precluded by Congress
violated the [Fourteenth] Amendment, as a condition of sustaining the
congressional enactment, would depreciate both congressional resource-
fulness and congressional responsibility for implementing the Amend-
ment."381 Drawing upon McCulloch v. Maryland,3" the Court then
established a two-part inquiry for determining whether a congressional act
constitutes "appropriate legislation" under Section Five: (1) whether the act
is "plainly adapted" to furthering the aims of the Equal Protection Clause,
and (2) "whether it is not prohibited by but is consistent with 'the letter
(invalidating a city ordinance dealing with the ritual slaughter of animals because "the protections of
the free exercise clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or
regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons"); Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (noting that a state may not restrict religious conduct "if it sought
to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because
of the religious belief that they display").
377. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
378. However, as Professor Laycock notes in regard to federal voting legislation, even though
"ihe Supreme Court construed the constitutional protection for minority voting rights to require proof
of overt discrimination or racial motive on the part of government officials[,] Congress dispensed with
the requirements of overt discrimination or motive [in the voting rights context], and required state and
local governments to justify laws that burden minority voting rights." Laycock, RFRA, supra note 17,
at 251.
379. None of the findings and purposes of the Act is phrased in the language of equal protection.
380. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
381. Id. at 648.
382. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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and spirit of the constitution."' Turning to the voting legislation in
question, the Court then proceeded through each inquiry, animated by a
common theme of deference to congressional judgment. Regarding the
"plainly adapted" criterion, for example, the Court stated,
It was for Congress... to assess and weigh the various conflicting
considerations-the risk or pervasiveness of the discrimination in
governmental services, the effectiveness of eliminating the state
restriction on the right to vote as a means of dealing with the evil,
the adequacy or availability of alternative remedies, and the nature
and significance of the state interests that would be affected by the
[legislation].'"
Likewise, regarding the requirement of consistency with the Constitution,
the Court rejected the claim that Congress had violated the Constitution by
extending its voting legislation to only one class of individuals. "[G]uided
by the familiar principles that a 'statute is not invalid under the Constitu-
tion because it might have gone farther than it did' [and] that a legislature
need not 'strike at all evils at the same time,' "" and drawing once again
on Congress's special capacities in this context,386 the Court held that no
such constitutional inconsistency existed in the legislation.3
Assuming that RFRA should be subjected to the Morgan analysis, to
what extent would it satisfy these two requirements? As for the first
requirement-that the Act be "plainly adapted"-it may depend on which
constitutional provision it is understood to further. If the focus is on the
Free Exercise Clause, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment,
then there can be little doubt that RFRA is plainly adapted to furthering
that Clause's aims. If, however, the focus is on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, by itself or additionally, then the verdict may not be quite as
favorable, at least if incorporation is considered to have been an aim of that
Amendment. For as I noted earlier,38 the Act appears to undermine the
goal of incorporation of providing concrete guidance to courts in their
exercise of judicial review, especially in light of the Court's assessment of
the pre-Smith era of free exercise doctrine. Certainly, much will depend
on the level of deference accorded to Congress by the Court; Morgan, for
example, simply declared that "[iut was for Congress ... to assess and
weigh the various conflicting considerations .... It is not for us to
review the congressional resolution of these factors. It is enough that we
383. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421).
384. Id. at 653.
385. Id. at 657 (citations omitted) (quoting Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339 (1929), and
Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 610 (1935)).
386. Id. at 657-58.
387. Id.
388. See supra text accompanying notes 342-44.
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be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the
conflict as it did."389
As for the second requirement-that the Act be "consistent with 'the
letter and spirit of the constitution"-there should be greater cause for
concern. To a large extent, I have already examined the constitutional
consistency of RFRA in relation to both the Establishment Clause and,
earlier in this section, the underlying principles (the "spirit") of Section
Five. Yet, the most problematic aspect of RFRA in this regard is that its
requirements are not, in fact, fully consistent with the Court's interpreta-
tion of the Free Exercise Clause. We must remember that, while the
legislation at issue in Morgan simply ventured where the Court itself had
declined to go,3" RFRA attempts to repudiate a line of Supreme Court
decisions that themselves reflect the Court's conclusion, after two decades
of the Sherbert test, that strict scrutiny is generally inappropriate. The free
exercise slate, in other words, is not clean: The Supreme Court had already
tried strict scrutiny for twenty to twenty-five years before ultimately and
flatly rejecting it. True, the conflict is not direct, as would be the case if
the Court had required strict scrutiny and Congress had required something
less. But still there is a conflict, unlike in Morgan, because the Court
specifically attempted and then retreated from the sort of scheme RFRA
requires. In short, because there is a conflict between a congressional
interpretation and a Supreme Court interpretation of the First Amendment,
notwithstanding the standards of Morgan, RFRA simply may not be consid-
ered "appropriate legislation."391
This perspective gains particular strength when we recall that Smith's
abandonment of strict scrutiny was as much premised on the institutional
incompetence of courts as it was on the independent substantive merits of
religious liberty.3"a This aspect of RFRA has been most carefully studied
by Professor Lupu, who has arrived at a similar, if not markedly stronger,
view regarding the Act's constitutionality:
[T]he Act's proponents have substantial reason to fear that the
Supreme Court will not extend Section 5 power this far. The
Supreme Court in Smith held that courts were not equipped to
389. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653.
390. The literacy requirement prohibited by the Voting Rights Act (the legislation upheld in
Morgan) was, seven years prior, determined to be constitutional in Lassiter v. Northampton County
Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
391. This issue is analogous to federal preemption, in which the power of the states within any
particular area will vary depending on whether Congress has not spoken at all; Congress has spoken,
but has deliberately left room for state involvement; or Congress has spoken and has in some way
indicated that its enactments should be exclusive (i.e., that Congress has occupied the field). See
generally TRBE, supra note 335, §§ 6-25 (discussing the doctrine of federal preemption). Of course,
here it is the Court, through its body of precedent, that would be effectively preempting Congress.
392. See supra notes 115-26 and accompanying text.
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balance religious interests against governmental concerns and that the
Free Exercise Clause henceforth would not support claims to be
exempt from state laws of general applicability. Unless the Court is
now willing to expand the Section 5 power to that of complete
substantive revision of judicial enforcement of the Bill of Rights as
applied to the states, Congress cannot substitute a stringent religion-
protective doctrine for the Court's new hands-off approach to the
Free Exercise Clause.39
Like Professor Lupu, ultimately I am not contending that RFRA need
be found unconstitutional. To be sure, there is probably sufficient
doctrinal flexibility, and certainly there is ample prudential reason, to hold
that the Act is a legitimate exercise of Congress's Section Five power.
Rather, I am simply highlighting that its constitutionality is an open
question at this point in time, if only because the Court never has directly
assessed federal legislation of this sort. In turn, to the extent that RFRA
does potentially exceed Congress's powers, at the very least this fact must
be acknowledged, even if doing so would provoke great angst among those
who worked so earnestly to have it enacted.
I. Functional Limits
RFRA's implementability and constitutionality certainly should be the
principal concerns of one who either celebrates or intends to rely upon its
promise of protection. Nevertheless, in this final Part, I wish to discuss
two additional categories of potential problems raised by the Act. The first
of these, addressed in subpart A, requires that we revisit the Establishment
Clause, not for the purpose of questioning RFRA's constitutionality as
such, but rather to examine the interplay between the Clause and the Act.
This interplay may have significant consequences for the interpretation of
each source of law. The second category, addressed in subpart B, con-
cerns the effects of protecting religious liberty through codification, as
compared to protecting it solely under the Constitution. While codifying
free exercise, as RFRA does, may offer a number of benefits, so may it
also pose several new or different complications.
A. RFRA and the Establishment (ause
One of the most uncertain aspects of RFRA, and still another source
of interpretive mischief, is its relationship to the Establishment Clause of
393. Lupu, Statutes, supra note 10, at 58-59 (footnotes omitted); see also Lupu, Separadonism,
supra note 114, at 275 ("[lIt is not obvious that Congress has the constitutional power to impose upon
the states a view of the Free Exercise Clause that the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected. Although
there are both institutional and substantive arguments available to advocates who may defend the Act,
none are close to invulnerable." (footnote omitted)).
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the First Amendment. Earlier in the Article, this relationship was
examined for the purpose of assessing the Act's constitutionality.3"
Assuming that the Act is facially constitutional, I would like to reexamine
these two sources of law to determine the potential modes of interplay
between them. At least three possibilities arise in this regard: (1) that
RFRA will affect the meaning of that Clause; (2) that RFRA somehow will
codify the current meaning of that Clause; and (3) that the interpretation
of the Clause will affect, and potentially restrict, the meaning of
RFRA390
First and most obviously, there should be some concern that RFRA's
effort to protect religious liberty will alter the current meaning of the
Establishment Clause. If we take RFRA at face value, of course, this
concern seems entirely unfounded. That is because, in Section Seven of
the Act, Congress specifically addresses and rejects this possibility:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect, interpret, or in
any way address... [the Establishment Clause]. Granting govern-
ment funding, benefits, or exemptions, to the extent permissible
under the Establishment Clause, shall not constitute a violation of this
chapter. As used in this section, the term 'granting,' used with
respect to government funding, benefits, or exemptions, does not
include the denial of government funding, benefits, or exemp-
tions.3
Yet, it is not clear that we should take the Act at face value. As a practical
matter, the proscription in Section Seven is highly formalistic and some-
what fanciful, for it seems to assume that the mere existence of a free
exercise statute will have no direct or indirect bearing on the Establishment
Clause and that judges will be able to maintain a wall of separation, if you
will, between the meaning of the Clause and the meaning of RFRA. We
394. See supra subpart II(A).
395. Professor Daniel Conkle has likewise exposed the potential for friction between RFRA and
the Free Speech Clause:
RFRA's interaction with freedom of expression could create more general doctrinal
confusion. In particular, if the Act is deemed to apply to religiously motivated speech,
such speech presumably would be protected, under the statute's strict scrutiny standard,
even from content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations. But the Supreme Court
does not apply strict scrutiny to such laws, regardless of whether the affected speech is
religious or nonreligious. Recognizing this potential problem, the House and Senate
Reports of RFRA each state that "where religious exercise involves speech, as in the case
of distributing religious literature, reasonable time, place and manner restrictions are
permissible consistent with First Amendment jurisprudence." The face of the statute,
however, suggests no such exception, and it may be difficult to construe the Act in the
manner that the reports suggest.
Conkle, supra note 23, at 37 (footnotes omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 88, supra note 71, at 9; and
S. REP. No. 111, supra note 86, at 13).
396. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993).
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know, however, that the enterprise of judicial interpretation is neither that
simple nor that constrainable and that legislative acts often have unintended
and unforeseen ripple effects, even when judges are acting in good faith.
What might some of these effects be in relation to Establishment
Clause doctrine? For one thing, if the constitutionality of RFRA is
challenged under the Clause, then it is very likely that a new or modified
Establishment Clause doctrine will emerge. For as I discussed earlier, the
constitutionality of RFRA under the Clause is not entirely clear,3" and
this uncertainty will force the Court to clarify-that is, to narrow or
expand-its doctrine. At the very least, an Establishment Clause prece-
dent, complete with inevitable and influential dicta, will exist that would
not have existed but for the Act. In turn, as the specific doctrine invoked
to uphold or invalidate the Act is altered, related doctrines will also be
altered, if only in minute ways. Additionally, even if RFRA is held to be
facially constitutional, it is highly probable that particular cases arising
under RFRA will implicate Establishment Clause concerns, such as exces-
sive entanglement or endorsement or preferentialism, and will therefore
result in new cases and the further potential for new or modified doctrine.
It is not difficult to envision, for example, a state agency defensively
raising a claim of entanglement based on the Act's least restrictive means
requirement. After all, if "least restrictive" regularly translates into "most
accommodating," then the likelihood of entanglement, if not also endorse-
ment, may be significant.
The second possible concern is that RFRA, instead of altering current
Establishment Clause doctrine, will do the exact opposite by effectively
codifying or "freezing" it. What makes this such a troubling prospect is
that this doctrine is substantially disliked by people of almost all ideological
and jurisprudential stripes.3 Of course, if we look once again to Sec-
tion Seven, this result would appear to be precluded by the Act, because
it would indeed amount to "affect[ing], interpret[ing], or in any way
address[ing]" the Establishment Clause."9 As with the first concern,
however, we cannot simply close our eyes, by statutory command, to the
likelihood of unanticipated and unintended effects resulting from the
introduction of RFRA into the legal environment. One could easily
imagine, for example, that courts, unconsciously or consciously, might be
hesitant to modify current Establishment Clause doctrine for fear that it
397. See supra subpart H(A).
398. See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, Religious Purpose, Inerrancy, and the Establishment Clause,
67 IND. L.J, 1, 1 (1991) ("The Supreme Court's establishment clause doctrine has been attacked from
all quarters.").
399. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993); see also Laycock, RFRA, supra note 17, at 244-45
(concluding that the words of the statute preclude the possibility that RFRA codifies existing
Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
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could affect the meaning of RFRA. Hence, courts receptive to RFRA may
be less willing to restrict the scope of permissible accommodation or to
expand the reach of the endorsement test, while courts unreceptive to
RFRA may be less willing to move in the opposite direction, even though
both would constitute acceptable modifications or extrapolations of current
doctrine. Likewise, to the extent that the Supreme Court is discontent with
RFRA's enactment, it may be less willing to make drastic revisions in its
nonestablishment doctrine-as it did in Smith regarding its free exercise
doctrine-lest Congress enact a statute similar to RFRA dealing specifically
with nonestablishment-we might call it the "Nonestablishment Restoration
Act." In short, and contrary to the wooden commands of the Act, judicial
interpretation does not transpire in a vacuum. And just as one cannot
assume, then, that RFRA will not alter the meaning of the Establishment
Clause, neither can one assume that RFRA will not effectively freeze its
meaning at present, notwithstanding the strict admonition of Section Seven.
The third and most serious concern in this realm is not RFRA's effect
on current Establishment Clause doctrine as such, but rather the impact of
that doctrine on the effective scope of RFRA. In Part I, it was demon-
strated that the language of the Act and the current corpus of free exercise
case law, animated by a judicial and governmental undervaluation of
religious liberty, could unduly restrict the scope and effectiveness of
RFRA's implementation. In the same way, there is a possibility that
several extant Establishment Clause doctrines or principles, once in the
hands of certain decisionmakers, could lead to relatively narrow readings
of the Act, thus further undermining its principal goal of providing broad
protection for religious exercise.' The doctrines and principles to
which I am referring are basically the same as those invoked when
assessing RFRA's constitutionality under the Establishment Clause. They
400. Consider the case of Fordham Univ. v. Brown, 856 F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1994), which
involved Fordham's challenge to a federal governmental determination that because the university's
radio station aired weekly broadcasts of a Catholic Mass, it was ineligible for special facilities funding.
In rejecting Fordham's claim under RFRA, the district court found no substantial burden as required
by the Act. Id. at 697. The court also concluded that even if there were a substantial burden, the
government should still prevail because its "attempt to comply with the Establishment Clause does
constitute a compelling interest." Id. Only one case, Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), is
cited as support for this conclusion, id., and the court provides not one sentence of legal analysis-and
for good reason, because Widmar simply does not stand for the broad and firm principle that an effort
to comply with the Establishment Clause is a compelling interest. Rather, as the Supreme Court noted
in a more recent case, the "Court suggested in W'tdar... that the interest of the State in avoiding
an Establishment Clause violation 'may be [a] compelling' one justifying an abridgment of free speech
otherwise protected by the First Amendment...." Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2148 (1993) (citation omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Widmar, 454
U.S. at 271). In turn, what Fordham illustrates is the ease with which judges may engage in narrow
readings of RFRA-in this case by essentially fabricating a rule that an "attempt to comply with the
Establishment Clause does constitute a compelling interest," Fordham, 856 F. Supp. at 697-underthe
guise of merely applying existing Establishment Clause doctrine.
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fall within two nonexclusive sets, one for assessing constitutionality in
general and the other for assessing constitutionality specifically in
accommodation situations, such as tax exemptions. The former set requires
that (1) there is a secular purpose; (2) the primary effect is not the
advancement or endorsement of religion; (3) there is no coercion; (4) there
is not excessive entanglement between religion and government; and (5)
there is no preferentialism for a particular religion or for religion in
general." 1 The latter set advises, but does not necessarily require, that
(1) the accommodation does not extend only to religious persons or insti-
tutions, and certainly not to specific religions at the exclusion of others; (2)
the exemption does not place undue burdens on either the accommodating
party (such as a claimant's employer) or nonbeneficiaries (such as a claim-
ant's fellow employees or taxpayers); (3) the-burden removed by accom-
modation is substantial or important; and (4) the accommodation facilitates,
but does not induce, religious belief or practice.'
The problem is that RFRA's mandate of governmental accommoda-
tion, even if facially constitutional, will inevitably lead to conflicts with
these doctrines. It was noted earlier, for example, that the implementation
of the Act would seem to pose a considerable risk of excessive entangle-
ment as government actors attempt to discern, perhaps with the assistance
of clergy, when their laws and policies might substantially burden the
exercise of religion.' The likelihood of entanglement, however, is
simply the most obvious example of an administrative conflict with non-
establishment doctrine. Another concern is the potential for burdening
nonbeneficiaries in the process of effecting accommodations-a factor that
is not mentioned in the Act, but one that the Court in Texas Monthly, Inc.
v. Bullock' considered relevant in striking down a state's accommoda-
tory taxation scheme.' Similarly, while the Act requires that one's
religious burden be substantial, it does hot address the related question of
inducement. This is problematic because the existence of a statutory right
to mandatory accommodations would seem to create a powerful source of
inducement and because the Court has previously expressed concern about
this very effect.' Furthermore, these are simply the problems that
401. See supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 221-26 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 270-78 and accompanying text.
404. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
405. See id. at 15 (explaining that a religious preference that is not required by the Free Exercise
Clause and that "burdens nonbeneficiaries markedly" sends a "message of endorsement to slighted
members of the community").
406. See McConnell, Response, supra note 212, at 700-02 (noting that under the Court's
accommodation analysis, an accommodation may become an unlawful establishment of religion if its
effect is to induce a person to adopt a religious belief in order to receive the benefits of the
accommodation).
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could arise under Establishment Clause doctrine as it is currently
formulated. The potential for conflict between the Clause and the Act
presumably would only increase should this doctrine take a more separa-
tionist, less accommodationist, turn in the coming years.'
B. The Independent Problems of Codifying Religious Liberty
Lastly, I turn to a variety of potential problems arising from the basic
concept of RFRA itself-that is, from the notion of codifying religious
liberty. Generally speaking, religious liberty in this country has been
formally and systematically protected through written constitutions, which
are enforced by courts against legislative and administrative actions.
RFRA seeks to change this pattern. To my knowledge, in fact, RFRA
represents the first congressional effort to superimpose upon the Court's
free exercise interpretations a general statutory framework for the
protection of religious liberty. Therefore, we should rightly be curious
and perhaps concerned about what effects, if any, this effort and resulting
framework will have on the conceptual and practical status of free
exercise.401
Most obviously, the effective transformation of free exercise into a
statutory right renders it vulnerable to congressional amendment, either
directly or, less conspicuously, through "riders." As Professor Laycock
notes,
[p]rotection for religious liberty was placed in the Constitution in
order to insulate religious liberty from shifts in political majorities.
Making the protection statutory necessarily subjects religious liberty
to shifting political majorities. The great danger is that in some time
of public excitement, Congress may amend RFRA to deny protection
to an unpopular religious practice, or that some interest group may
successfully demand an amendment denying protection to any reli-
gious practices that inconvenience or offend it.4
In addition, the scope of the statute effectively could be limited even
without an amendment, because Congress may exempt itself or any other
entity it chooses at any time as long as it does so expressly.41
407. For a recent discussion of the place of the separationist paradigm in the law of the First
Amendment, see Lupu, Separationism, supra note 114.
408. For a more general discussion of the effects of codifying entire areas of law, such as evidence
or commercial transactions, see Mark D. Rosen, What Has Happened to the Common Law?-Recent
American Codifications, and Their Impact on Judicial Practice and the Law's SubsequentDevelopment,
1994 Wis. L. REv. 1119 (concluding that the primary effect of codification upon the subsequent
development of an area of law is to restrict the conceptual approaches used by judges and attorneys).
409. Laycock, RFRA, supra note 17, at 254.
410. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(b) (Supp. V 1993) ("Federal statutory law adopted after
November 16, 1993, is subject to this chapter unless such law explicitly excludes such application by
reference to this chapter.").
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While the prospect of amendments and exemptions may seem a serious
concern, it should properly be viewed in comparison to the alternative
scenario of Employment Division v. Smith,4" which presumably would
define much of the world of free exercise had RFRA never been enacted.
For one thing, federal codification such as RFRA is basically the only
feasible, large-scale response to Smith, and, presumably, most claimants
will be no worse off with RFRA than with Smith alone. Hence, the risk
of amendment may simply be seen as a necessary cost of responding to
Smith via Congress. For another thing, the view that a constitutionalized
right is relatively safer or more stable than a codified right, given that the
amendment process is nore burdensome for the former and that judges are
bound to the doctrine of stare decisis, is called into question by Smith
itself. In turn, the prospect of statutory amendments may look no more
undesirable than the prospect of leaving the issue with the Court, because
the Court in Smith demonstrated an extraordinary ability, precedent not-
withstanding, to revise its own doctrines.
A more serious prospect concerns the likelihood that RFRA will hin-
der the advancement and protection of religious liberty through alternative
legal channels. For example, the wide reach of the Act will likely serve
as a disincentive to state legislatures and state courts to expand or develop
their own regime of free exercise protection. Just as relegating the
protection of rights to the federal courts, as was the habit prior to the last
decade, generally forestalls both federal and state legislative attempts also
to guarantee protection," relegating the protection of rights to Con-
gress-in this case relegating the protection of religious freedom to a
federal statutory context-may discourage both state legislative and judicial
efforts to provide enhanced protection through state sources of law, such
as statutes and constitutions. Moreover, even in cases in which it may
seem that RFRA mandates such efforts by legislatures, reality could very
well prove otherwise. "It seems possible that after passing this legislation,
Congress-and state legislatures-could be content to allow courts to deter-
mine when exemptions should be granted. Rather than drafting exemptions
into pending legislation, legislatures may wish to avoid such issues alto-
gether, particularly if they are controversial." 413
At the same time, the enactment and implementation of RFRA may
postpone indefinitely a reconsideration of Smith and the constitutional status
411. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
412. See Mark Tushnet, A Cholcefor Stabiity, LEGAL TIMES, June 21, 1993, at 26 ("[L]egal
victories can turn into political defeats: If winning plaintiffs relax their guard, relying on the courts to
protect them, they may find their gains eroded by legislatures responding to opponents mobilized by
the very fact of their courtroom defeat.").
413. Ryan, supra note 10, at 1440.
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of free exercise by the Supreme Court: "If the religious claim prevails
under the statute, there will be no need to reach the constitutional issue.
If the religious claim does not prevail under the statute, it cannot prevail
under any plausible constitutional test ... so there is still no need to
reconsider Smith. "414 In short, "RFRA may eliminate whatever chance
exists of correcting the constitutional law of free exercise."415 At least
one commentator has suggested that this is, in actuality, "not a large cost
[to the proponents of religious liberty], because there is little near-term
prospect that the Court will reconsider Smith."416 But that is not entirely
true, particularly given recent changes in the composition of the Court.
The Justices are divided anywhere from six-to-three to four-to-five on the
validity of Smith,417 and with the right set of facts, a reconsideration of
Smith might indeed have been forthcoming. Moreover, even if an over-
ruling of Smith was not realistically a near-term prospect, certainly its
scope could have been limited through subsequent constitutional free
exercise cases. With RFRA now on the books, however, the opportunity
for judicial reconsideration has been substantially eliminated. Hence,
unless and until Congress chooses to amend the Act or to exempt various
governmental actions from its scope, thus allowing litigants to ask the
Court to reconsider its own doctrine, it seems as though Smith is here to
stay.
414. Laycock, RFRA, supra note 17, at 254.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 255.
417. Of the original five Justices in the Smith majority, four remain-ChiefJustice Rehnquist and
Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy. Two other Justices-Justices O'Connor and Souter-have
explicitly challenged Smith's validity. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113
S. Ct. 2217, 2243-49 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at
2250 (Blackmun, J., joined by O'Connor, J., concurring in thejudgment); EmploymentDiv. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 891 (1990) (O'Connor, I., concurring in the judgment). Likewise, there is a fair
possibility that Justice Ginsburg will disagree with Smith, should the opportunity arise. See Goldman
v. Secretary of Defense, 739 F.2d 657, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the majority's decision to let stand a lower court ruling that had upheld the Air Force's right to prevent
an officer from wearing a yarmulke while on duty suggested "callous indifference" to the officer's
religion), aff'd sub nom. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); SENATE JUDICIARY COMM.,
NOMINATION OF RUTH BADER GINSBURG TO BE AN ASsOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPR4ME COURT, S. EXEC. REP. No. 6, 103d Cong., 1 st Sess. 27-28 (1993) (noting that the testimony
of nominee Ginsburg appeared to call Smith into question). As for Justices Thomas and Breyer, the
verdict is still out. For example, while free exercise cases such as New Life Baptist Church Academy
v. Town of East Longmeadow, 885 F.2d 940 (1st Cir. 1989) (rejecting a free exercise challenge to
state education requirements), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1066 (1990), suggest that Justice Breyer's
apparent pro-government orientation and instrumentalistic disposition may point away from a strong
jurisprudence of religious liberty, there is no indication that he would accept Smith's across-the-board
repudiation of the compelling interest test. Likewise, although Justice Thomas is often philosophically
aligned with Justice Scalia, he has not been given a meaningful opportunity to express his individual
views on the validity of the doctrine announced in Smith. But cf. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2226
(majority opinion, joined by Thomas, I.) (reaffirming the general rule of Smith).
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One certainly can imagine other problems arising from the codification
of religious liberty,418 but those listed above would appear to be the
major concerns. And, of course, none of these is necessarily an argument
against RFRA's enactment. Rather, they represent a statement of the costs
associated with that enactment, costs that presumably were deemed not to
outweigh the benefits of codification. More fundamentally, they represent
yet another source of limits on the exercise of legislative power, in this
case in terms of its actual capacity to function once introduced into the
extant legal environment. Like the cultural and constitutional limits
examined earlier, these functional limits serve to constrain the overall
effectiveness and utility of the Act and thus to remind us of the internal,
as well as external, limits of positive law.
IV. Conclusion
RFRA is a powerful statement of aspirations-the aspirations of
religious and nonreligious citizens alike who realize the immeasurable
importance of protecting free exercise from the carelessness, and
sometimes the callousness, of the legislative and administrative processes.
It is also a salient reminder that when it comes to the protection of liberty,
the received wisdom of the Warren Court era-that legislatures are the
perpetrators, and courts the redeemers-may not always be correct.1
Indeed, the much-celebrated possibility of using state constitutional law to
safeguard individual liberties,4 2° including the free exercise of
418. For example, the risk of inducement, as well as free-riding, may be greater under a conspicu-
ously prospective statute, such as RFRA, than it is under the seemingly more abstract, less accessible
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
419. As Justice Holmes said nine decades ago, "it must be remembered that legislatures are
ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts."
Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904). One commentator has specifically
argued that
faith in the courts in [the free exercise] area is misplaced, and that religious groups and
individuals fared better in the legislatures than in the courts before the Smith decision.
Indeed, perhaps the most lasting and helpful legacy of the case will be that it finally
dispelled the mistaken notion that courts were the leading institutional protectors of
religious liberty.
Ryan, supra note 10, at 1413.
420. When it became apparent in the late 1970s and 1980s that the Court was beginning to narrow
its interpretation of certain liberties under the Constitution, the fashionable alternative'was toward
increased and expansive state court interpretations of state constitutions as a means of securing their
protection. See Symposium, The Emergence of State ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959 (1985)
(discussing how declining federal intervention in state issues resulted in the growth of state constitu-
tional jurisprudence because of a perceived need to protect individual rights and compensate for
Supreme Court retrenchments). This move was called by some the "new judicial federalism." E.g.,
Donald E. Batterson, A Trend Ephemeral? Eternal? Neither?: A DurationalLook at the New Judicial
Federalism, 42 EMoRY L.J. 209, 210 & n.5 (1993); Louise Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism:
Where We Are Now, 19 GA. L. REv. 1075, 1075 (1985). Justice Brennan was one of the earliest, and
certainly the most noted, of the advocates for this institutional shift. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State
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religion,42 seems at best to be an uncertain and unreliable enterprise,421
and it is not surprising that some rights advocates have turned to Congress
to vindicate their positions.4' In many respects, RFRA is part of this
pattern, and its proponents should be congratulated for their overwhelming
legislative success.
Whether RFRA will ultimately prove constitutional, effective, or even
desirable, however, is a different question entirely. As for its constitu-
tionality, this Article has argued that the issue is neither as simple nor as
settled as some of RFRA's proponents have insisted and that there are
sufficient bases in both precedent and principle to conclude that the Act
independently transgresses the Establishment Clause as well as Congress's
power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the
Court's accommodation jurisprudence is arguably broad enough to encom-
pass the Act, its particular and unprecedented nature, as well as its demand
that courts engage in a form of balancing specifically abandoned in the
Smith decision on institutional grounds, may be enough to jeopardize its
constitutional validity. Likewise, while the Court's cases under Section
Five could fairly be construed in favor of upholding the Act, there are too
Constitutions and the Protection ofIndividual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 502 (1977) ("Every
believer in our concept of federalism, and I am a devout believer, must salute this developmentin our
state courts."); William 3. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: 77Te Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 550 (1986) ("This rebirth
of interest in state constitutional law should be greeted with equal enthusiasm by all those who support
our federal system, liberals and conservatives alike.").
421. The Smith decision seemingly has precipitated the calls for state constitutional protection of
religious liberty. See, e.g., Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise:
An Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 275, 275-76 (arguing that Smith
motivated four state supreme courts to interpret their constitutions to provide more protection of free
exercise rights than the federal constitution); Tracey I. Levy, Rediscovering Rights: State Courts
Reconsider the Free Exercise Clauses of Their Oye Constitutions in the Wake of Employment Division
v. Smith, 67 TEMp. L. REv. 1017 (1994) (noting the shift from federal to state constitutional law to
protect free exercise); Stuart 0. Parsell, Note, Revitalization of the Free Exercise of Religion Under
State Constitutions: A Response to EmploymentDivision v. Smith, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 747
(1993) ("Instead of using the current First Amendment analysis articulated in Smith . . ., state courts
have been providing broader free exercise protection by relying solely or independently on state
constitutional free exercise clauses."). The lag may have resulted from a belief that free exercise, like
free speech, would withstand the Court's conservative metamorphosis.
422. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MicH. L.
REV. 761,763-64 (1992) (claiming that "contrary to the claims of New Federalism, state constitutional
law today is a vast wasteland of confusing, conflicting, and essentially unintelligible pronouncements"
and "the failure of state courts to develop a coherent discourse of state constitutional law.., reflects
* a failure of state constitutionalism itself"). For a variety of critical responses to Gardner's thesis,
see Roundtable, Responses to James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 24
RUTGERS LJ. 927 (1993); David Schuman, A Failed Critique of State Constitutionalism, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 274, 280 (1992).
423. See, e.g., Freedom of Choice Act, H.R. 25, H.R. 1068 & S. 25, 103d Cong., 1st Sesas.
§ 2(A)(1) (1993) (attempting to codify the abortion right announced in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973)). The proposed statute is carefully examined in Lupu, Statutes, supra note 10, at 37-52.
Texas Law Review [Vol. 73:247
many unanswered questions regarding the scope of Section Five, and too
many novel aspects of RFRA, to know with certainty which way the Court
will rule. Given the political and institutional interests at stake, it probably
would be wiser to wager in favor of its constitutionality, but that is much
more a prudential assessment than a doctrinal one.4'
As for its effectiveness, there should be serious concern about the
capacity of RFRA, as a creature of positive law, to be fully implemented
within a cultural context that may not place a premium on religious liberty,
particularly of the nonmainstream variety, and within a doctrinal context
that leaves substantial room for judges to render restrictive interpretations
of the Act-a problem that is only compounded by the Act's undefined and
pliable language. It is too early, of course, to know whether these
concerns will be fully or ultimately borne out in actual litigation. In
litigation thus far, there have been several losses,4' several nominal
424. See generally Carter, supra note 354, at 863, 862-63 & n.136 (distinguishing between
constitutional interpretation based on "a reading of the minds of the Justices" and constitutional
interpretation based solely on doctrine and statutory language).
425. See, e.g., Vemonv. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385, 1393 (9th Cir.) (affirming summary
judgment under the Act against an assistant police chief who "failed to meet the threshold test of
establishing that his right freely to exercise his religion was substantially burdened" by a city investiga-
tion into whether his religious beliefs were interfering with his police duties), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
510 (1994); Merritt-Bey v. Delo, 26 F.3d 127 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiffs had failed to
show under RFRA that their exercise of religion was substantially burdened by an alleged discrim-
ination in the allocation of prison funding to prisoner religious groups); United States v. Brock, 863
F. Supp. 851, 866-67 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (holding that the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
of 1994 (FACE) posed no substantial burden on defendants' conduct and, even if a substantial burden
had been shown, the statutory interests in preventing violence and ensuring access to clinics were
compelling and were furthered by the least restrictive means); Riely v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693, 709
(D. Ariz. 1994) (finding that FACE did not burden the plaintiffs' free exercise of religion because the
plaintiffs failed to allege that their religion advocated or mandated the statutorily proscribed behavior);
Prins v. Coughlin, No. 94-2053, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10564, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1994)
(denying a prisoner's application for an injunction to stay a pending transfer to another prison because
the prisoner failed to show that the kosher menu at the new prison was so insufficient that it burdened
his free exercise of religion); Boone v. Commissioner of Prisons, No. CIV.A.93-5074,1994U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10027, at *19-*27 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 1994) (finding that confiscation of personal documents
by prison authorities, a 15-day cell restriction, and prison regulations prohibiting group meetings
without approval and supervision were not substantial burdens on the prisoners' free exercise of
religion); Fordham Univ. v. Brown, 856 F. Supp. 684, 697 (D.D.C. 1994) (finding that the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration's denial of a funding request for a university radio
station whose programming included a Sunday broadcast of Catholic Mass did not burden anyone's
exercise of religion because "[i]n no way is a failure to subsidize a 'burden'"); Council for Life
Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422, 1430 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (finding that FACE placed no burden
on the plaintiffs' religious exercise because they "did not contend that it is part of their exercise of
religion to make ingress to or egress from a facility impossible, unreasonably difficult, or hazardous,
which is what is prohibited by the statute"); American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 855 F. Supp. 137,
144 (E.D. Va. 1994) (finding that FACE placed no burden on religious exercise when "the plaintiffs
[had] not alleged ... and [did] not contend ... that physical obstruction of abortion clinics is a
sacrament or important ritual to their observance of their faith"); In re Faulkner, 165 B.R. 644 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1994) (holding that RFRA does not exempt religious charitable contributions from scrutiny
in a Chapter Seven discharge proceeding); Allah v. Beyer, No. 92-0651 (GEB), 1994 U.S. Dist.
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victories, 4  two clear victories,4' and at least one decision that split
LEXIS 14340, at *18-*20 (D.NJ. Mar. 29, 1994) (denying an inmate's RFRA application for a
preliminary injunction against his transfer to another prison because the state demonstrated a compelling
state interest in maintaining the prison's security, and an interstate transfer was the least restrictive
means to accomplish that interest); Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 280
n.9 (Alaska) (holding that a state could prohibit a landlord from discriminating against unmarried
potential tenants, despite the landlord's claim under RFRA that the prohibition violated his religious
beliefs), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994).
426. See, e.g., Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F. Supp. 538
(D.D.C. 1994) (granting summaryjudgment on RFRA grounds to allow a church to operate a homeless
feeding program in violation of a zoning ordinance); Powell v. Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343, 1347 (D.
Colo. 1994) (granting summary judgment and thereby rejecting a theology teacher's ADEA claim
against a Catholic school because the government's "interest in eradicating age discrimination ... is
not compelling in light of the fundamental right of a church to determine who may be trusted with the
spiritual function of teaching its ecclesiastical doctrine under the free exercise clause"); Lawson v.
Dugger, 844 F. Supp. 1538, 1542 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (holding that prior restrictions on a prisoner's use
of Hebrew literature violated RFRA); Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F. Supp. 194, 208-09 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (granting preliminary injunctive relief against a prison ban on the possession and wearing of
religious beads because of New York's failure to demonstrate that an outright ban was the least
restrictive means of preserving order in the prison); Smith v. Fair Employment& Hous. Comm'n, 30
Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 403-05 (Ct. App.) (holding unconstitutional a state prohibition on housing discrim-
ination on the basis of one's marital status because it prevented a landlord from engaging in such
discrimination in accordance with her religious convictions), review granted by 880 P.2d 111 (Cal.
1994).
I say 'nominal" victories because not one of these cases can clearly support the proposition that
RFRA has independent legal force; the decisions turn mostly on judicial predisposition or other sources
of law. In Western Presbyterian Church, 862 F. Supp. at 538, for example, the judge found that the
activity of feeding the homeless "happens to provide, at no cost to the city, a sorely needed social
service" and that "[i]t is difficult to imagine a more worthwhile program." Id. at 546. Moreover, the
court expressly held in favor of the church under both the RFRA and the First Amendment, thus calling
into question the former's independent potency. Finally, there is some question as to the existence of
a real controversy insofar as "[t]he District of Columbia concede[d] that 'it ha[d] no compelling
government interest.., so long as appropriate controls are in place." Id. at 545. Likewise, the
decision in Powell turned principally on a line of ADEA cases, Powell, 859 F. Supp. at 1346-47, not
to mention the fact that the judge also found independent violations of both the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses, id. at 1349. As for Lawson, the court already had held for the same claimants
eight years earlier, rendering the more recent decision merely a reaffirmance of its original holding.
Lawson, 844 F. Supp. at 1539. In Campos, thejudge enjoined a prison's practice of confiscating beads
worn by Santerian claimants. Campos, 854 F. Supp. at 197. This probably could be called a RFRA
success, although it is noteworthy that it was only a preliminary ruling and that the prison
administration's total ban on some, but not all, religious symbols was so obviously irrational, see id.
at 204 n.7 (concluding that the ban "does not satisfy the less onerous reasonableness standard in
existence prior to the passage of the Act'), that RFRA was theoretically unnecessary. Finally, the
California Court of Appeals in Smith specifically held that "RFRA afford[ed] plaintiff no greater
protection than that to which she [was] already entitled [under Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990), and the California Constitution]." Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 410. In other words, the
Act proved basically superfluous.
427. See Cheema v. Thompson, No. 94-16097, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160, at *11 (9th Cir.
Sept. 2, 1994) (holding, for purposes of a preliminary injunction, that a public school could not, under
RFRA, prohibit the wearing in school of ceremonial knives (Kirpans) by children baptized into the
Khalsa Sikh religion because a total ban, even though generally applicable, was not the least restrictive
means to serve the school's compelling interest in safety); Hamilton v. Schriro, 863 F. Supp. 1019
(W.D. Mo. 1994) (holding, under RFRA, that a Missouri prison could not, pursuant to its existing
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the difference.' Many cases have simply resulted in a remand or denial
of summary judgment because parties in pending cases had not prepared
their arguments to conform to the Act's compelling interest
requirement.' 2 Nevertheless, the concerns raised in this Article are real,
for they rest on nothing less than the manipulable nature of both pre-Smith
free exercise case law and the Act's language as well as the cultural setting
in which the Act will be interpreted over the coming years.
All of which is to remind us that, in the end, there is much more to
the protection of religious liberty than simply the passage of a statute-the
erection of a parchment barrier. The forces that limit legislative power are
as varied and complex as the interests and dynamics that underlie our
culture and thus our system of law. In the case of RFRA, these forces
range from the relatively straightforward problem of its constitutionality,
to the somewhat less. straightforward issue of adverse collateral conse-
quences, to the highly complex problem of cultural-legal dissonance. The
extent to which the Act can successfully weather these forces, and thus the
extent to which it will actually advance the cause of religious freedom,
simply remains to be seen. Such judgments are best reserved for the
scholars and critics of the future, not for the advocates of the present.
regulations, restrict the hair length of a Native American inmate and had to accommodate the inmate's
religious obligation to perform sweat lodge ceremonies).
428. See Hunt v. Hunt, 648 A.2d 843, 851-54 (Vt. 1994) (holding that mandatory child support
does not violate RFRA, despite direct conflict with religious tenets, but holding that the contempt order
arising from the failure to pay violated RFRA because it was not shown to be the least restrictive means
of furthering the state's interest).
429. See, e.g., Smith v. Elkins, No. 93-15185,1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 4293, at *6 (9th Cir. Mar.
2, 1994) (remanding the issue of whether a prison could prohibit non-English prayer to allow the prison
an opportunity to show a compelling interest under RFRA); Celestial Church of Christ, Inc. v. City
of Chicago, No. 93 C 7610, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8380, at *1 (N.D. I. June 21, 1994) (denying
a motion to dismiss and entering a stay to allow the parties to brief their arguments in light of RFRA
standards); Allah v. Menei, 844 F. Supp. 1056, 1063 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (denying summary judgment
becausethe state failed to assert a compelling interest under RFRA); Rust v. Clarke, 851 F. Supp. 377,
380 (D. Neb. 1994) (denying summary judgment because the defendant failed to argue under the new
RFRA standard); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994) (reversing summary
judgment for two apartment owners charged with violating a Massachusetts law forbidding landlords
to discriminate among tenants based upon marital status because there existed a factual issue whether
the state's interest in enforcing the law was compelling enough tojustify the substantial burden it placed
upon the religious practice of the owners, who believed it sinful to facilitate fornication).
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